

EL SUEÑO AMERICANO, ES PARA TODOS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORIC
TOWARD LATINOS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS OF BILL CLINTON
AND GEORGE W. BUSH, 1992-2000

A Dissertation

by

KRISTINA MARIA CAMPOS

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2009

Major Subject: Communication

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ABSTRACT

El Sueño Americano, Es Para Todos: An Analysis of the Rhetoric toward Latinos in the Presidential Campaigns of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 1992-2000. (August 2009)

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This dissertation examined the presidential elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000 for the narrative tools used to persuade Latino voters. Using Walt Fisher's narrative theory, I evaluated the various parts of the American Dream myth, looking specifically at the characters and settings used in the candidate's narrative. Then, I evaluated the values in those narratives through the lens of the Plan of Delano, specifically looking for ways these candidates actually reinforced important Latino values.

The new tellings of the American Dream myth valued specific characters—characters that had been blessed by the American Dream. Clinton's 1992 character had to work to gain success, but he was also blessed. George P. Bush (George W. Bush's nephew) was another character blessed by the American Dream. As a first-generation American, he represented the hope that brings many to America; the idea that their children could have opportunities the parents could not.

The settings of the American Dream story were also important. These settings varied greatly—from the decrepit and desolate to the fanciful and idyllic—but they represented all the different places where the American Dream is possible.

Hope, Arkansas is not a place where much hope seems to exist. But even a community as impoverished as Hope can be the birthplace of a President, because of the amazing ability of the Dream to permeate even the darkest corners of America. The barrios of the Southwest appear to be hopeless, but as Clinton's telling of the myth reminded Latinos, even people growing up in the barrios should have hope—because the American Dream can exist anywhere.

These values, these characters, these settings have added to the rich rhetorical history of the American Dream myth. These presidential candidates expanded the places where that hope could reach, and the people who could be blessed by the Dream. All of this culminated in a story that Latinos could relate to, that they shared in and that rhetorically persuaded them to believe in these candidates.

To Téa,
sine qua non.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: LATINOS IN AMERICA

Electing an American president has always been a difficult task: influenced by the power of the media, lobbyists, and advertisements—campaigning represents partisanship at its best, or worst.¹ However, the task has become even more complex given the nation’s increased diversity. During the last forty years, ethnic groups’ influence over the electoral process has grown. What we now call “interest” politics has become a critical part of the election process.² “Interest” politics include many different groups—such as soccer moms and NASCAR Dads—but some of the most influential groups are ethnically based. Politicians must learn to engage these increasingly important groups.³

Hispanics are one such major “interest” group.⁴ Over the last several decades, American culture has become “Latinized.” As actor Antonio Banderas argued in 2002 to a convention of television advertisers, “Latinos are hot, and we are not the only ones who think so. Everyone wants to jump on the bandwagon, and why not? We have the greatest art, music, and literature. It is time we tell our stories.”⁵ In the 2000 Census the Hispanic population was at 38.8 million or 13.5% of the total U.S. population, up 57.9% from the 1990 census.⁶ Whether through the filtration of the Hispanic culture into mainstream popular culture or through the constantly growing legal and illegal Latino communities, American politics has likewise been infused with a Latin element.⁷ Latinos’ concentration in more populated states makes them an important political force.

This dissertation follows the style of the *Quarterly Journal of Speech*.

With 88% of the Latino population concentrated in California, Texas, Florida, New York, Arizona, Illinois, New Mexico, New Jersey, Colorado and Virginia, it influences the 232 electoral votes of those eleven states. During the 2004 election many of those states, except for California, Texas, Massachusetts and Illinois, represented swing states.¹

Presidential campaigns have begun to reach out to this important contingent. The *Washington Post*, *Univision* and the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute's 2004 poll found that 40% of registered Hispanic voters felt that in the 2004 presidential campaign both Bush and Kerry made a sincere effort to reach out to Hispanics.² In the end, it appeared that Bush connected with the Hispanic community more than his opponent, John Kerry. The numbers are not conclusive, but according to Republican leaders, Bush won 44% of the Latino vote, up almost nine points from the 2000 election.³ The Democratic numbers show that Bush won closer to 34 % of the Hispanic vote.⁴ Regardless, Bush and the Republicans appeared to be making inroads with the Hispanic community: Hispanics' support for the Democratic Party has been decreasing since 1996 when Clinton won 72% of the Latino vote.⁵ However Democrats regained their foothold in 2008, President Barack Obama gained 67% of the Hispanic vote, the reason for this shift is still being explored by researchers across the nation.⁶

Recent campaigns have identified the Latino population as an important contingent. Latinos, as a voting block, have not shown their power politically, despite several elections being coined (by the media) as the "Year of the Hispanic," none of those predictions have come true.⁷ Yet, the United States borders on becoming a Latino

nation. As journalist and Hispanic political scholar Jorge Ramos asserts, “Hispanics will elect the next American President.”⁸

This dissertation will argue that presidential candidates have been able to reach the Latino population through the use of narratives—specifically the story of the American Dream—and that Latinos have helped elect candidates who campaign in a way that suggests those candidates understand Latinos better than their opponents. In this chapter, I will take a closer look at what it means to be Hispanic, what differentiates Latinos from the general population, the history of minority political power in the United States, an analysis of narratives and the American Dream and how that Dream is interpreted by Latinos, specifically looking at the Plan of Delano.

Who Is Latino?

The difficulty in defining the terms Latino or Hispanic comes from their interchangeability. These terms appear simple, and yet represent a broad range of people. The term Latino relates to the ancient region Latium in modern-day Italy.⁹ It also refers to “a native or inhabitant of Latin America, [or] a person of Latin-American origin living in the U.S.”¹⁰ People who reject the term Latino often do so because they argue that they do not speak Latin.¹¹ Hispanic means “of, relating to or being a person of Latin American descent living in the U.S.; *especially* one of Cuban, Mexican, or Puerto Rican origin.”¹² The etymology of ‘Hispanic’ has its roots in Hispania, the antiquated name for the Iberian Peninsula. Connotatively, it also refers to Spanish conquests during the medieval period, which is why some refuse to use this term.¹³ However, Hispanic was the legal term used in the U.S. Census from 1970 until 2000.¹⁴

Both terms, Latino and Hispanic, only have meaning in the United States because they refer to those who live within this nation. Among other Hispanics, both in the United States and abroad, Latinos refer to themselves based on their ancestry. For example, I would say I am Mexicana y Uruguaya (Mexican and Uruguayan). This delineates my ancestry to anyone who might ask; clearly, there is not a box for “Mexicana y Uruguaya” in the Census reports, so I tend to check “Hispanic.”¹⁵

The other problem with defining who *is* Hispanic involves the issue of race. As historian George J. Sanchez found when he asked a Mexican American history class to fill out a questionnaire about their ethnicity [identical to the U.S. Census] at the University of Southern California:

All Americans were asked whether they had “Hispanic ancestry” and then, in a separate question what their own racial background was. This second question allowed for multiple responses, but did not include a category for Mexican or Latino as a race. . . . One student explained that all the members of her family had answered the racial question differently, depending on their own self-identities. Her father had checked “white,” whereas her mother had checked both “white and Indian.” She herself had checked “other” and filled in “Mexican” as her racial designation.¹⁶

This anecdote represents the problem of identity facing Latinos: some do not consider themselves “white” (and some purposefully refuse to use this term because of connotations about white supremacy and loss of culture) and many do not consider themselves “black,” so they tend to feel invisible in America’s over-simplified black and white society.¹⁷

Researchers in sociology, history and Chicano studies have identified two factors that unify this diverse population. These characteristics separate the Hispanic population from the general population: “having experienced a colonial relationship to the United

States as a people, and having come to the continental United States as an immigrant/migrant group.”¹⁸ The U. S. Census divided Hispanics into four major ethnicities: Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban and Other. Of the 35.3 million Hispanics identified in the 2000 Census, 20.7 million (59%) were Mexican, 3.0 million (8.5%) were Puerto Rican, 1.4 million (4%) were Cuban, 6.6 million (18.6%) identified as Other (South/Central American and Other).¹⁹ The three largest groups tend to be the most vocal, therefore gaining the most attention from political candidates. The three largest groups do share the immigrant experience, and do have the experience of colonialism by the United States.²⁰ This shared experience places them under the “Hispanic/Latino” umbrella.

Because of differences in histories, these three groups are culturally separate which makes it difficult to lump them together under one name.²¹ Each group has retained its own culture and identity. These different histories have also led to differences in their views of U.S. politics, opportunity and economic status. Discussing each major group separately will allow for a more accurate view of the power of socialization, and the differences in each group.

The History of Latinos

It is difficult to say where Mexican-American history began. During the 1640s when Spaniard José Francisco Canales first landed in the “New World,” he settled near modern day Monterrey. Through Spanish colonialism, the Mexican peninsula was quickly taken over. In the 1800’s when Irish, British and German settlers began to head west, they confronted the Spanish and Native communities, and began to take over the

continent. The new settlers threatened Mexicans, questioning their claim on land that they had owned, lived on, and worked for generations. In 1846 when Texas became a part of the United States, many Mexicans became U.S. citizens overnight. Mexicans, especially in South Texas, were seen as obstacles to progress, because they owned valuable land, or because of their “backwards” ways; consequently, violence became a daily occurrence.²² In 1855, a reporter for *Galveston Weekly News* reported the lynching of eleven Mexicans, “The whole race of Mexicans here is becoming a useless commodity, becoming cheap, dog cheap. Eleven Mexicans, it is stated, have been found along the Nueces [River] in a hung up condition. Better so than to be left on the ground for the howling lobos to tear in pieces, and then howl the more for the red peppers that burn his insides raw.”²³ Mexican Americans faced violence like this almost daily. Some scholars have compared the violence to the horrors faced by African-Americans in the Deep South.²⁴ Despite the work of a few Mexicans to stop the encroachment of Anglos on their land, most Mexicans lost their land, their rights and the peace that independence had offered. This discrimination continued until the 1960s when the civil rights movement began to make differences in the Deep South, including Texas. Today, most Mexicans reside in the Southwest (Texas, California New Mexico and Arizona), a large population also resides in Illinois.²⁵ While Mexican immigrants have faced the problem of being dominated on their own soil, Cuban and Puerto Rican immigrants have had a very different immigrant experience.

At the end of World War II the world’s politics had changed drastically: there were two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and many newly independent

countries. Consequently, the two superpowers worked to control the smaller countries and to ideologically co-opt the leaders of these small nations. President Truman created a foreign aid policy that would allow for this ideological warfare: the Point Four Program.²⁶ Proposed in his January 20, 1949 Inaugural Address, the program was based literally on the fourth point of his speech: “We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”²⁷ Congress approved the program in June of 1950.²⁸ San Juan, Puerto Rico became the headquarters for the Point Four Program because the U. S. government agreed to remake Puerto Rico into a model of American capitalism for the Third World.²⁹ This included eliminating the shantytowns in San Juan (which made up almost fifty percent of housing), raise the yearly income of each household, and conceal Puerto Rico’s colonial status. The American government and the Puerto Rican government accomplished these goals by designating Puerto Rico a U.S. Commonwealth, including giving federal assistance to build a better infrastructure. Second, the governments created Operation Bootstrap, which was used to attract U.S. businesses to the island, and finally, they initiated a program of lower airfare costs to promote migration from the island to the mainland.³⁰ For the U.S. government, the Point Four Program was a success, more than thirty thousand government officials went to Puerto Rico and trained with the program. However, the program had some negative consequences as well.

The poorest citizens of Puerto Rico migrated to the U.S., where they continued to live in poverty. Offered no assistance by the government, their fate was sealed as some

of the poorest citizens of this nation.³¹ More than a million Puerto Ricans lived in the United States by the mid-1960s.³² Most Puerto Ricans have settled in the Northeast (61%) -- primarily in New York, however, there is a small group (14%) in Florida.³³ While Cubans and Puerto Ricans have shared in the colonial experience of American domination, the federal government has treated them very differently.

Both Cuban and Puerto Rican migration to the United States began as an answer to the geopolitical climate, and at the behest of the American government. Cubans began migrating to the United States after the communist revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power in 1959.³⁴ This revolution changed geopolitical power structures for two reasons: first, it brought America's worst fear, communism, to within 100 miles of the border. Second, it created an excellent opportunity for propaganda about the superiority of capitalism and democracy. After the military debacle of the Bay of Pigs, American foreign policy focused on an ideological war with Castro. America began a trade embargo against Cuba in 1964, which continues to this day. As George W. Ball, undersecretary of the State Department argued in 1964, an important component of the embargo was a philosophical war. "The objectives which this program can accomplish are to demonstrate to the peoples of the American Republics that Communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere. . . . to make plain to the people of Cuba . . . that the present regime cannot serve their interests."³⁵ The government began a Cuban Refugee Program that assisted refugees by allowing them access to the United States, giving them a fast track for citizenship, job training, language classes, educational support, education loans, health care and financial assistance to support their move. In the fifteen years

between 1961 and 1974, the U.S. government spent \$1.3 billion in aid to approximately seven hundred thousand Cuban refugees.³⁶

The refugees who arrived in the U.S. were from the higher classes in Cuban society, mostly managers, military officers, doctors, lawyers, scientists and their families.³⁷ In 1962, when the Cuban Refugee Program was originally discussed, President John F. Kennedy explained why helping Cubans was important: “From the earliest days of our history, this land has been a refuge for the oppressed . . . helping those who are forced to flee to maintain their lives as . . . human-beings.”³⁸ President Johnson also worked to protect and aide refugees from Cuba with the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, which made Cuban immigrants instantly eligible for Medicaid, food stamps, public health assistance, business credit and start-up loans for their business ventures.³⁹ The CIA also employed about twelve thousand Cubans by 1962; the CIA was one of the largest employers in Miami. These opportunities and government-funded programs allowed many Cuban immigrants to have a higher standard of living than most immigrants were enjoying at the time.⁴⁰

Even today, most Cubans continue to reside in the south Florida area.⁴¹ Cubans are the most successful subgroup of the Hispanic ethnicity. For example, fifty percent of Mexicans do not have a high school degree, compared to only twenty-nine percent of Cubans. Only eleven percent of Cubans live below the poverty line, whereas twenty-five percent of Mexicans and forty-three percent of Puerto Ricans live in poverty.⁴² Government programs created for Cuban immigrants in the 1960’s have led to some problems between Cubans and other Latino groups, as none of the other immigrant

groups had access to help from the government. This rift between groups has led to both a philosophical and political polarization between Puerto Ricans, Mexicans and Cubans; however, political candidates continue to treat them as a homogenous group.

The modern Hispanic community has kept many of the characteristics and ideals of their immigrant fore parents, which makes it difficult to create a message to touch this unique and diverse community; therefore, it is important that we understand who they are. Despite the differences in these groups, the present analysis follows in the footsteps of other scholars and studies Hispanics as a unified whole. There are several reasons why I chose this path. First, this constitutes the way that the various political entities treat the Latino community. A great deal of the statistical research does not make distinctions among the various facets of this group, and it would be difficult to draw distinctions the research does not provide. Second, as other scholars have noted, it is important to focus on what this community has in common with the larger national community, not what separates them. For the most part I will deal with the group in a panethnic (general) way. There will be a few notable exceptions, as they relate specifically to the criticism.

Characteristics of the Latino Community

The Latino community holds unique values and ideas that are vital to understanding their political ideology. In many ways Latinos differ greatly from mainstream American culture, a problem that has caused trouble as Latinos assimilate into American culture. Hispanic's assimilation into American culture occurs more slowly than many other minorities. Latinos have assimilated into American culture in

some ways, but in other ways, its members refuse to conform. For example, Hispanics have exported the ideals of democracy and a market economy to their home countries. Nevertheless, in other areas, such as culture, and the adoption of values, Latinos refuse to change.⁴³ Hispanics differ because of their commitment to the Spanish language, views on culture, family and religious values and the role of democracy.

Whereas Spanish was once the main connection between people of Latin descent, the power of the Spanish language is faltering in many Hispanic households; it still connects Latinos, but subsequent generations are not as bound by language as their ancestors. Many second- and third-generation immigrants do not speak fluent Spanish; 93 percent of second-generation Hispanics are bilingual or speak English predominantly.⁴⁴ Many young Hispanics have begun to lose full command of the language, and have therefore begun to speak a mixture of Spanish and English.⁴⁵ Spanglish is growing more and more popular, especially in the Southwest, and has also begun to infiltrate popular culture. Spanish-speaking television stations (such as Univision and Telemundo) use a mixture of Spanish and English phrases in their news programs. This practice does cause some criticism from the community, especially from people who would like to preserve Spanish in its most correct form. However, as Noticiero Univision anchor Jose Ramos argues in his book *The Latino Wave*, “We speak the way we live, and--far from denoting a lack of depth or dedication--our language simultaneously expresses conflict and an expansive wealth of culture.”⁴⁶ While the use of Spanish connects candidates with the Latino community, being able to speak Spanish is not the key. Understanding the values, opinions and mindset of the Hispanic

community allows a candidate to connect with Hispanics. In order to understand Latino voters, one must first understand their culture and their country of origin.

Cultural differences cause a distinction between Hispanic voters and Anglo voters, especially related to issues of assimilation. Despite their movement to the United States, many Hispanic immigrants (and their children) tend to stay very connected both financially and emotionally with their nations of origin.⁴⁷ In countries such as Mexico, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, remittances have become an important part of the national economy.⁴⁸ In El Salvador remittance averaged more than a billion dollars a year, and became the largest source of foreign exchange.⁴⁹ Emotionally, many Hispanics view themselves as world citizens, and therefore feel both “here” (America), and “there” (their ancestral country). Sociologist Peggy Levitt has argued that the “social remittances” of Dominican and Brazilian immigrants has affected the values, social and cultural practices of those still living in their country of origin, because expatriates export American ideals and thinking along with the financial assistance they offer to family abroad.⁵⁰

Even the religious community has allowed Latinos to keep their cultural heritage, while still worshipping in a Euro-dominated church. The Catholic Church in particular, has allowed for the combination of traditional Latino practices into the structured liturgy, by allowing the liturgy to be spoken in Spanish. These same allowances are not given to other ethnic groups, and many believe that the Church’s leniency directly relates to the number of Latinos in the laity.⁵¹ As Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa argues, “This is the first time in history where a community originating

outside the United States has not been subject to the homogenizing process of the cultural melting pot . . . in order to be recognized as ‘Americans.’”⁵²

Hispanics are participants in the political system, and for the most part support American policy and cultural values (such as equal opportunity and the importance of education).⁵³ However, Hispanics differ from the general population when it comes to questions of social policy, and this represents the area that has caused problems for the Democratic Party. Large numbers of Latinos oppose abortion (77 percent), homosexual marriage or adoption (72 percent) and divorce (40 percent); these numbers are about twenty percent higher than the Anglo-American population. Moreover, these same Latino voters believe that the morals and values in the United States are deteriorating (72 percent), and feel that Hispanic families are stronger than white families (79 percent).⁵⁴

Latinos’ values tend to vary greatly from the general American population, which affects this community’s political views. Whereas twenty-five percent of Americans claim to have no religious preference, only thirteen percent of Latinos deny any religious affiliation.⁵⁵ Moreover, research demonstrates that religious Latinos tend to be Catholic, more than seventy-percent of Mexicans, sixty-five percent of Puerto Ricans and seventy-five percent of Cubans self-identify as Catholics.⁵⁶ Hispanics also make religion a daily part of their life more often than their American counterparts do: less than half (41%) of Mexican-Americans attend church at least once a month, which is only slightly higher than the Anglo number (30%). Nevertheless, Latinos keep religion around them on an informal basis: more than three-fourths of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans have home altars, are involved in pilgrimages and light candles in church on a

regular basis.⁵⁷ These beliefs have led to a disconnection between Latinos and Anglo-Americans because many Hispanic's views of the Anglo-American family and American values are greatly affected by their religiosity. In addition, this strong connection to faith also affects Latinos' politics.

Most Americans believe that participation is a part of democracy; however, Latinos as a group are absent from the polls. Unlike their Anglo or even African-American counterparts, Latino voters have tended to be apathetic toward partisan politics.⁵⁸ Despite research that argues that most Hispanics identify with the Democratic Party (more than two to one), that connection does not translate into party loyalty. Roberto Suro, director of the Pew Hispanic Center concluded the 2002 Pew Hispanic Center and Kaiser Family Foundation report with this caveat, "Despite strong Democratic leanings, Latinos show significant partisan ambivalence. At a time of very sharp partisan divisions, they're not ideologically committed to either of the major parties."⁵⁹ There are several reasons for this ambivalence. First, their connection with Democrats began during the 1940's and 1950's when the migrant farm workers movements associated themselves with liberals, idealists and progressives.⁶⁰ However, that association no longer exists. Second, the "hot-button" issues that are prevalent in the Democratic Party are contrary to most Hispanics religious beliefs.⁶¹ As political scholars have seen Southern conservatives become Republicans because of differences with the Democratic Party on matters of religion and other social issues, so have some Latinos become Republicans.

The relationship between the major political parties and Latinos has a long, and somewhat convoluted history. Much of that history is directly related to the history of African-Americans' struggle for equality and other civil rights groups. But Latinos also have been treated separately from other minority groups.

History of Minority Groups' Political Influence

Minority groups became an important constituency much later than common wisdom might suggest.⁶² African-Americans' hard fight to gain respect and equality laid important groundwork for Latino advances that would follow in the 1950s and 1960s. Even though the 1870 passage of the Constitution's Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed the right to vote to former slaves, those 'voters' were essentially ignored by the late 19th century presidents.⁶³ Politicians ignored African-Americans because they believed African-Americans would not have enough political power to make a difference in an election.⁶⁴ Ironically, part of the daily intimidation and discrimination African-Americans faced in the 19th century included intimidating freed slaves into not voting.⁶⁵

Party affiliation was not what modern wisdom would suggest, during the 1800's and 1900's the Republican Party was the party of equality. Wendel Philips Dabney explained that during the late 1800's and early 1900's "a great mass of Negroes [sic] regarded white Democrats as the Devil's chosen children, and a Negro Democrat was a creature of such depravity that hell was far too good for him."⁶⁶ In the early 1900's a few prominent African-Americans did begin to make connections with the White House, namely W.E.B. Dubois and Booker T. Washington. Washington, because of his conservative views, worked with presidents from Grover Cleveland to Theodore

Roosevelt.⁶⁷ Washington was the recipient of “selective preferment” that was used to favor certain African-American leaders to appease the masses. “The ultimate goal of selective preferment was to defuse radicalism by rewarding in general terms moderate to conservative political behavior.”⁶⁸

Washington and his successors, such as Emmett J. Scott and Robert Moton, used their political power to control the African-American community for many years.⁶⁹ They controlled it mainly by controlling access to the President and others in power. When President Taft considered DuBois for an appointed position, Washington began a rumor campaign against DuBois, arguing to Taft (and his confidantes) that DuBois had no power in the African-American community. He also argued that DuBois was anti-Taft. Other African-American leaders who questioned Washington’s power in the White House received similar treatment.⁷⁰ Despite all of the work Washington did to advance African-Americans’ power in Washington D.C., their advancement was cosmetic at best.

Presidents of this era, from Rutherford Hayes to Herbert Hoover, “did almost nothing to advance the cause of civil rights.”⁷¹ These presidents attempted to silence any discontent within the African-American community with token efforts at appeasement. This attitude changed in 1930, during the presidency of Herbert Hoover, with the defeat of Supreme Court nominee John J. Parker. After Parker’s nomination, past statements he made began appearing in the African-American community, thanks to NAACP publicity. Parker, an unabashed segregationist, routinely denigrated “the capacity of blacks for electoral politics.”⁷² When leaders of the Tuskegee Institute became aware of this, they refused to give Hoover the endorsement he requested. Republicans and the

moderate Tuskegee Institute always had a good relationship, but the organization drew the line with a segregationist judicial nominee. The Tuskegee Institute and the NAACP did not defeat Parker single-handedly, but his defeat signaled to the president and other politicians that this particular constituency possessed the political shrewdness to matter. As historian Russell L. Riley argues, “What that loss represented . . . was the beginnings of a slow evolution in the political calculus of race relations in the United States. Further, it hinted at the ultimate futility of presidential efforts to control fully those relations.”⁷³ After this win, the African-American community found a fickle friend in Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

History remembers the FDR Administration as friendlier to civil rights than it really was. As historians have argued, FDR worked to advance relations with the African-American community when it benefited his political interests.⁷⁴ However, in 1934 Walter White and Roy Wilkins (two NAACP leaders) decided to use the First Lady to reach the President — one of the most pivotal decisions that civil rights leaders ever made.⁷⁵ Eleanor Roosevelt became one of the strongest public advocates for the civil rights movement. Her commitment stemmed from a “[d]eeply held personal interest in economic and social justice” marking the first time that the African-American community had an ally to pass their concerns on to the White House.⁷⁶ While some historians have questioned Ms. Roosevelt’s true conviction about racial equality, no one can argue with the results.⁷⁷ Ms. Roosevelt provided African-Americans entrance into the President’s mind and heart, and from that time on African-Americans would not be ignored by a President again.⁷⁸

Harry S. Truman advanced the interests of African-Americans more than his predecessor. Specifically, “those demographic, organizational, and political forces that inclined Roosevelt toward concessions to black America had, by Truman’s time, become even more irresistible.”⁷⁹ From that time on, minority groups (such as the NAACP and later LULAC) held enough political power that presidents and presidential candidates began working with them and working to attract them.

Increasing political power for African-Americans led to an increased power for Hispanics as well.⁸⁰ Latino organizations, similar to the NAACP, established themselves as early as the 1920’s in South Texas. Mostly created to deal with local issues, these organizations generally ignored politics on a national level.⁸¹ Once thousands of Mexican and Puerto Rican veterans returned from World War II and the Korean War, they believed that blatant segregation should not continue. Historian Juan Gonzalez argues that this was the turning point in Hispanic’s political power: “The veterans not only threw themselves into organizations . . . but they also turned to politics and began to challenge the historic exclusion of Mexicans from the voting booth.”⁸² Unfortunately, Hispanics in the Southwest faced some of the same discrimination, intimidation and violence that African-Americans faced in the South.⁸³ This discrimination came in direct response to the advances of African-Americans, particularly in Texas. As Texas legislators began to see the advances that African-Americans were making in the South, they instituted poll taxes and other discriminatory measures to “counter the growth of the Populist movement among blacks, Mexicans and

poor whites.”⁸⁴ Between 1950 and 1960 Hispanics advanced their cause in local politics, but did not attempt to influence national politics, until they met John F. Kennedy.⁸⁵

Kennedy attracted Latinos for several reasons: his religion, his politics and his running mate. As the first modern Catholic presidential candidate, and among a community of more than ninety percent Catholics, Kennedy identified with Latinos in a way no previous candidate ever had.⁸⁶ Second, Hispanics liked Kennedy’s liberal politics. Kennedy’s connection to the African-American community led Latinos to believe that his election would lead to more freedoms for them.⁸⁷ John F. Kennedy’s brother and campaign manager Robert intentionally worked to foster a relationship with both the Hispanic and African-American communities. This relationship led to the formation of Viva Kennedy clubs throughout the Southwest.⁸⁸ These grassroots clubs fostered an excitement in the Hispanic community for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. While these clubs were enormously important to the relationship between Hispanics and Kennedy, the relationship between Latinos and Kennedy’s running mate proved more pivotal. Well-known and well liked in the Hispanic community, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson grew up in poor parts of rural Texas among Mexican-Americans. He understood the struggles of poverty, immigration and power in Texas and had a heart for the plight of Mexican-Americans in particular.⁸⁹ This understanding translated to a great deal of power during his presidency, specifically in 1964 as he dealt with foreign policy problems in Latin America.

This combination of religion, politics and running mate led to an unprecedented amount of support for Kennedy in the Latino community. Kennedy swept eighty-five

percent of the Hispanic vote nation-wide.⁹⁰ Many scholars believe that Latino voters helped Kennedy win in 1960.⁹¹ Historians also agree that the election of Kennedy served as the turning point in the recognition of Latinos as a group that had political influence. In the 1964 election Johnson received even more support from the Latino community than Kennedy received, more than ninety percent.⁹² From that time on Hispanics began to flex their political muscles, even taking on a new moniker, Chicano.

During the 1960's 'Chicano' became the predominant term used by Latinos.⁹³ This title proved important for two reasons: first, it unified the various factions of the Hispanic community, including Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, Californios, Tejanos, and the like. Secondly, as historian José de la Isla argues, the title 'Chicano' "implied – beyond ethnicity—an identity with a cause."⁹⁴ 'Chicano' caught the imagination of activists, as journalist and historian Juan Gonzalez notes, and the "radical nationalist period" began.⁹⁵ During this period Latinos used many of the similar strategies African-Americans made popular during the 1950s. Militant groups, such as the Brown Berets, La Raza Unida, the Young Lords and the United Farm Workers, began to form and usurp power from the well-established League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC).⁹⁶ These groups were prominent in "every urban barrio and Southwest farm community, rarely with much organizational connection."⁹⁷ Chicano activism on the local level finally gave rise to national activism.

The most notable Latino activist at this time was César Chávez. The leader of the United Farm Workers (UFW) organization, Chávez fought for the rights of migrant farm workers throughout the Southwest. Because his parents were migrant farm

workers, and moved frequently, he never finished high school, and estimated that he had attended more than thirty elementary schools.⁹⁸ Like Martin Luther King, Jr., Chávez believed in non-violent resistance, specifically three forms of resistance: strikes, boycotts and fasting.⁹⁹ The UFW began its first strike in 1965 against Delano, California area grape-growers.¹⁰⁰ The boycotts and strikes were so successful that between 1965 and 1970 thousands of migrant workers and hundreds of thousands of supporters throughout the world boycotted grapes, lettuce and other vegetables. The boycotts also brought attention to the work of César Chávez, and he became a national figure.¹⁰¹ Chávez was most famous for his fasts. Even in his later years, Chávez fasted for up to 36 days at a time. His water-only diet was not only vital to him personally, but also to the movement. Chávez once stated:

A fast is first and foremost personal. It is a fast for the purification of my own body, mind, and soul. The fast is also a heartfelt prayer for purification and strengthening for all those who work beside me in the farm worker movement. The fast is also an act of penance for those in positions of moral authority and for all men and women activists who know what is right and just, who know that they could and should do more. The fast is finally a declaration of non-cooperation with supermarkets who promote and sell and profit from California table grapes.¹⁰²

Chávez also fasted in response to his research on the growing use of pesticides in vegetables and fruit production. In his last years, Chávez worked to educate Latinos about the dangers of pesticides. Chávez's last (and longest fast) took place in August of 1988, on behalf of his anti-pesticide message.¹⁰³ Since Chávez's death in 1993, no other Hispanic leader has been able to replace his notoriety, his power in the community and his ability to unify all Latinos under one cause.¹⁰⁴ Because of Chávez's work Latinos emerged onto the national political scene.

Since the time of Chávez and UFW, Hispanics have continued to work for more political power, and as the population has increased dramatically since the 1960's, Latinos are finally a voting block that could make a difference in local and more importantly, national elections. Even though Latino voters are more politically active than they were in 1960, the political strategies of Anglo politicians have not changed since the Kennedy election. All subsequent elections have followed Kennedy's model like a template, with only minor changes.

Ronald Reagan recognized the importance of Latinos as a voting block during his 1980 campaign, hiring a campaign consultant, Lionel Sosa, specifically to run a campaign directed at Hispanics. Reagan felt that "Hispanics are Republicans, they just don't know it."¹⁰⁵ Reagan argued that Latinos' religiosity, values and family structure should cause them to lean Republican.¹⁰⁶ In his September 16, 1980 speech in Harlingen, Texas, at a Mexican Independence Day (Día de Septiembre) Celebration, Reagan reiterated these ideas to a crowd of Hispanics:

That heritage [of freedom and independence] is not a relic of the past, but a vital force in American life today. Americans of Mexican ancestry have honored the values they cherish, and, in doing so, have made a significant contribution to the growth of our nation. You have preserved the fundamental values of the Hispanic community--not merely the immediate family, but the extended family linking the generations. . . . Strong ties of language, religion, culture, and family combine to build communities of shared values, communities organized for public service--for better housing, for improved education, for recreational opportunities, for activities that enrich life on the small, human scale where people live their everyday lives.¹⁰⁷

Since 1980, Reagan's view of Latinos has been proven correct. As Lionel Sosa, who designs political campaigns for Republican candidates (and has since 1980) explained after the 2000 election, "[The Hispanic] vote will not remain in the

Democrats' column in the future. It is a vote that Republicans can attract consistently by doing the right things, and that is inviting them, involving them, and connecting with them."¹⁰⁸ However, this connection must be covert; Latinos do not like to be converted to a party affiliation. As Roberto Suro director of the Pew Hispanic Center has concluded, ultimately Latinos would rather vote for a candidate they know, rather than a party.¹⁰⁹ Politicians struggle with Latinos' lack of party affiliation when reaching out to them. Democrats struggle with continuing Latino support because of the morals and values of the Hispanic Community.¹¹⁰ These distinct value differences have led many Hispanics over the years to move slowly into the Republican Party.

Republicans have made more of an effort to reach out to Latinos. Whereas many Hispanics felt a connection to the Democratic Party because of their political views and the connection to Catholic President John F. Kennedy, the Republican Party has worked since 1980 to reach out to Hispanics.¹¹¹ After decades of ambivalence, the sudden attention being paid to Hispanics by Republicans is confusing, it makes them unsure how to vote, as reflected in conflicting polling data.¹¹² The messages that Democrats have been sending for decades have worked; Hispanics have been called to the party and to the polls for Democratic candidates. However, lately, Republicans have figured out how to reach Hispanics too.

By evaluating the reality created by presidential campaign rhetoric, specifically by looking closely at narratives and the use of the American Dream story, we will be able to discover what messages have the potential to woo Hispanics, and to keep their attention through Election Day. Understanding the characteristics of a group that is

simultaneously connected and disconnected from the norm is key to understanding how to stir their political passion.

Methodology

A rhetor's power is his or her ability to create a common language among the audience, one that becomes second nature to the audience. This language communicates an understanding between the rhetor and his or her audience. During the 1960 election, Robert Kennedy created "Viva Kennedy" campaigns throughout the Southwest and New York for his brother.¹¹³ The language used during that campaign was so powerful, and became such a part of the Latino political language that there have been Viva Johnson, Viva Nixon, Viva Bush, Viva Kerry, Viva Carter and Viva Clinton campaigns that have all been successful parts of the Latino community's political strategy.

The first political advertisement for President directed at the Latino community was a television ad featuring Jacqueline Kennedy in 1960. In the ad she discussed the importance of stopping communism, helping the poor, creating safer schools and better medical care for the elderly, all in Spanish. The ad was directed at the Puerto Rican community in New York, and only ran in the city.¹¹⁴ In the advertisement, Ms. Kennedy refers to her husband as a person who "cares for the interests of Hispanics in New York."¹¹⁵ By using his wife in a Spanish-speaking advertisement, Kennedy was creating a narrative relationship with the Hispanic audience, by sharing their value of family and putting his family at the forefront of the campaign. This language was successful, because Latinos felt an affinity to the candidate. Kennedy wanted to revolutionize the government, and Latinos wanted to be a part of that change.¹¹⁶ Kennedy was the first

political candidate to create advertising in Spanish, which galvanized Latinos who were watching his campaign.¹¹⁷ The ad and its message were simple, but the importance to Latinos and their collective story was immeasurable.

Identifying a specific methodology in a case like this is difficult. As a researcher, it is important to get a representative and manageable sample of the discursive tools used by Presidential candidates toward the Latino community. I believe in a narrative approach in the methodology, focusing on the dominant rhetorical forms in the political discourse aimed at Hispanics: specifically related to the idea of myths. It is not possible to evaluate every word uttered in a presidential campaign toward the Latino community because those kinds of records do not exist. Celeste Michelle Condit explains, “. . . [S]ince most public speech is never recorded, it is too ephemeral to allow that kind of completeness.”¹¹⁸

Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, I will evaluate available official campaign speeches and campaign ads from general Presidential campaigns from 1992-2000 that are clearly directed at Latinos, either through language or location.¹¹⁹ These speeches and ads come from several sources: the largest source of my data comes from the University of Pennsylvania-Annenberg School for Communication’s *Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*, the second source is the University of Oklahoma’s Presidential Campaign archive. Unfortunately, these databases are not complete; many speeches are missing from these sources. Therefore, in an effort to gain an understanding of the entire election I will supplement these sources with media reports of the presidential campaign events. This information allows me to get a deeper

understanding of the rhetorical situation. Media reports include a description of the audience and their reactions, as well as meaningful information from the campaign trail. I will further redefine my artifacts by including only those speeches and ads that are clearly directed at the Latino community: this will include speeches and ads in Spanish, or delivered (or aired) in areas where Hispanics are geographically centralized. This will provide a clear, but still rich set of artifacts to criticize.¹²⁰ Narratives play an important role in campaign ads.

Narratives

Narratives have been an important part of the campaign process, whether through candidates telling their personal stories or using “average people” to tell stories about the candidate. Rhetorician Walter Fisher argues that human communication is narrative, and that humans are innate storytellers. This is a simple idea, but the consequences are important. Fisher questions the idea that humans are rational in Aristotelian terms, or in some way make decisions based on the strict rules of syllogisms and enthymemes. He argues that people are persuaded by stories (accounts of experience), and that they are able to innately understand the logic of such narratives.¹²¹ Humans use two tools to evaluate the truth of a story, according to Fisher, narrative fidelity and narrative probability. Narrative fidelity describes the consistency between the rhetor’s message and the audience’s values. When a narrative does not make sense with the audience’s values, they will reject it. Narrative probability explains the internal consistency of a story.¹²²

Narratives take many different forms as a narrative is any account of experience. Fisher sees narrative as a metaphor for all of human communication. Therefore, a myth, a metaphor, a joke, or a strategy has the potential to convey a truth, just like all other narratives.¹²³ Another form of narrative is an anecdote. Anecdotes are the simple stories that people tell, the simplicity of the message is the key to its rhetorical power. An anecdote can be about anything, its importance is in its ability to convey common sense truths and values. William F. Lewis explains, “Anecdotes are the quick stories, jokes, or incidents that are the verbal counterpart of the visual image. The anecdote is intended to spark interest, and its meaning is established in reference to some larger frame of understanding that is either specified within a discourse or assumed in an audience.”¹²⁴ Regardless of what form it takes, narratives have persuasive power because of their ability to convey values to the audience.

All narratives communicate specific values, whether or not the audience is aware of the message. As Hayden White asserts, “Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moral impulse is present too.”¹²⁵ Every narrative is imbedded with morality or narrative truth. Not all stories are true, but all stories have some level of truth, according to Lewis, “If the story is not true, it must be true-to-life; if it did not actually happen, it must be evident that it could have happened or that, given the way things are, it should have happened.”¹²⁶ Narrative truth either conveys the truth, or helps to give meaning to a misunderstood world.¹²⁷ Often times, especially in political rhetoric, the truth may change based on the author. For example, when Clinton is evaluating the reasons for the implementation of trickle-down

economics he is going to have a different explanation than Ronald Reagan would.

Clinton's version of the story is going to differ based on his different values and on his audience's values.

In that sense, narrative truth is in the author's mind, "Has any historical narrative ever been written that was not informed not only by moral awareness by specifically by the moral authority of the narrator?"¹²⁸ The key is to persuade the audience to agree with the narrator's values. Being able to 'relate' to the author can be based on several variables: the speaker's credibility, the context of the speech, the willingness of the audience or "the logic of good reasons," all of these components work together to create persuasion.¹²⁹

Narrative theory argues that all texts can be evaluated for their good reasons. As Walt Fisher argues, "texts are viewed as verbal phenomena composed of good reasons as elements that function as warrants for believing or acting in accord with the message of the text."¹³⁰ Each good reason contains different components, and can have different mediums, but ultimately the "good reasons" give narratives their persuasive power. Fisher gave critics two tests to measure a text's effectiveness, or narrative rationality: narrative probability and narrative fidelity.¹³¹ Essentially all stories have natural storylines that are expected by the audience, and a story that violates that norm would not have narrative probability. For example, in American culture all fairy tales begin "Once upon a time" and end with "and they lived happily ever after," anything else would violate our expectations, and would automatically be incoherent. Narrative fidelity is external consistency of the story with the audience's values or the

“truthfulness of a story,” which Fisher argues is based on the “logic of good reasons.”¹³²

Good reasons can be evaluated based on argumentation theory, but ultimately reside in the mind of the audience. Good reason is “those elements that provide warrants for accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communication that can be considered rhetorical.”¹³³ Good reasons require warrants; they justify, authorize, and sanction changes in belief, attitudes or actions. Nevertheless, Fisher is quick to point out that the usefulness of warrants depends on the audience and their values, “whatever is taken as a basis for adopting a rhetorical message is inextricably bound to a value—to a conception of the good.”¹³⁴ The warrant is based in the audience’s perceptions of truth. This definition opens up the field of possible texts, no longer is narrative bound solely to stories, but to any utterance that conveys a message; like presidential campaign rhetoric.

At the core of every narrative are several components: characters, setting or scene, and the moral of the story. Much like Kenneth Burke’s pentad (act, scene, agent, agency, purpose) these components help a critic to understand the message of the narrative.¹³⁵ “I believe that texts, whatever their subjects, times, places, or cultural contexts, can be characterized as expressing one or more of four, perhaps five, motives”¹³⁶ Fisher defines motives like Burke does, “it is a name that characterizes the nature of a symbolic action in a given situation.”¹³⁷ This is the key to the methodology of this dissertation; I will be evaluating the characters, scene and moral of each candidate’s story. There are many different stories that are part of American culture; however, one of the most powerful story is the American Dream.

The American Dream

The American Dream is an iconic part of the American life. Millions have come to America in order to seek this dream of freedom and materialistic success. Native-born Americans have used the dream as a justification for continuing to work on failed ventures. Everyone defines the Dream differently, but ultimately it comes down to one word: success.¹³⁸ The phrase “The American Dream” can be traced back to 1930’s historian James Truslow Adams in his 1931 book *The Epic of America*, where he defines the term as the “dream of a better, richer and happier life for all our citizens of every rank . . . each generation has seen an uprising of ordinary Americans to save that dream from the forces which appeared to be overwhelming it.”¹³⁹ Adams saw the desire for a better, richer, happier life as the struggle of the century, “ [the struggle] of the ordinary man [*sic*] to hold fast to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’, which were vouchsafed to us in the past in vision and on parchment.”¹⁴⁰ Even though the term does not appear in print until well into the 20th century, the Pilgrims understood the concept when they landed in the new world.¹⁴¹

There are many different versions of the American Dream, but there are essentially two major themes: “There is the materialistic myth of individual success and the moralistic myth of brotherhood.”¹⁴² These dual dreams work in concert and in contrast. At their most basic, they are competing dreams. One is based on individualism and “the right to get rich,” the other on compassion, equality and the importance of work.¹⁴³ The materialism of the first seems to directly violate the egalitarian values of the second.¹⁴⁴ But, these two dreams are two sides of the same indefinable idea:

success. “A definition of success involves measurement as well as content.”¹⁴⁵ Each person has a different definition of success, but success is still the major tenet of *any* definition of the American Dream.

Clinton sought to connect with Latinos by using the myth of the American Dream. Myths, much like narratives, help an audience to understand their chaotic world. As Walt Fisher explained, “Myths are vehicles of communication . . . their functions are to provide meaning, identify and a comprehensive understandable image of the world, and to support the social order.”¹⁴⁶ In the case of presidential rhetoric, narratives and myths function in much the same way; they communicate truths. However, myths are powerful because they follow a plotline, usually a well-known story, which gives order to the audience's world. “The story fulfills all the requirements of myth—it is widely believed, generally unquestioned, and clearly pedagogical.”¹⁴⁷ The American Dream is a perfect example of a modern myth.

The rags to riches story of individual success is the basis for the materialistic myth: “For hundreds of years, American readers and writers have had tireless appetites for tales of poor boys who, with nothing but pluck and ingenuity, created financial empires.”¹⁴⁸ This is the version most natural-born citizens aspire to, the dream of wealth, fame or simply a better life. As journalist Dan Rather explains, “I could feel its truth in my father’s tireless drive to build a better life for himself and his family and in my mother’s determination to make the best of what we already had.”¹⁴⁹ The materialistic myth is grounded in a deep belief in the importance of work, and persistence.

The second myth is the myth of brotherhood, which is based in the renowned words of Thomas Jefferson from the Declaration of Independence, “all men are created equal, and they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness [*sic*].”¹⁵⁰ This moralistic myth implies values like equality, tolerance, charity and compassion for all.¹⁵¹ These two facets of the American Dream are at the core of Clinton’s campaign message.

The American Dream has played a part in political rhetoric for many generations. It is a story, or narrative, that politicians tell to make sense of the world, “In narrative application, [the American Dream] becomes a plot artfully used to account for one’s experience and life trajectory.”¹⁵² Previous researchers have focused on how presidents, like Ronald Reagan, have used the American Dream story to spur Americans to continue working toward the rewards the Dream offers. Communication theorist G. Thomas Goodnight argued that Reagan was able to use the American Dream imagery to distract Americans from many of the economic problems during his Administration, and instead focus on their hard work. Goodnight says, “Reagan’s rhetoric succeeds not by virtue of its request to simplify or forget the particulars of American history. . . . Rather, it succeeds because the Dream releases family members from pain of loss caused by the economic displacements, change and scattering over which there could be scant control.”¹⁵³ This strategy exonerated Reagan from the blame for his downfalls, and laid the responsibility of their own success in the hands of average Americans.

Successful political candidates, such as Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have also been able to use the American Dream to remind Americans of the importance of

believing in this nation's promise. Clinton used his own story of a poor upbringing and his eventual success to recall the importance of believing in the Dream. He told Americans that the Dream was possible again, and used himself as the hero of that story. George W. Bush held up his own family as an example of the power of the American Dream. Despite the family's wealth and legacy in politics, George W. Bush used his half-Mexican nephew as an example of the American Dream. Bush essentially argued that the Dream was available to everyone, and that his nephew was the embodiment of that Dream. However, the American Dream has persuasive power over more than just American citizens, immigrants also see the American Dream as their key to success. Over the years a subset of the Dream has developed, historian Jim Cullen calls it the Dream of the Immigrant.

The Dream of the Immigrant

Of the millions of immigrants who have crossed American borders to find freedom and prosperity there is a common story that unites them. Jim Cullen, in his book *The American Dream*, argues that the Dream of the Immigrant unifies all immigrant communities together, and is constantly in flux based on the new immigrants who are coming to America. Cullen describes immigration as stretching the American Dream, "not always comfortably."¹⁵⁴ It is difficult to describe exactly what the Dream of the Immigrant is because it is constantly changing. "So the saga of the Dream of the Immigrant is far from over. Indeed, it seems anything but static. Once the hopes and anxieties surrounded the Irish and Germans; then it was the Italians and Japanese. Now

it's the Arabs and Mexicans.”¹⁵⁵ The faces change, and with those different faces come different interpretations of the Dream of the Immigrant.

There is no precise script for the Dream of the Immigrant but it has similar characteristics for all, “a story where hard work pays off and aspirations are realized. And a story where the principals speak of their adopted land with accents of love and loyalty.”¹⁵⁶ The American Dream is poignant for Latinos in particular. Regardless of whether they are first- second- or third- generation immigrants, Latinos understand that people have moved and died for the American Dream, this is the story they share. Since the birth of the nation, that idea of advancement spread from the Colonists to outsiders, such as immigrants. During the Industrial Period, this idea was most obvious in the number of immigrants who fled to the United States, the land of opportunity. According to Cullen, because of the nature of American multiculturalism the American Dream is accessible to all; only allegiance to America and its ideals are necessary to take part in the Dream.¹⁵⁷ Each culture has its own elements of the Dream, Latinos in particular.

Narratives in Latino Culture

The written word is an extremely important part of Latino culture. In their 1994 article “Ethnic Heritage as Rhetorical Legacy,” John C. Hammerback and Richard J. Jensen discuss the power of written “plans” or “proclamations” in the history of Mexican-Americans. These declarations became a form of rhetorical identity, and created narratives for the people to believe. During the 1800’s, Mexican dissenters would use written proclamations to communicate with their collaborators during their fight for independence from Spain. Named after the cities in which they were penned,

these declarations were usually less than a page in length, and were copied by mobile printing presses throughout the region.¹⁵⁸ The most decisive proclamation was “El Plan de Iguala” which was issued by Colonel Agustín de Iturbide in 1821. The Plan outlined twenty-four articles detailing the revolutionary actions needed for independence. It also reinforced the importance of a Roman Catholic nation that “guaranteed a close union of Americans and Europeans,” the residents of “New Spain.”¹⁵⁹ Understanding the power of the “Plan of Iguala” is vital to understanding the history of declarations in Mexico. After the Plan was released on February 24, 1821, it quickly found its way into the minds and hearts of Mexicans: “As if by magic, the Plan of Iguala appeared on billboards in plazas of towns all over Mexico, and citizens, in defiance of the law, gathered in groups to argue its merits.”¹⁶⁰ Within a few years, more ‘plans’ began to appear in Mexico, and all of them followed the same basic model of the Iguala. They exemplified the ideals of the movement, and always had a signature (or set of signatures) to back up the credibility of the plan through its authors.¹⁶¹ César Chávez made powerful use of declarations during the 1960’s and 1970’s, his writings continue to influence Latinos today. During that time, Chávez created powerful narratives through his plans, including the importance of education and economic prosperity; both key components of the American Dream.

Chávez’s most important rhetoric was not spoken, but written, in “The Plan of Delano,” which has become a model of Hispanic narratives.¹⁶² Written to win support for the crop pickers union (United Farm Workers) that Chávez represented, the “Plan” became a rallying cry for all Latinos. Not only did Chávez author and sign the “Plan,”

but also he publicly read it nightly during his famous 1966 march from Delano to Sacramento.¹⁶³ The struggle for equality and economic freedom also galvanized the Latino community, especially around this important document. Poor Hispanics across the Southwest read the “Plan” at political rallies; it was often the most exciting part of the event.¹⁶⁴ The Plan of Delano was invaluable as it had the ability to persuade all Hispanics, not just Mexican-Americans and the poor; it had a “startling effect on the Mexican Americans in the cities: they began to rethink their self definition as second-class citizens and to redefine themselves as Chicanos.”¹⁶⁵ Historians and rhetorical critics have argued that the “Plan of Delano” was the most important piece of revolutionary rhetoric from the Latino movement, and in the minds of Mexican-Americans across the country, the “Plan of Delano” is legendary as the start of the revolution, that continues.¹⁶⁶

The “Plan of Delano” is important to this discussion because Chávez created a document that outlined six important Hispanic values. These values are indicative of the truths that Latinos see in the American Dream. In the “Plan of Delano” Chávez explained the importance of each value, and then concluded with a slogan. First, Chávez argued that the “Plan of Delano” created a new social movement that would give justice to the oppressed, which is a God-given right. Chávez concluded, “To respect the rights of others is peace.” The second idea is a clear distrust for the government. Chávez and his followers felt they had been abandoned by their legislators, that they did not trust lawmakers to listen to their concerns or to help them seek justice. Therefore, a change in the government was important to the movement, “We shall be heard.” Third, Chávez

reinforced the Latino movement's close connection to the Roman Catholic Church, an association that Chávez (a devout Catholic) encouraged. "We seek, and have, the support of the Church in what we do." Chávez also mentioned the Jewish faith: "we also carry the Star of David . . . because we ask the help and prayers of all religions." He concluded, "God shall not abandon us." Fourth, Chávez repeated the mantra that so many other civil rights groups have used, "We shall endure." Chávez noted the suffering, the injustice and the fact that his supporters will continue to suffer, "with hope that our children will not be exploited as we have been." Just like the Chicano poets who were his contemporaries, Chávez reiterated the importance of suffering for the cause (*la causa*). The fifth idea connected all civil rights groups from the same time, "United we shall stand." Chávez connected his fight to the struggle of poor whites, Filipinos, Blacks, Japanese-Americans and Muslims, arguing that all minorities in the U.S. must band together to defeat the discriminatory system. Finally, Chávez gave his audience this pledge, "We are sons of the Mexican Revolution, a revolution of the poor seeking bread and justice. Our revolution will not be armed, but we want the existing social order to dissolve, we want a new social order."¹⁶⁷ Borrowing from his friend Martin Luther King Jr., Chávez ended, "We shall overcome." The "Plan of Delano" set the mood for the Hispanic movement, and it has continued to be powerful even today.¹⁶⁸ Chávez's call for justice, economic prosperity and equality, hope for the future, the power of the Church, the power of suffering, the importance of unity and the power of perseverance reverberate in the messages used by presidential candidates from 1992 until 2000.

Research Questions

This research will answer one important research question. How does the American Dream, as defined by the “Plan of Delano,” play into successful campaigns toward Latinos? That is, what parts of the American Dream narrative are compelling to Latinos, and how can utilizing those parts lead to a more successful campaign? I will accomplish this objective through two means: first, I will evaluate the various parts of the American Dream myth, looking specifically at the characters and settings used in the candidate’s narrative. Then, I will evaluate the values in those narratives through the lens of the Plan of Delano. Specifically looking for ways these candidates actually reinforced important Latino values, as designated by César Chávez. Because each election provided a unique set of rhetorical exigencies, I will evaluate each election separately.

Chapter II will discuss the 1992 election, between George H.W. Bush and Gov. Bill Clinton, which was heavily influenced by the narrative of a poor boy from Hope, Arkansas who became a successful example of the American Dream. Clinton created a connection with Latinos by using narratives that showed how he understood the plight of the impoverished in America. This connection allowed Latinos to feel that Clinton felt their pain.¹⁶⁹ Then in Chapter III, I will discuss the 1996 election between incumbent President Bill Clinton and challenger Senator Bob Dole. In this election the issue of immigration became such a powerful tool that Latinos were quickly brought into the election. However, one party continued to offend them by arguing that immigrant’s access to the American Dream should be limited; whereas, the other party opened up and

spoke instead about the importance of equal opportunity for all. The striking difference between these two narratives made the election extremely powerful for Latinos—and branded one party as “anti-immigrant” for a generation. Then in Chapter IV, I will discuss how rhetorically George W. Bush was able to repair the damage between the GOP and Latinos, by using his Latino family members to create a connection with Hispanics. With the help of family Bush was eventually able to repair the rift that had been created during the 1996 election, a feat that many thought was impossible. Chapter V will conclude the dissertation and make recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER II

1992 ELECTION

Arkansas governor Bill Clinton faced difficult challenges when he announced his intent to run for the presidency on October 3, 1991. Being the lesser-known governor of one of the smaller states was not exactly the résumé Americans were looking for, yet the Democratic faithful encouraged him to run as early as 1988. Clinton's centrist politics and his gift for campaigning made him an attractive alternative to the other Democratic candidates.¹ Unfortunately, even before he announced his candidacy, rumors about sexual harassment and infidelity in the Arkansas Governor's mansion surfaced in the media.² Clinton also faced other challenges: his wife Hillary, a successful lawyer in her own right, appeared the antithesis of the 'First Lady' image that America had come to expect from Nancy Reagan, Rosalynn Carter and Barbara Bush.³ Clinton admitted in his autobiography that he had serious concerns about running for the Presidency: concerns for his family, his home state and his reputation.⁴ Nevertheless, he agreed to run.

Governor Clinton gained support quickly from many of the Democratic faithful. Already a supporter of civil rights and an open admirer of Martin Luther King, Jr., Clinton brought the support of minority groups (specifically African-Americans) with him during the 1992 campaign. Clinton had a well-known history as a civil rights activist in his youth, having worked to stop racism in Arkansas during its ugliest days.⁵

Ironically, once he entered the race, his campaign focused less on his overt ties to the African-American community and more on his commonalities with mainstream voters. Other than the occasional speech in a predominately African-American church,

Clinton no longer put minorities in the forefront of his campaign.⁶ While there is no way to measure how this affected his national image, it did cause minorities to question his commitment to their issues.⁷ National Hispanic groups, such as La Raza and LULAC, criticized Clinton.⁸ Their concern stemmed from the lack of Latino insiders on the campaign staff and they were concerned that Clinton was focusing on Latinos for opportunistic reasons, not out of a true commitment to their issues.

Despite discussions about the importance of Latino voters and several notable appearances at Hispanic conventions and events, Clinton did not hire many Hispanics. From the beginning of his campaign, Clinton utilized one main Latino confidante: Henry Cisneros. At the time Clinton spoke to the LULAC national convention in July 1992, many had speculated that Cisneros might become the Governor's choice for a running mate. Organizers made that sentiment clear to Clinton while he was on stage during the event.⁹ By the time the Democratic National Convention (DNC) arrived, Clinton chose Al Gore; some Hispanic organizations began to lose faith in the Democratic ticket, and that distrust grew during the 1992 Democratic National Convention (DNC).¹⁰ During the DNC convention, Clinton's staff told Latino delegates to keep their comments and focus on Clinton, not on "special interest politics."¹¹

The campaign's request for unity worked for the convention, but once the convention ended Latino groups continued to question Clinton's commitment to Latino issues. National organizations like La Raza and LULAC listed several concerns, including Clinton's commitment to Latinos and the number of Latinos representatives on his staff. José Villareal, deputy campaign manager, dealt with most of the criticism, and

began to hire more Latinos in power positions. However, when Clinton supporter Representative Bill Richardson (D-NM) appeared on the Spanish network *Televisa*, he stirred more criticism. Richardson told viewers that Latinos should be patient with Governor Clinton because he had not grown up around Latinos, and was unaccustomed to dealing with their issues.¹² This caused a backlash amongst some Latino organizations who had heard those type of excuses before from both parties, and did not want to wait. Despite this controversy, Clinton's ultimate ability to identify with the Hispanic voting public led to their support of his campaign, the Latino groups were unable to discredit him.

In the 1992 election, Clinton's campaign rhetoric painted him as a man who understood poverty, and the plight of the working class in America. In this chapter I will evaluate how the rhetorical situation in 1992 affected Clinton's narrative, specifically, Clinton's values on equality of opportunity and the materialistic myth of the American Dream. Then I will discuss the various ways that Clinton characterized himself as a hero of the American Dream myth—he connected himself to John F. Kennedy, a person that Latinos emulate. Then I will assess the various scenes Clinton used to explain the plight of modern America. In doing so, he was able to communicate a hopeful message by the way he described America. Finally, Clinton's rhetoric conveyed values that corresponded with Latinos' values (as described in the "Plan of Delano") which connected with his audience. These values are part of the Latino interpretation of the American Dream, and help us to understand how parts of the Dream connected to

Latinos. This persuaded not only the Anglo audience, but also the Latino audience to support him.

The Rhetorical Situation in 1992

President George H.W. Bush faced many difficulties in his efforts to be re-elected in 1992: the economy had not yet fully rebounded from a recession, and President Bush's most prominent issue—foreign policy—had lost its persuasive power after the fall of communism.¹³ Despite what appeared to be an early lead, Bush quickly lost ground to billionaire Ross Perot, Republican rival Patrick Buchanan, and ultimately lost to Arkansas governor William Jefferson Clinton. This loss occurred for many reasons; however, one interesting feature was the Hispanic turnout for Governor Clinton.

During the 1992 election, Governor Clinton separated President Bush from a faithful group of Latino supporters. President Bush had a good rapport with the Latino community. During the 1988 election, Bush made ample use of his Mexican daughter-in-law, Colomba, and his “brown grandchildren.”¹⁴ Bush, who was from Texas, always worked closely with Latinos and had learned the importance of their political power from President Reagan. During his time in the White House, Bush advocated for many of the issues that mattered to Latinos.¹⁵ However, because of Governor Clinton's use of narrative, he separated Bush from his small (but strong) Latino following by tapping into their feelings of discontent and discrimination. What the public remembers from the 1992 election is Clinton's simple slogan, “It's the Economy Stupid,” and unfortunately, for Bush, it was. During the end of Desert Storm, the United States entered a recession. By November 1992, the economy was growing; however, the

American public did not forget the economic downturn.¹⁶ Governor Clinton played on the fear of another economic decline, and by appearing like a “New Democrat” with frequent references to building bridges, universal healthcare and the importance of education, he created an image reminiscent of John F. Kennedy’s “Camelot” optimism.¹⁷ The 1960 Election, Kennedy’s election, played an important part in the collective history of Latino political success. By sharing in this history, Clinton connected with his audience on a pre-rhetorical level, before they even knew they were part of a conversation, which made the Latino community much more receptive to Clinton as a candidate.¹⁸

It’s about the Economy, Stupid!

Hispanic researcher, Geoffrey Fox, argues that the only way for a candidate (whether Anglo or Latino) to have any credibility with Hispanic voters is to defend the rights of the working poor.¹⁹ Many Hispanics are part of this group, and even those that are more affluent can identify with the working class.²⁰ This idea allowed Clinton to break through the criticism he received from the Hispanic bureaucracy, and reach individual Latino voters.²¹ Clinton was able to explain his understanding of the working poor, by telling the story of a poor American family: his family.

This was the power of Clinton's rhetoric, he helped Latinos to remember their past, learn from their present and dream of their future. “Without dreams or myths, a man [*sic*] or nation is without a past, present, or future.”²² Clinton used narrative to define two specific parts of the myth of the American Dream: the characters and the

settings. Clinton's rhetoric created a specific version of the American Dream, which might be stated in this way:

America is a nation where a poor kid from Hope, Arkansas or the barrios of Texas can someday be president. When I was a kid I had hope that I would someday be someone important, and after meeting President Kennedy, I knew God had chosen me to lead this country. During the last twelve years, so many people I know have been hurt by the economics of the previous presidents, they haven't let you accomplish the Dream. But, it doesn't have to be that way. The American Dream is real, I know, I live it. Vote for me, I will help you live it too.

In this version of the myth Clinton was the star of the American Dream. The American Dream was a powerful influence that made Clinton who he became, the Dream acted in his life as many Latinos hoped it would act in theirs. He used his personal story to spur others to work toward the Dream. Clinton was also deeply connected to John Kennedy, who he met as a teenager, because Clinton felt that meeting Kennedy was a pivotal point in his life.

Clinton used several different settings during his 1992 campaign, these scenes were not random, they helped to make his message persuasive. First, he used his hometown, Hope, as the backdrop to tell his version of the American Dream. Second, he visited the barrios of Texas and used them as setting for his message. Going into the barrios is an important concept for Latinos, because the barrios (or neighborhoods) are representative of the heart of Latino culture. When Clinton told the American Dream in the setting of the barrios, he spoke directly into the heart of the Latino community. Third, Clinton took full advantage of the 1991 recession as the scene.²³ Clinton's main campaign theme was a critique of Reaganomics and the trickle-down economy. In all of Clinton's narratives he told the story of Americans who had been hurt during the

recession, and that became the key setting of his campaign. He used these parts of the story (characters, settings) to communicate values about the state of the nation.

The Hero

Clinton as the Star

Clinton's anecdote about how a poor kid from Hope, Arkansas can meet the President, and then some day run for president, communicated the power of the American Dream. Clinton was the perfect character to embody this dream. Clinton even looked the part: with his chubby cheeks, ruddy complexion and down home charm. He was the classic image of a poor kid from the Deep South, who made something of himself with hard work and gumption. As Clinton himself describes in his autobiography, "I thought I could make it [in politics] without family wealth or connections . . . Of course it was improbable, but isn't that what America is all about?"²⁴ This message could have been persuasive to any American, but Latinos were especially interested, because they understand a life of poverty and the desire for success. No one represented those American values more than a poor kid from Hope, Arkansas, who once had a brush with greatness.

In the very first ad run by the Clinton campaign, "Hope," Clinton describes his birth, "I was born in a little town called Hope, Arkansas, three months after my father died. I remember that old two-story house where I lived with my grandparents. They had very limited incomes."²⁵ This advertisement and other campaign material also explain, in detail, how poverty affected Clinton in all of his big decisions. Just as so

many people who live in poverty have to make tough sacrifices to support their families, Clinton had to make sacrifices to make a life for himself.

As he describes in the “Hope” ad, “I worked my way through law school with part time jobs — anything I could find. After I graduated I really didn’t care about making a lot of money. I just wanted to go home and see if I could make a difference.”²⁶

Clinton is painted himself as a character that is defined by his family’s poverty, but he was able to transcend the poverty. He went to law school, and paid for it by working lots of jobs, only to come back and give to others who live in poverty. Clinton’s official biography described how poverty affected his family’s choices, “Needing to find a way to support herself and her new child, Bill Clinton’s mother, Virginia Cassidy Blythe, moved to New Orleans, Louisiana, to study nursing,” which led to Clinton living with his grandparents.²⁷ One can only imagine how difficult it would have been for Virginia Blythe to leave her young son with her parents. But, if she wanted to have a better life for herself and her child, she needed to go, so she did. This is a choice that many poor people must make, to choose to pursue an education or a job, to provide for their family. This would have been a story that poor people, like Latinos, would understand. The story had narrative fidelity to them; they would have made the same choice in the same situation.

Clinton’s choices about education were also affected by money: “Bill Clinton recognized that although college would be expensive, it would give him the education he needed to accomplish his goals.”²⁸ This explains the view that so many immigrants have of the American Dream. The Dream is about education, education is the vehicle by

which one can achieve greatness. Clinton knew that, and as the star of the story, he made the right choice to pursue an education. All of these stories together create an image of Bill Clinton, as a character whose every decision was affected by his family's poverty.

This led not only to empathy, but also a level of credibility in the eyes of Latinos, who also struggle with many of the same choices Clinton had to make and who hope for the kind of success Clinton had later in his life. The story of Clinton's upbringing and tough sacrifices had narrative fidelity for the Latino audience, because they too had made those same choices. And Clinton's success had narrative probability for this audience, because they believed that only in America is that type of success possible. Clinton's version of the story of his upbringing and the potential of the American Dream pervades all of his rhetoric, but he tells the story most clearly when he wants to inspire others who struggle with poverty, like Latinos.

Clinton as John F. Kennedy

The 1960 election proved an important turning point in the history of Latinos as a political powerhouse. Prior to this election, Hispanics had been campaigning in local elections about local issues, but when Robert F. Kennedy reached out to garner support for his brother, this community quickly accepted the invitation. John F. Kennedy became a hero, of sorts, joining Latinos in their fight for equality, and recognition. This indelible relationship has been the basis for many political campaigns, and has led to a close bond that has never been broken.

Several factors explain the John F. Kennedy/Latino connection. Kennedy was Catholic, a religion that a majority of Hispanics shared.²⁹ As the first Catholic

presidential candidate, Kennedy's opponents forced him to defend his religion.

Opponents argued that President Kennedy would allow the Vatican to make decisions for the American government. However, in several different speeches, most notably the Houston Ministerial Address on September 12th, 1960, Kennedy answered this criticism. "I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute," Kennedy announced, "where no Catholic prelate would tell the president, should he be Catholic, how to act . . ." ³⁰ Kennedy made clear his intention to keep the Vatican out of American governing, regardless of his religious loyalty to the Pope. Because his religion was under attack during the election, the Latino Catholic population empathized with the religious persecution that Kennedy faced, and were sympathetic to his plight. ³¹

Hispanics also feel that much of the credit for Kennedy's ascension to the presidency rested with them. The 1960 election is the first presidential election that Latinos were intimately involved in, and therefore they feel closely connected to it. ³² During the election campaign, Robert Kennedy, John Kennedy's brother and campaign manager, reached out to the Latino population through Viva Kennedy clubs and advertising in Spanish. ³³ The connection between Hispanics and Kennedy extended to his election, with eighty-five percent of registered Latino voters supporting him. ³⁴ This connection has continued even to present times.

Many Hispanics still view Kennedy as the first "Hispanic" president, and others consider him the greatest president this nation ever had. In Latino cultural history, Kennedy is iconic—he is a hero. It is common to see pictures of President Kennedy, along with the Virgin of Guadalupe and deceased family members, at the home shrines

of traditional Latino families.³⁵ In a sense, Kennedy's 1960 victory has become a part of the Hispanic identity, as many feel they contributed to his victory and felt a close connection to him during his Presidency. However, Kennedy's election was ultimately important because it proved the political power Latinos held, which made it an important part of the collective history of Hispanics.

Bill Clinton met John F. Kennedy in 1963. Clinton represented Arkansas in the Boys Nation Program, and visited Washington D.C. as part of the program. President Kennedy met with the boys on the South Lawn of the White House. There are two pictures of Kennedy and Clinton that surfaced during the election, one shows Clinton with a group of other boys surrounding Kennedy, and the other shows Clinton shaking Kennedy's hand. Clinton's campaign used these pictures in their first ad, the "Hope" advertisement. Clinton narrated the story: "And I remember just, uh, thinking what an incredible country this was, that somebody like me, who had no money or anything, would be given the opportunity to meet the president. That's when I decided I could really do public service because I cared so much about people."³⁶ There were almost a hundred boys at the event—meeting the President would be an important event for any teenager. But, because Clinton grew up to run for president as a Democrat, the meeting was especially poignant.

This story plays into Clinton's narrative of the American Dream because, as Clinton explains, it shows what an amazing country this is, where anyone can meet the leader of the free world. But, there are also some more subtle explanations of the connection between Clinton and Kennedy. Kennedy was the president during a very

idealistic time in America, his election was moving. Clinton wanted people to equate his presidency with Kennedy's Camelot. Clinton campaigned on the same idealism, and wanted voters to see him as a president like Kennedy. The "New Democrat" label that followed Clinton also played into the idea that he would be able govern like Kennedy. While Clinton clearly implied the connection during this first ad, others made the association more overtly for him. During one of his first stops in Texas, the residents of that neighborhood mentioned the likeness, "Several of the people at the rally said Clinton reminded them of John F. Kennedy, whose, 'Viva Kennedy' clubs helped him carry the region in 1960."³⁷

Clinton tried to argue, through his narrative, that he would be a president like Kennedy. Being like JFK would have been appealing to those who remember the idealistic and innocent America of 1960. Even as he attempted to imply this connection, Clinton's message was that the relationship was not of his own making; it was something bigger than him, outside of his control. In his autobiography, Clinton downplayed the importance of the 1963 meeting with Kennedy. "Much has been made of that brief encounter and its impact on my life. My mother said she knew when I came home that I was determined to go into politics . . . I'm not sure about that."³⁸ Which is interesting because in his first advertisement during the 1992 election season Clinton said of the meeting, "That's when I decided I could really do public service . . ."³⁹ In downplaying the meeting, Clinton almost makes it even more powerful; his discussion in the book almost sounds like a religious calling that he was too young to understand, but that his mother understood. The same mother he calls a saint, in his autobiography.⁴⁰ This

spiritual connection to Kennedy started in Clinton's childhood, when he campaigned on Kennedy's behalf. Clinton is very clear about his youthful support for Kennedy. During the 1960 election, when Clinton was in the ninth grade, he defended Kennedy during classroom debates. "I badly wanted him to win Most of my classmates, and their parents, disagreed. I was getting used to it."⁴¹ Clinton admits that this early campaigning experience was profound, in that it solidified his love and ambition for politics; however, he wanted to be a Senator, not the President.⁴²

In creating an association with Kennedy's image, Clinton gathered support from the entire nation. Yet, the move was particularly touching for Hispanics. Anecdotes can persuade either through context, or through its connection to a particular audience.⁴³ The Kennedy anecdote communicated two different meanings: first, the young Clinton's brush with greatness was clearly used to compare Clinton's potential greatness with Kennedy's. Second, to the right audience (like a group of Democrats or Latinos) a comparison to Kennedy would be enticing, a reason to find out more about an unknown candidate. Anecdotes also communicate particular values to an audience, according to Lewis; their credibility lies in their common sense.⁴⁴ Clinton's simple story of the quick meeting with Kennedy communicated two important ideas: first, the power of the American Dream, and secondly, his ideological connection with Kennedy, an association Clinton created to give himself credibility.

Part of Clinton's appeal was his understanding of the important issues in the Hispanic community. Much like Kennedy in 1960, Clinton was there in the barrios, talking about the important issues: education and the economy. Although he could not

compete with the image of the lean and handsome Kennedy; Clinton used his image, as a southern kid who understood the personal pain discrimination causes, to connect with Latinos. “Indisputably, [Clinton] is the personification of that sometimes ephemeral entity, the New South. . . His message, clear and compelling, is that the South paid a price for bigotry and has learned a lesson the rest of the country could use.”⁴⁵ This message, although directed at all minorities, resonated with the pain Latinos felt they were suffering, because of discrimination. “It is important that leaders channel the frustrations of citizens in positive or constructive directions when times are hard. . . The Clinton message has been a sharp contrast for those who have grown weary of destructive racial rhetoric.”⁴⁶ This association with Kennedy was not only helpful with the Anglo community, but was especially important to Latinos. Clinton’s narrative strategy connected him with Kennedy, so that he could recreate the optimism of the 1960 election and evoke the social history of Latinos.

In all of these stories, Clinton created an image that he embraced the ideas of the American Dream, empathizing with his Latino audience. He was an empathizer, “I know and understand the problems of this state [Texas].”⁴⁷ An advocate, “We’ve got to send a clear signal that we will not permit our nation to be divided anymore by race, by region, by gender, or by income.”⁴⁸ And an inspiration, “Tonight when you go home, and the cheering has stopped Think in your own house, do you believe your country can do better?”⁴⁹ The media played along with Clinton’s characterizations of himself, “He knows and cares about Texas,” one supporter in South Texas was quoted in a local newspaper.⁵⁰ Clinton was an advocate who cared about the problems of the common

person, and fought to change the political system. This message was helpful to the poorer voters in America; one newspaper reported that when Clinton discovered that 85% of his supporters had only a high school education, he was nonplussed. Clinton, a Rhodes scholar and Ivy League graduate was not attempting to persuade others who had a similar educational level. But, as journalist Walter Robinson explained, the 1992 election was about class, and Clinton was winning, “What we have here is the electoral equivalent of class warfare.”⁵¹ In his ability to draw in minority voters, “Bill Clinton is a Superpol who has yet to meet his Kryptonite.”⁵² All of these references created an important mystique about Clinton, which helped his credibility.

The Scene

Hope and the Barrios

By sharing his own story of a childhood in poverty, Clinton was able to identify with a large portion of the Latino audience, and their stories. Not only had Clinton lived in poverty, he was the embodiment of the American Dream, someone who had escaped poverty and made something of himself. Clinton's first ad set the scene for the rest of his campaign; he was the “boy from Hope.” Despite the fact that he grew up in the Deep South and away from any Hispanic communities, Clinton understood what living below the poverty line was like, and he communicated that to Hispanics.⁵³ In his first advertisement called “Hope,” Clinton narrated his life story: “I was born in a little town called Hope, Arkansas, three months after my father died. I remember that old two-story house where I lived with my grandparents. They had very limited incomes.”⁵⁴ The

double meaning of the name of Clinton's hometown, and the value of hope was not lost on his audience.⁵⁵

Clinton was communicating the power of hope when he went on in the same advertisement to describe his 1963 meeting with John F. Kennedy. This anecdote is particularly important because it communicated not only a connection to Kennedy, but also an understanding of the values associated with the American Dream, specifically opportunity and equality. Clinton concluded the ad with a perfect explanation of his success, "Now it's exhilarating to me to think that as president I could help to change all our people's lives for the better and bring hope back to the American dream."⁵⁶ This first ad created a clear image of Clinton's version of the American Dream: the poor kid who made something of himself, after a brush with greatness.

"Hope" the advertisement also visualized a scene, the setting of Bill Clinton's upbringing in a small town living with poor grandparents. Pictures of the childhood home of Clinton show peeling paint and falling down shingles. In the ad, pictures of rows of decrepit houses, in black and white, underlined the theme of hope as Clinton narrated, "That's when I decided to do public service because I cared so much about people."⁵⁷ Clinton clearly made a connection between the setting of his hometown and his upbringing as a way to "bring hope back to the American Dream."⁵⁸ In Clinton's version of the American Dream, Hope was like so many small, poor towns where many Americans grow up. It was a place of love (his grandparents), values (hard work, persistence, religion), but so poor that it almost hurts to look. This definition of a classic

small town sounds like the explanation of the barrios, an important comparison that helped Clinton connect with Latinos

Clinton affiliated himself with Kennedy to recreate the idealism of Camelot; part of that idealism included a connection with minority voters. From the time he announced his candidacy on October 3, 1991, Clinton began to pursue the Hispanic population, even though he was unfamiliar with Hispanics as an audience.⁵⁹ Within a month, he was campaigning to Latinos. The media noticed Clinton's early visits to South Texas in November 1991, and commented on Clinton's attention to Hispanics.⁶⁰ Then Clinton returned to South Texas for a second visit in March of 1992; as the *only* presidential candidate to visit the area, he was "greeted like a local boy."⁶¹ Clinton's ease in the barrios of Texas was an important part of his narrative strategy: the barrios were an important setting for his message.⁶² Clinton's many visits to the barrios of South Texas were an important part of his 1992 campaign. Robert Brischetto, director of the Southwest Voter Research Institute concluded after polling in Texas, "It was obvious [in the polling data] that Clinton visited the barrios of San Antonio and South Texas more than his opponents."⁶³ The barrios of Texas provide a powerful setting for the rhetoric of an Anglo presidential candidate. The barrios of Texas provide a powerful setting for the rhetoric of an Anglo presidential candidate and they play an important part in the Latino narrative.⁶⁴

As Michael Victor Sedano found during an examination of Latino narratives, "Poems about the barrio abound in Chicano literature. The overall image is of a lost or ruined homeland."⁶⁵ In the narratives of many Hispanics, the barrio is the representative

of a modern day Aztlán, the mythic homeland of the Aztecs.⁶⁶ Barrios are the home communities of many Latinos, and even those who did not grow up in traditional barrios feel a relationship with the setting. It represents the best and worst of the Latino community; it is both a culturally rich community and a place ravaged by crime and violence. Clinton's ability to move comfortably into the barrios was a sign to many of his ease with Latinos.⁶⁷ One of the reasons many non-Hispanics avoid the barrios is because of the crime and poverty, but Clinton's apparent comfort in the setting was another sign to Latinos of his ease with them, and in their homes. Clinton also used the economic recession of 1991 as a backdrop to his campaign. Many minorities and poor people had been hurt by the flailing economy; which made Clinton's message even more salient to his audience.

The Economy in 1992

In his rhetoric during the 1992 campaign, Clinton connected Latinos' frustration over their economic condition to the American Dream. Many Latinos feel that discrimination has caused their poverty, especially the politics of previous presidents Reagan and Bush. By positioning himself as an Anglo candidate who understood that frustration, Clinton connected with Latinos. In a speech to a group of minorities in Washington, D.C., "Your success is American's success. . . . If you work hard, you'll get ahead not just materially but in your overall ability to fulfill your God-given capacities. That is as it should be and that is the great legacy of our country."⁶⁸ Clinton identified with the minority population by admiring their values and expressing the idea that their values will bring success, despite discrimination. Clinton became one of the leaders that

Chávez hoped for, as Chavez foreshadowed in the “Plan of Delano”, “From this movement shall spring leaders who shall understand us, lead us, be faithful to us, and we shall elect them to represent us. WE SHALL BE HEARD.” Chávez believed that his revolution would create a generation of leaders who would help with the plight of Latinos everywhere; Clinton was a child of that revolution. Clinton told Hispanics that he heard them and would respect them. Another important value in the Latino mindset to stop discrimination, is to change the system, to revolt.

Revolution is a powerful idea in Latino culture, it is a way to change the discrimination that is prevalent in American culture. Just as Mexicans fought for their independence from Spain, and Latinos fought for their rights in California in the 1960’s, Latinos today see non-violent change as an important responsibility.⁶⁹ As César Chávez, explained in the “Plan of Delano”, “Now we will suffer for the purpose of ending the poverty, the misery, and the injustice, with the hope that our children will not be exploited as we have been . . . We shall endure.” Chávez argued that the outcome was worth the struggle, Clinton communicated that message to Latinos. In his ads, when he said, “After I graduated I really didn’t care about making a lot of money. I just wanted to go home and see if I could make a difference.”⁷⁰ Clinton talked about change, about revolution, about taking the few advantages he was given and using them to benefit his community. Clinton’s rhetoric made him seem to understand the struggle Latinos faced in America, whereas his opponent did not. In his first campaign stop in San Antonio during the 1992 Election, Clinton told the crowd, “If we ask Ronald Reagan’s question, ‘Are you better off then you were four or more years ago?’ the Democrats are going

back in the White House.”⁷¹ The struggles of the lower and middle class are problems that Latinos definitely associate with, and as Geoffrey Fox argues, one of the strategies to associating with Hispanics in general is to empathize with those struggles.⁷²

The differences between Clinton’s understanding of the frustration of poverty and his opponents’ were obvious during the presidential debates. When asked about the recession, Clinton was able to make the impact of the economy personal, whereas the other two candidates were unable to connect with average Americans. During the October 15th, 1992 presidential debate, Clinton discussed the plight of poor American families, “All across America, people [talk to me] who have lost their jobs, lost their businesses, had to give up their jobs.”⁷³ By discussing the effects of the recession personally, one on one, with voters all across the nation, Clinton made himself accessible. Which made him appear to be someone who understood what the recession had done to average citizens; this gave him more credibility with poorer Americans, including Latinos.⁷⁴

In that same debate, one moderator asked the candidates to describe how the 1991 recession had affected them personally. Ross Perot argued that the recession spurred him to run for President. Clinton argued that it affected individuals he knew by name, “I have seen what’s happened in this last four years when in my state, when people lose their jobs, there’s a good chance I’ll know them by name. When a factory closes, I know the people who ran it.” Clinton continued, “[The loss of jobs] is because America has not invested in its people. . . . Most people are working harder for less money than they were making ten years ago.”⁷⁵ This answer expressed the important

values of economic opportunity and reinforced Clinton's concern for the poor in

America. Bush, on the other hand, was unable to answer the question:

BUSH: Well I think the national debt affects everybody. Obviously, it has a lot to do with interest rates. It has —

MODERATOR: She's saying you personally.

BUSH: Well, I'm sure it has. I love my grandchildren and I want to think —

Q: How!

BUSH: I'm not sure I get it. Help me with the question and I'll try to answer it.⁷⁶

This blunder just reiterated Bush's distance from the personal effects of the recession:

whereas Clinton talked about its effect on individual people, Bush could not connect

with the average person. In campaign speeches, Clinton would repeat the same

statistics, "People are working harder for less money than they were making ten years

ago, two-thirds of our people."⁷⁷ He told an audience at a minority-based community

center in Los Angeles, "I do not want to win this election to simply change my address. .

. . I want your life to change. I want it to be better."⁷⁸ Clinton reiterated the frustration of

the average person, giving voice to the problems facing the middle-income family, and

Latinos value the importance of giving the impoverished a voice. Clinton's narrative

used the 1991 recession as the setting for where the country was going. Clinton's

narrative was a vehicle for that voice, and seemed to hear the frustrations of the

underprivileged community, which resonated with Hispanics.

Clinton's 1992 American Dream

Whereas previous campaigns had attempted to create an image of 'moving America forward' or attempting to gain votes through particular issues (such as Bush's Willie Horton and crime ads in 1988), Clinton built an audience around the issues he thought important to Latinos in particular. Clinton accomplished this by narrating the

shared election story; with himself in the role of hero and advocate. He was able to accomplish this by sharing in their values and validating the Latino community as an important group. Many Latinos value the things that Chavez discussed in the “Plan of Delano”. Clinton was able to connect to those values and share with Latinos why he was the right person to represent them.⁷⁹ The most important step in sharing this history is to give it legitimacy in a larger context, and by identifying and sharing his time with Latinos; Clinton was able to give them legitimacy in a political world that had begun to question their necessity.

In much of Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, he spoke about the struggles facing marginalized people, from his first ad where he explained his humble beginnings, “I remember that old two-story house where I lived with my grandparents, they had a very limited income,” to his later “I feel your pain” message. Clinton clearly wanted to identify with an audience that understood the struggles of discrimination and economic inequality.⁸⁰ With a group of Cubans in Tampa, Florida, “My fellow Americans, we have a chance not to win a victory of party but to give the American people their government, their country and their future back . . .”⁸¹ Clinton created a situation where all working class Americans, including Hispanics, felt a connection to this poor kid from Hope, Arkansas. This connected Clinton to the values of the Latino community, as described by César Chávez. Clinton was able to describe to the Hispanic population his understanding of their struggle and how through his belief in the American Dream he was able to overcome the obstacles. The American Dream was a force that had acted in his life, and by extension through narrative validity, Latinos could believe that it would

also act in their lives. Through that connection, Clinton gained credibility with Hispanic voters that led to sixty-two percent of Hispanics voting for Clinton nation-wide.⁸²

However, Clinton's success with Latinos in 1992 was minute in comparison to his success in 1996.

Clinton's best resource was his ability to connect with Latinos on the issues that matter to them: jobs and the economy. After winning the Democratic primary election in Texas, exit polling showed that Latinos supported Clinton over Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas by more than three to one. "When we asked people what mattered most to them in the presidential primary, it was a tie between jobs and education."⁸³ Clinton's continual mantra of, "It is the economy, stupid," and his concentration on education resonated with Hispanic voters.⁸⁴ Clinton's view of what was wrong in America 'rang true' with the reality that minority voters had experienced, the story had narrative fidelity. Clinton was able to overcome the problems his campaign had created with the Hispanic establishment by connecting with the voting public on an individual level.

CHAPTER III

1996 ELECTION

The Republican Party's 1994 "Contract with America," and other measures considered anti-immigrant, polarized the nation on issues of ethnicity.¹ During the 1994 off-year election, voters in California, under the influence of Republican Governor Pete Wilson passed Proposition 187, which limited access to public programs to only those who could prove their immigration status. They also passed strict English-only legislation, essentially outlawing bilingual education.² Republicans in twenty-two other states followed California's lead passing English-only legislation aimed mainly at Latinos, many of whom only spoke Spanish. This clear anti-immigrant message from the Republicans caused the minority population, across ethnicities, to support Clinton.³

The struggle of Latinos to be a part of political decisions became even more important in the years between 1992 and 1996, as the political right attacked minority and immigrant rights. When the Republicans took over the Congress in 1994 they quickly ended social programs that were important to Latinos.⁴ Newt Gingrich, author of the 1994 "Contract with America," argued that illegal immigration, specifically from Mexico, was out of hand and needed to be controlled.⁵ In May 1995, the House passed several budget cuts that either reduced or eliminated even more education and social programs often used by Hispanics, specifically poor Hispanics.⁶ With their economic safety net under attack by Congress, Latinos were shocked when the Supreme Court also attacked their voting rights. In June of 1995, the Supreme Court struck down parts of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 had played an integral

role in the number of Latino legislators rising seventy-four percent from 1984 to 1994; this legislation allowed voting districts drawn along racial lines. When it was deemed unconstitutional, Latinos felt that the judicial branch had let them down.⁷ The Latino community saw this turn of events as an unfair strike against them, as Hispanic Congressional Caucus chair Ed Pastor (D-Arizona.) said, “They’ve taken away our economic opportunities, educational opportunities and now our political opportunities.”⁸

The final setback to the Latino community came in August 1995 when California Governor Pete Wilson announced his run for the Presidency under the Statue of Liberty, saying, “that immigrants who arrived at Ellis Island had come to America ‘the right way.’”⁹ He offended not only Latino immigrants but also African-American and Asian-Americans. As historian José de la Isla argued; “[h]e implied that the others—whose ancestors arrived in slave ships or had become Americans because of land acquisition or who were more concerned about fleeing war, revolution, economic wreckage and ruin—didn’t merit the same claim on the country as the European immigrants from the turn of the century.”¹⁰ This general anti-immigrant environment caused many minorities, particularly Latinos, to worry about the importance of the 1996 election.

Unfortunately, Republicans were not the only ones to offend the Hispanic population; President Clinton began the 1996 campaign by offending them as well. In order to protect himself from the Republican claim that he was allowing illegal immigrants to drain our economic resources, Clinton reiterated all the ways he had protected the borders.¹¹ This argument greatly offended Latinos who feel that any attack on immigration is an attack on them.¹²

Clinton regained Latino voters' respect, and ultimately won their support through his use of narratives. Instead of using the materialistic myth of the American Dream as he did in 1992, Clinton focused on the myth of brotherhood, rhetorically arguing that all Americans deserved a chance to have a better life. The main issue in all of the 1996 election was immigration, which asks the most basic question about the American Dream, *who* has the right to access the Dream. Clinton was able to argue that access to the Dream was a basic right guaranteed to all. In doing so, Clinton created an American Dream narrative where he was the narrator and protector of the Dream, and not a character involved in the Dream. In telling his version of the Dream myth Clinton set his narrative in educational facilities, arguing that education was the place where the Dream began. Finally, he used several key concepts from the "Plan of Delano" to communicate with Hispanics his understanding of their values. Ultimately, Clinton's version of the American Dream narrative was grounded in his belief that the Dream is available to all members of American society, as Thomas Jefferson wrote, "all men [*sic*] are created equal."

*The Myth of Brotherhood: the American Dream*¹³

Clinton's rhetoric in the 1996 election was dominated by the moralistic American Dream myth, which argues that success is possible for *anyone*, and that America is the kind of country that accepts *all* people. The moralistic American Dream myth reads much like the materialistic one. As previously mentioned, both are based in the idea of success. It is this kind of openness that has led to millions of people seeking success and "a better life" in America.¹⁴ Whereas the materialistic myth is about financial success,

the moralistic myth is about “the idea of freedom that stresses the freedom *to be* as one conceives himself [*sic*].”¹⁵ This difference seems small at first, but the moralistic myth values equality, education and community.

The moralistic myth is very important to immigrant’s culture. As Cullen argues, immigrants are the ones who keep the dream alive, “In these ways and other[s], the American Dream continues to be stretched, not always comfortably, by those from elsewhere—which in the final analysis is where every American is from.”¹⁶ The moralistic myth is most easily illustrated in the Civil Rights movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s, “But most of us have believed that equality must play a role in everyday American life, even if that role is almost wholly theoretical. That’s because the American Dream depends on it.”¹⁷ Even in 1933, during the Great Depression, John Truslow Adams recognized the power of equality and opportunity in the Dream:

No, the American dream that has lured tens of millions of all nations to our shores in the past century has not been a dream of merely material plenty . . . it has been much more than that. It has been a dream of being able to grow to fullest development as man and woman . . . And that dream has been realized more fully in actual life here than anywhere else, though very imperfectly even among ourselves.¹⁸

America is not perfect, and is certainly not perfect in its equality, but the Dream spurs us to keep trying; trying is enough to bring millions to our shores and across our borders.¹⁹

Latinos understand this Dream. Their ancestors were the ones who gave their lives for the chance at this Dream, a fight that started at the same time as the founding of this nation and culminated in the non-violent revolutions led by César Chávez. They feel its pull and work every day to fulfill their lives through the American Dream. One important component of the moralistic myth is education. Education is the main vehicle

to gain success in America. As Dan Rather explains, “Our democracy and our New World freedom to move beyond the circumstances of our birth have bestowed it this privilege of [education].”²⁰ Clinton reinforced this idea in his 1992 campaign, discussing how his ability to attend Georgetown, Oxford and Yale Law School gave him the ability to move beyond the poverty of his childhood.²¹ Latinos understand the importance of education; in polling education is one of the most important issues in Hispanic’s political choices.²² In 1996 instead of arguing against immigration, which was a no-win issue, Clinton defined the American Dream as offering educational opportunity for all.

In the 1996 election, the Clinton campaign’s narrative of the American Dream, directed at Hispanics could be summarized like this: The American Dream should be available to all people, regardless of race, class or gender. I know the Republicans are telling you that you should not have access to the American Dream, because you are an immigrant. However, I think you should. In addition, I will help you by giving you access to education, which is the one way to make the American Dream a reality.

Ultimately, the 1996 election came down to a debate about immigration, which is the most basic question of *who* has access to the American Dream. Clinton defined himself as the narrator and protector of the Dream, upholding the right of all immigrants to have access to the promise of the Dream. As the narrator of the Dream, Clinton also defined where it should be set, specifically he used educational institutions as the backdrop for his telling of the Dream and finally, he rhetorically connected with Latinos on some of their most important values including representing their voices and

upholding their right to access all of the promises of the American Dream. However, first Clinton had to deal with the issue of immigration.

Intimately related to the debate about the American Dream, is the debate about immigration. *Who* should have access to the promise of the American Dream is the central question about immigration. Immigration is a tough issue there is no right side and there are no easy answers. Moreover, as far as Latinos are concerned, any opposition to immigration is an opposition to them. Therefore, when the Republicans made it their main campaign issue, they started poorly with Latinos, however, so did Clinton.

The Rhetorical Situation in 1996: Immigration

Bill Clinton started the 1996 election year by offending Latinos. However, he was able to turn that mistake into an advantage by defining the American Dream by the opportunity offered to immigrants. Immigration has always been a contentious subject, for both Democrats and Republicans. During his 1996 State of the Union address, President Clinton pledged to increase border patrol (by 50%), to increase inspections to prevent the hiring of illegal immigrants and to deny government contracts to businesses that hire illegal immigrants.²³ Although Clinton was quick to comment, “We are a nation of immigrants and should be proud of that,” it was still perceived as a criticism of the legal and illegal immigrant population, and specifically the Latino population.²⁴ Several articles and op-ed pieces showed the frustration that Latinos across the country felt. One writer commented that the 1996 State of the Union, “. . . displayed a frightening lack of humanity toward millions of Latino families and children . . . Instead

of healing the deep racial and class divisions in our society, Clinton has chosen to exploit them. He has jumped into the driver's seat of the anti-immigration bandwagon."²⁵ Many of the national Latino organizations, who felt that their previous concerns about Clinton had been justified, shared this sentiment.²⁶ This anti-immigrant backlash of 1995 and 1996 led to an increase in the number of both illegal and legal residents who chose to apply for citizenship. Because of bills like Proposition 187 in California, citizenship allowed residents to access some of the services they had been using as illegal immigrants. Furthermore, it allowed them to continue working in jobs that they enjoyed without the harassment of mounting discrimination.²⁷

Clinton blundered again in July of 1996 when his campaign answered an ad run by Dole's campaign by running advertisements about the importance of restricting the borders. Dole's ad, called "Classroom" was a direct critique of Clinton's actions as president:

Two million illegal aliens in California. Twenty thousand in our prisons; four hundred thousand crowd our schools. Every year they cost us three billion tax dollars. Bill Clinton has fought California in court, forcing us to support them. Clinton fought Prop 187, cut border agents, and gave citizenship to aliens with criminal records. We pay the taxes. We are the victims. Our children get shortchanged. If Clinton wins, we lose.²⁸

Republicans laid all of their frustrations about immigrants in this one ad, coupled with the searing verbal attack on Latinos, the visual images of this ad clearly delineated who the party blamed for the problems. The lines about immigrants in schools and prisons were attached to images of dark-haired people in prisons and dark-haired kids in school. Yet, at the end, with the "we pay the taxes" lines, the ad showed pictures of an Anglo couple, clearly distressed looking at a checkbook, and blonde kids looking downtrodden

as they sit in a classroom. What makes these visual images problematic is its clear attack on people who appear Latino, there is no exception made for legal immigrants. Obviously, there is no way for someone to know visually if an immigrant is legal or illegal, but this is the crux of the problem with the immigration debate. When conservatives, like Dole, begin to attack immigrants, it is difficult to distinguish whom they are attacking. Therefore, all Latinos feel demoralized, because their legal status is questioned. Clinton mistakenly responded to Dole's ad with an ad of his own. Clinton's initial reaction was to answer Dole's ad, which was an ill-considered rhetorical action.

Clinton's response ad, entitled "Signed," reaffirmed how Clinton had signed legislation that increased Border Patrol throughout the Southwest:

Bob Dole. Desperate and wrong. President Clinton doubled border agents, a thousand more for California. Signed a tough anti-illegal immigration law protecting US workers. And 160 thousand illegal immigrants and criminals deported, a record. Bob Dole voted against reimbursing California for jailing illegal immigrants. Time Magazine says his risky tax scheme could cut 2,000 border agents.... cut 4,000 FBI. Bob Dole. Wrong in the past. Wrong for our future.²⁹

This advertisement added to the Latino establishment's anger toward Clinton. National Council of La Raza president Raul Yzaguirre told a gathering at the 1996 annual convention (which included representatives from both campaigns); "Intended or not, the presidential candidates are sending us a message about the status of the Hispanic community, they're telling us that we don't count, that our support is not worth soliciting and that we can be taken for granted."³⁰ However, because the ad was in response to a Republican ad accusing Clinton of corrupting the educational system for citizens by

opening up the “floodgates” to immigrants—Clinton gained Latino support by arguing that legal immigration was positive while carefully arguing against illegal immigration.³¹

Clinton communicated with Latinos about immigration when he illustrated his understanding of the issues that are most important in the Hispanic population, specifically, opportunity. Second, when he realized there was no “right” way to talk about immigration, Clinton silenced the campaign on the issue which left Dole as the only candidate talking about immigration and offending Latinos. Clinton chose instead to talk about education and opportunity, two issues that resonate with Latinos. This move forced Dole to posit his anti-immigrant views against Clinton’s belief in the American Dream, and immigrant populations quickly chose sides.

Immigration is directly related to the American Dream. The American Dream is the reason why so many risk their lives to enter this country. When people enter legally, they are searching for opportunity and are willing to leave their families to get it. When people enter illegally, it is because their situation is so desperate; they have no other choice but to try to make a better life. Any criticism of this community ends up being a criticism of all Latinos, especially during the 1996 election when Buchanan and Wilson were arguing about the “right way” to enter the country.³²

The number of young Latino men who seek their fortunes in the United States has increased dramatically in the last two decades. Demographers Sara Curran and Estela Rivero-Fuentes have found that there was a 300 percent increase in the number of young men (between the ages of 17 and 25) fleeing their home countries for the United States, between 1982 and 1997. The research goes on to argue that the success of these

new immigrants is dependent on their family and friends already in the States.³³ Indeed, the draw of this “American Dream” is enough to force some to leave their families in order to pursue some semblance of financial security. Clinton’s narrative strategy was to reinforce his belief in the values of equality, education and opportunity, which are the values of his version of the American Dream. This strategy worked because these values have narrative validity for his audience, Latinos.

By legitimizing an immigrant’s reasons for coming to America, Clinton answered Dole’s criticism of his support of immigrants, and he reinforced his belief in the American Dream and Latinos right to share in it. As he discussed in one stop in Florida on September 6, 1996, “We sometimes forget what a remarkable place the United States is and how real the Statue of Liberty is in the lives of so many millions of our people”³⁴ This statement legitimized the reason why so many immigrants flood the United States, to a certain extent Clinton was saying, ‘I understand why you want to be here in America, it’s okay.’ This message was persuasive to Latinos because they understand why someone would come to America. This message has both narrative fidelity and probability. It has narrative fidelity because they know why the Statue of Liberty is real in people’s lives; this story makes sense with their worldview. The message also has narrative probability, because they know the ‘Dream of the Immigrant’ is a story that they believe, the story is repeated over and over in immigrant cultures. They know that when someone comes to America, they will be welcomed because America is a remarkable place. This story has internal consistency and external consistency with Latinos: it has narrative validity.

Clinton also used the prosperity of freedom in the United States as another example of the nation's international advantage, "I know what I want. I want the American Dream alive for every person who is willing to work for it."³⁵ Clinton is reinforcing the values of equality and work, and specifically the power of the American Dream.³⁶ By reiterating these values, Clinton is persuading his audience by telling a story that has narrative validity, which is important because it communicates Clinton's "good reasons." It communicates that giving opportunity is the right thing to do, that giving opportunity is a morally correct.

Clinton portrayed the story of the American Dream as a continuing struggle for opportunity and equality. In some ways, the 1996 myth was like the 1992 myth—the story of success. However, it was the myth of brotherhood, the moralistic version of the American Dream. When the debate on immigration turned nasty during the summer of 1996, his campaign pulled all offending ads and silenced the candidate on the issue, which allowed Latinos time to forget the comments. Especially since Clinton's opponent, Bob Dole, continued to discuss the immigration issue, Clinton appeared friendlier toward immigrants, and therefore gained support from voters who were sympathetic to immigrants. Clinton accomplished this persuasion by separating himself from his audience, by being both the narrator and protector of the American Dream. As narrator Clinton defined the Dream, explaining what it was to the public through his rhetoric. He was also the candidate who could protect the Dream from those who wanted to change/shorten/deny it. Clinton focused on education as being the star of the American Dream. Clinton also gave his message an interesting setting; he chose poorer

schools and educational facilities as the scene for his telling of the American Dream. All of these components together communicated Clinton's belief in equality and community, a message that had narrative validity for his audience, Latinos.

The Hero

Clinton as Protector/Narrator

In 1992 Clinton was a character in his own narrative of the American Dream, he was a poor kid from Arkansas who had lived with the same struggles as many Latinos—he was the star of the American Dream. In 1996 Clinton was no longer a character in the story of the American Dream—he was the narrator. At its most basic, communication theorist Rudolph Arnheim argues that a narrator should “be recognizable as a human being addressing human beings.”³⁷ As later theorists argue, “the perfect narrator . . . must find his [sic] exact place on the long scale between the extremes of complete empathy and utter detachment.”³⁸ Clinton, as narrator, was trying to find his way between being as connected as he was in 1992, and still being presidential or detached. Instead of characterizing himself as one who has succeeded because of the American Dream, instead as the narrator of the Dream, as President, he has the power to define it.

Clinton did not speak to Latinos as an equal as he did in 1992. Rather, Clinton spoke to them as a narrator, telling the story of the myth from a place separated from the common person—the Oval Office. Clinton was presidential this time, watching the people from his higher stature. Clinton was not arrogant in his separation from the people; he was simply no longer one of them. In October of 1995, Clinton visited Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio and told the mostly Hispanic audience “You have proven

that you could work together across racial and ethnic lines.”³⁹ The language is different from 1992; no longer do “we” work together, but “*you* have shown personal responsibility.”⁴⁰ This separation didn’t affect Clinton’s narrative validity, because his office made the separation natural. No longer could he act as an equal with the Hispanic audience, he was now the President.

Clinton was also separated from his audience, by not being the only character in his advertisements. Instead of Clinton talking to the audience about his upbringing or his policies, the campaign hired actors to describe the wonderful things Clinton had done in his first four years, as protector of the American Dream. During an education ad (aired in Spanish), the Hispanic actor says, “As a student and Latino I know the value of education President Clinton wants to prepare our youngsters for the future.”⁴¹ This ad highlighted Clinton’s separation from his audience, but he was still the force that was working to better education, he was no longer working *with* the Latino population, but *for* them, as the protector of the Dream.

Clinton, as the protector, was moving from his heightened position into a position that was more substantial. His narrative strategy used simple statements to reinforce to the average voter that Clinton supported Latino rights, and valued their influence in American society. This was an important statement during a time when immigrants in general were under attack, by making a few key comments he became an active narrator, taking sides.⁴² At the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute’s annual gala in September 1995, Clinton uttered the simple phrase (in Spanish), “Me gusta hablar español. [I like to speak Spanish],” and went on (in English) to argue for the

importance of bilingual education.⁴³ This statement won over many in the audience because it showed Clinton's support for the group in the middle of a national debate about bilingual education and the value of Latinos in America.⁴⁴ These messages held narrative power because they reinforced Clinton's belief in the importance of the immigrant population, and their language. Clinton moved from a passive narrator to an advocate. Interestingly, he continued to narrate the action of the campaign, but he took sides.

Clinton rhetorically moved from the position of an unbiased narrator into a more active position, which sent a clear statement to the Latino community of his support. Narrators are helpful, especially when there are disagreements, because they help stay just somewhat outside the conflict and yet can influence the outcome, as rhetorical theorist Harald O. Dyrenforth explains, "narration is as much acting as story-telling, and it is within the power of the actor-narrator to lift the narration to just slightly below the emotional level of the dramatic scenes"⁴⁵ Clinton allowed Republicans and Latinos to battle over the rights of immigrants and commented on the situation from his place in the Oval Office. He would tell stories in his speeches of the actions Republicans had taken against immigrants and then he would take a side. He would advocate for the Hispanic community, but he never allowed himself to become a character in the drama, only an observer. As Dyrenforth argues, when a narrator takes sides it becomes a fascinating part of the story. Dyrenforth's case study of the narrator of the Thornton Wilder play *Our Town* sounds like Clinton's approach to the 1996 election "The narrator takes no part in the action; he is merely an observer and commentator. But what an

observer! He is anything but impersonal or unconcerned . . . he is the friend of every man, woman and child in [town]. He lives and loves and hopes and dies with them.”⁴⁶

Clinton had that same kind of stake in the dealings of the Latino community, but he never got involved in the drama. He simply told them that he cared and that he wanted them to prevail.

When Clinton abandoned his role as a character in his version of the American Dream myth, he became a narrator and protector of the Dream, which he defined as the ability to access education. The importance of education and the value of education became the catalyst for change in his myth. As previously stated Clinton’s message to Latinos was ‘I will help you by giving you access to education, which is the one way to make the American Dream a reality.’ Clinton believed, and Latinos agreed, that education was the one way to get out of the cycle of poverty and discrimination that plagued them. In 1992, Clinton used his narrative to tell others about how education had lifted him out of his hometown Hope. The American Dream acted upon him. In 1996 Clinton no longer told his own story, he invited Latinos to live it themselves and the only way to do that was to have equal access to education. And he promises to protect the Dream from the attacks of Republicans so that it will still exist for Latinos in the future. Clinton is acting upon the Dream, defining it, shaping it, and protecting it.

The importance of education, and Clinton’s work to “improve our quality of life,” constituted main themes throughout the 1996 campaign. By focusing on education throughout his stump speeches, and in most of his advertising toward Latinos, Clinton played on the positive image that Hispanics have of the educational opportunities in the

United States. So many members of this community feel that education is the only way to gain the American Dream.

The Scene

Educational Facilities

Access to education is an important part of how Latinos define the American Dream. In every election, in every nation-wide poll education ranks as one of the most important issues to this population. As Latino journalist and researcher, Jorge Ramos explains:

Whoever wants to win the Latino vote will have to address these two critical problems. Hiring a mariachi band to play at a political rally is worthless if the rally itself doesn't feature a comprehensive plan for improving the quality of life and the quality of education for Latino children. It's education *and* the economy, stupid.⁴⁷

Clinton made sure at every stop in Latino populated areas to speak specifically about his plan for improving quality of life and quality of education. According to the Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation survey, 58 percent of Latinos rate education as the most important issue when choosing which candidate to vote for; among those born outside the U.S., the figure jumps to 68 percent.⁴⁸ Giving credence to the importance of education meant that Clinton was giving credence to the hope that Hispanics put in the American Dream.

Clinton's camp ran an advertisement called "Education," in this Spanish-language ad, a young Latino college student told Hispanic voters about the education budget cuts supported by Republicans Bob Dole and Newt Gingrich and about President Clinton's increases in scholarships and grants. The actor ended the ad: "President

Clinton wants to prepare our youngsters for the future, and to have more opportunities to improve our quality of life. That is why on the 5th of November I'm going to vote for President Clinton.”⁴⁹ The ad, which was in Spanish, featured a clean cut, college-aged student who was clearly a model of what the Latino community hopes American education can accomplish. The actor was the epitome of what education could create—a Hispanic who is well spoken and successful, and who cares about helping others. The actor spoke to the audience as a cohort and, therefore, works to persuade them by arguing that Clinton understands their values.

Education is referred to as the only way to open the door to opportunity and a better quality of life. This is one instance where Clinton's campaign used education in an implied way, arguing that Clinton's education policy can give Hispanics legitimacy, like the young man. The young man was education, and he wanted to share his success with others. Again, this message had narrative validity with its audience. Latinos know education can create success; this young man was simply the embodiment of that hope. According to Clinton's narrative, the way to share in that success was through supporting Clinton. On the campaign trail, Clinton was very specific about how he was going to protect education for the masses. Education was not only a part of Clinton's narrative; it was also the setting for his narrative.

President Clinton first outlined a clear plan for increasing educational opportunity for minorities during a stop at Hillsborough High School in Tampa, Florida on September 5, 1996. During the short speech he discussed several issues that later became staples in his stump speeches: the importance of modernizing classrooms and

making community college education accessible to everyone through tax credits and deductions. He concluded his speech by saying, “If we do [these things] we will be well on our way . . . to creating an America where there is opportunity for everyone, without regard to their gender, their race, their ethnic background, where they start from economically, an America where we’re growing together.”⁵⁰ The setting in this case is important because Clinton chose to speak at institutions that were fighting to keep access to education alive and many of these facilities served the minority community. These institutions defined, to Clinton and his audience, the places where the American Dream was accessible.

Modernizing classrooms and making higher education accessible to all through grants was the main message of Clinton’s education speeches during the 1996 election. This strategy was important because it outlined in detail what Clinton intended to do about increasing educational standards. As Jorge Ramos explains, Latinos need to hear a specific plan to solve this nation’s education problems. They do not like to hear only ideas—they want a clear plan.⁵¹ However, the real power in this message was the importance of allowing all Americans to have access to education, the foundation of the American Dream.

Access to higher education is an important issue to Latinos because it represents an opportunity to a better life. Even though statistics show that few Latinos actually complete a college degree, the ability to try is an important part of the freedoms America offers. As Clinton discussed during a campaign stop on September 12, 1996 at Chaffey Community College in Rancho Cucamonga, California, “Let me say that we have to

make college education available to every single solitary person in America. In four years . . . we can make a degree from a community college just as universal in America as a high school diploma is today.”⁵² This statement reiterated Clinton’s belief in the American Dream, and the fact that education is a vehicle to realize that Dream. His education message was well received as he linked education to the need to provide opportunities for it.⁵³ Latinos realize that the only way they will have access to education is when someone in power helps them, this is the role that Clinton takes on as protector of the Dream. That is why, for a majority of Latinos, education is the most important issue in any election. This narrative had narrative validity; it made sense that they needed to support someone who would protect their right to an education.

The message was not the only important part of these stump speeches on education, so was the setting. Clinton’s 1996 campaign trail looks like a tour of educational facilities, especially in California, Florida and the Southwest. During this campaign, Clinton spoke at nine community colleges, high schools and educational facilities, including Valencia Community College in Orlando, Florida; Morris E. Dailey Elementary in Fresno, California; and Gulf Coast Community College in Panama City, Florida.⁵⁴ While it seems like a well-planned campaign trail, it was much more than that. These institutions were not the schools of the Big 10 or the PAC-12 (which would draw larger crowds); these were small community colleges and educational facilities built for the impoverished population. These are institutions that cater to students whose access to education might be in question otherwise; these places helped people who have struggled to get an education. These schools stood in the gap between the poor and

higher education. These were powerful settings for a well-crafted message. By reinforcing the idea that *everyone* should have access to an education, Clinton took sides against the exclusionist rhetoric of his opponent.

Values in the 1996 Election

The “Plan of Delano” outlines several key values that are important in this discussion of Clinton’s version of the American Dream Myth. First, the Plan is generally inclusive—arguing that anyone who fights for social justice is a brother in the battle for equality. This argument derives heavily from the same “all men are created equal” mentality from the moralistic version of the American Dream myth. And second, the Plan also details the importance of fighting for what is right, being heard and finding Anglo candidates who will fight for equality for Latinos. As the second declaration explains, “we shall be heard.”

Previous researchers have argued about the importance of the revolution in Hispanic social history. Latinos are intimately aware of the battle of their fore parents, and believe that revolution is a necessity. In the “Plan of Delano”, Chávez argues,

This is the beginning of a social movement in fact and not in pronouncements. We seek our basic, God-given rights as human beings. Because we have suffered—and are not afraid to suffer—in order to survive, we are ready to give up everything, even our lives, in our flight for social justice. We shall do it without violence because that is our destiny.⁵⁵

Latinos believe in the revolution, the cause (la raza) because it has been the only way to change people’s attitudes. And they believe that the importance of the revolution is more than just something that they represent. All minorities’ struggles for equality are part of that same revolution. In this sense Latinos’ beliefs about the revolution embody

the power of the Myth of Brotherhood. All minorities are brothers in the fight for freedom, and all their hard work should be unified:

We know that the poverty of the Mexican or Filipino worker in California is the same as that of all farm workers across the country, the Negroes and poor whites, the Puerto Ricans, Japanese, and Arabians; in short, all of the races that comprise the oppressed minorities of the United States That is why we must get together and bargain collectively. We must use the only strength that we have, the force of our numbers.⁵⁶

When Clinton defined the American Dream through the Myth of Brotherhood it was compelling for Latinos because they too understand the importance of sharing in the revolution, not only with other Latinos, but also with all minorities. This version of the Dream represented their values and had narrative validity in their eyes.

Second, Clinton also represented the kind of leader that Latinos were looking for, as Chávez explained, “To the politicians we say that the years are gone when the farm worker said nothing and did nothing to help himself. . . from this movement shall spring leaders who shall understand us, lead us, be faithful to us, and we shall elect them to represent us.”⁵⁷ Clinton represented the best kind of candidate to Latinos, he understood their desires and was willing to represent them. By establishing himself as the protector of the American Dream he became the embodiment of the “Plan of Delano”, an Anglo politician who would understand, lead, and be faithful; and in return, Latinos elected him. He communicated the ability to protect the American Dream for them, by focusing on how his vision of the Dream provided opportunity.

In a move reminiscent of his 1992 campaign, Clinton focused on the importance of opportunity in the American Dream during the 1996 election. In five different speeches in Latino areas, he discussed the importance of opportunity. “I want an America where the American Dream is alive and well for any person responsible enough

to work for it, without regard to race or gender or background or where they start out in life.”⁵⁸ This idea resonated throughout several different speeches in California, Florida and New Mexico.⁵⁹ The idea of opportunity is important in the immigrant community because, as Latino researcher José Ramos argues in his book *The Latino Wave*, “[Latinos] long for [the United States’] freedoms and high standard of living.”⁶⁰

The message has narrative validity with Latinos because they believe in the freedoms offered in America. Latinos also tend to agree with the sentiment of equality regardless of upbringing, because, as research has proven, Latinos are always most concerned with social issues; including education, poverty issues and equal opportunity. “When asked about the *most* important issue the nation or their city faces, Latinos consistently identify social issues.”⁶¹ Indeed, Clinton’s strategy of expanding on the importance of the American Dream for all was an important part of his message to Latinos.

The values of the “Plan of Delano” were still powerful and compelling for Latinos in 1996. The two values that Clinton used are easily represented by their slogans from the Plan: WE SHALL BE HEARD and UNITED WE WILL STAND. This is the message that Clinton used to gain narrative validity with Latinos. He recognized their desire to find an Anglo candidate who would represent them and he shared his belief that opportunity was to be shared by all. These narratives led to a great success for Clinton in the 1996 election.

Clinton's 1996 American Dream

Despite early missteps in the 1996 election, Clinton was able to retain his popularity among Latino voters by keeping silent on the issue of immigration. He went on to win seventy-two percent of the Latino vote, the highest percentage since Johnson's 1964 election.⁶² One reason for his win was because he stayed relatively silent on immigration while his opponent alienated the Latino vote. Instead of talking about immigration, Clinton focused on education—the way to share in the American Dream. Because of the anti-immigration backlash during the election, Clinton's silence, and his encouragement of traditional Latino issues like education and the American Dream, led to his popularity in the community. More than five million Hispanics went to the polls in 1996, a twenty percent increase over 1992.⁶³ Clinton's win was a blessing, in the end, for the Hispanic community, as it reinvigorated a voting bloc that had suffered a great deal during the anti-immigrant trends during the 1994 off-year elections. Clinton revitalized them by changing the way he talked about the American Dream.

The American Dream myth is powerful. Millions of immigrants cross our borders annually to have a chance at the success it offers. Millions more live daily with discrimination and poverty hoping that it still exists. Latinos, in particular, believe in the power of the Dream and continue to search for it in this country. In 1996, Hispanics were under attack from the political right. Republicans had acted in ways to make immigrants feel unwelcome. Conservatives were trying to make a distinction between legal and illegal immigrants, but in the eyes of Latinos, any criticism of immigration is a criticism of them. Latinos felt attacked, and they turned to the advocate who had worked

with them in 1992. Unfortunately, Clinton immediately entered into the immigration debate offending Hispanics across the country. However, he quickly retreated. Instead, he created a new rhetorical message. Clinton took on a new character, the narrator and protector of the Dream; Clinton's narrative was distant, separate and presidential. Paradoxically, Clinton was still interested, but rhetorically he was no longer part of the struggle—he was the protector of the Dream and he helped to define it, but he was not in the trenches with minorities as he had been in 1992. In 1996, Clinton gave Latinos support; spoke on their behalf, but never got involved in the drama. He told a version of the American Dream myth in which community and equality were the paramount values, and the only way to reach that success was through education. Instead of discussing the rights of immigrants, Clinton focused on the amazing opportunity offered to all, through the American Dream, Clinton's narrative gave this community solidarity and an advocate at a time when they were being attacked from all sides.

In the end, Clinton had become one of the most popular and well-respected presidents in the Latino community, but a rich boy from Texas was able to match Clinton's popularity in the community. In 2000, George W. Bush created a bond between Latinos and Republicans that many thought was impossible.

CHAPTER IV

2000 ELECTION

The intervening years between the 1992 and 2000 elections were destructive for the relationship between Latinos and Republicans. The 1994 off-year election and the 1996 presidential election brought out the uglier side of the immigration debate; Republicans used immigrant bashing as their main campaign issue—a fact that Hispanics did not forget. The Republican Party became the anti-immigrant party and the anti-minority party; therefore, any notice they gave to Latinos seemed insincere. Many Latinos believed that Republicans' interest in them was superficial at best. After all, Republicans “had long proclaimed their desire to appeal to Hispanic voters – even as they supported efforts that alienated them, such as the controversial 1998 poll-watching drive to monitor ‘unqualified’ voters, and Proposition 187, the anti-illegal immigration initiative.”¹ From the beginning of the 2000 election Bush had a hurdle to overcome, Latinos believed that Republicans did not understand them; any attempt to prove otherwise would not have narrative fidelity. The idea that a Republican wanted to ally with Latinos would not have made sense with what Latinos already knew about the GOP. Bush himself recognized the difficulty he faced, he commented once during the election, “I believe this party is anxious for a different style of campaign. I think the Republican Party has somehow gotten the image that we are not mindful of the concerns of new Americans.”² When Bush began to campaign in 2000 he had to rebuild trust with the Hispanic community if he wanted his message to have narrative validity.

Even prior to the 1994 and 1996 elections that strongly alienated Latinos, Republicans struggled with connecting. Since the 1950's Hispanics voted for Democrats because they felt that Democrats understood the importance of equality of opportunity. Current research shows that those trends have continued into the 2000 election with Hispanics supporting the Democratic Party twice as often as Republicans.³ Of the Latinos who are Republicans most tend to be either Cuban or wealthy (a family income of \$50,000 or higher), whereas, Latino Democrats tend to be from a lower socio-economic groups (family income of less than \$30,000) and are either Mexican or Puerto Rican.⁴ Many Hispanics feel that Democrats understand their economic necessities and will fight to protect programs important to them, like Medicare, Medicaid and Welfare. Despite all of these barriers, somehow Bush was able to persuade nearly 40% of Hispanic voters to vote for him in 2000.⁵ Essentially, he influenced many Latinos to vote against their economic interests.

From the beginning of the 2000 campaign, George W. Bush made it clear that he was going to work to win as many Hispanic votes as possible. Media outlets reiterated Jack Kemp's proclamation that Latinos were the new "soccer moms," and political consultants, particularly Republicans, were listening.⁶ In a sense, Kemp's statement was a rallying cry to remind Latinos that Republicans would not forget them again. Although Republicans had been isolationist during the 1996 election and their rhetoric inflammatory, if not openly xenophobic and racist, during the intervening years, they adopted a more conciliatory stance and changed their message in 2000. This change came in part because of the importance of the sheer number of Latino voters, as

journalist Gregory Rodriguez explains: “In the unforgiving algebra of presidential politics the ‘Hispanic vote’ has long been a constant . . . marked for the Democratic side of the equation . . . Welcome to the new math of Campaign 2000.”⁷ This change can be attributed to Bush; his close relationship with Latinos gave him the needed narrative fidelity to persuade Latinos that he wanted to mend relations with them. Bush had a clear record in Texas that he could refer to; he could clearly show Latinos that while other Republicans had ignored them, he had always worked well with Hispanics. He was different than any other Republican; this knowledge gave his campaign the necessary credibility.

George W. Bush approached campaigning to Latinos differently than his predecessors.⁸ He faced it differently than even his father. Growing up in Midland, Texas in the 1950’s and 60’s around Latino (mostly Mexican) families, young George W. Bush learned what mattered to Hispanics. He also traveled with his father to Latin America on business trips during his adolescence, and he has credited those trips with shaping his views on how the United States should carry out international relations with Latin America.⁹ Unlike any of his predecessors, Bush is fluent in Spanish and comfortable with the Hispanic community.¹⁰ Bush’s wife, Laura, also has close ties to the Latino community. She has family ties in the predominately Latino town of El Paso and witnessed firsthand the struggles of minority children in education while she was a teacher in inner city Austin.¹¹ Furthermore, Bush’s close relations with the Latino community have affected more than his views of the world, it has also shaped his politics.

Bush has been a strong supporter of immigration and Latino issues, such as education reform, bilingual education and increasing economic opportunity for minorities in general.¹² During his 1994 gubernatorial run, Bush did not take advantage of his connection to Latinos, and, consequently only won 28 percent of the Hispanic vote.¹³ Nevertheless, in his first four years as Governor of Texas, he made Latino issues a central part of his administration. During his first term as governor, Bush was able to make important connections with Hispanics. Governor Bush tried to create a program to help illegal immigrants gain citizenship and openly criticized “English Only” programs.¹⁴ Of greater importance to Hispanics, Bush did not join in the anti-immigrant language of the 1994 Republican mid-term election. Governor Bush was openly critical of Proposition 187 and 1996 presidential candidates Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan, who made immigrant bashing their main campaign themes.¹⁵ By the 1998 gubernatorial election, he doubled the number of Latinos who voted for him; in 1998, he received 49 percent of the Hispanic vote in Texas.¹⁶ During his time as Governor of Texas 13% of his appointments went to Hispanics, a small number to some, but commendable in comparison to other Republican governors.¹⁷ Clearly Bush’s experiences in Texas with its growing Latino population taught him both the issues that matter to Hispanics and the importance of the Latino vote. Therefore, when it came time to run for the White House, Bush did not forget the importance of the fastest-growing minority group in winning a nation-wide election.¹⁸

The biggest difference between Bush and Clinton was in the medium of their message. Bush chose to reach out to Latinos through advertising—the campaign and the

Republican National Committee spent a total of ten million dollars on Spanish-language advertising.¹⁹ Unlike Clinton, who spent little time or money on advertising to Hispanics, Republicans spent ten times as much as Democrats in the 2000 election.²⁰ While Clinton did not film any television commercials in Spanish, Bush chose to use Spanish almost exclusively. In his most notable advertisements Bush used his Latino nephew, George P. Bush, as the main character of his ads.²¹ Despite this difference, and the others mentioned, there was a unifying element between the rhetorical strategies Bush used in 2000 and Clinton's 1992 and 1996 strategies. They both used narratives, specifically the American Dream narrative, to persuade their audience of the importance of their message. This narrative strategy was the full realization of President Reagan's 1979 musing to Lionel Sosa, "Hispanics are Republicans, they just don't know it."²² Initially, we must evaluate Bush's narrative strategy toward Hispanics.

Narratives

As established in Chapter I, the key elements of a myth are the characters, the scene and the moral of the story. The Immigrant story of the American Dream is a powerful reminder of why so many flee to America. Jim Cullen, in *The American Dream*, argues that the Dream of the Immigrant continues to draw millions to this country. It is the reason why so many feel a powerful pull to the freedoms and opportunities America offers. Much like Clinton, Bush used the Dream of the Immigrant as a powerful narrative during his elections. In the 2000 election, nephew George P. Bush was presented as the hero of the Dream, as the embodiment of all that immigrants hope America can give.²³ Bush's description of the American Dream was a

combination of both the materialistic and moralistic parts of the myth. He argued that financial success was available to everyone, and that America should give that same promise to immigrants, “I want the American Dream, el sueño Americano, to belong to all Americans If your parents are first generation (immigrants) . . . this dream belongs to you as much as anyone else.”²⁴ This interpretation of the American Dream was difficult for Latinos to understand, because the message lacked narrative validity.

There are two parts to the concept of narrative validity, probability and fidelity. As narrative theorist Walt Fisher wrote in his book *Human Communication as Narration*, “The principle of coherence [probability] brings into focus the integrity of a story as a whole, but the principle of fidelity pertains to the individuated components of stories—whether they represent accurate assertions about social reality and thereby constitute good reasons for belief or action.” Narrative probability is important for the story to make sense, to have consistency internally. The beginning, middle and end of the story must make sense with the audience’s understanding of how a story works. Narrative fidelity, on the other hand, is based on the social reality of the audience. The story must make sense with what the audience knows to be true of the world. The values of the narrative must make sense externally with the audience’s perception of reality.

Bush really struggled with the narrative validity of his campaign's message in 2000. Initially, his story lacked both narrative fidelity and probability. When he told Latinos that the American Dream was real and was available to them, the message lacked narrative probability because so many of them had watched as the American Dream story was denigrated by legislation like Proposition 187. The idea that an

immigrant could come to America and be successful just did not make sense anymore. The American Dream narrative had lost much of its luster because Republicans had taken action to deny Latinos access to the Dream. So, the internal consistency of the story was in question. The narrative also lacked fidelity because Latinos knew that Republicans would do everything they could to limit their access to the Dream. Latinos value opportunity and equal access for all to the promise of the American Dream; Republicans had proven that they wanted to create a social reality that did not include those same values. Bush's campaign struggled to regain narrative validity for their story.

Initially, they attempted to regain narrative probability by arguing that Bush was clearly someone whose actions were consistent with Latinos' view of the American Dream. He used his past experience as Texas Governor to show Latinos that the American Dream story was still true, at least in Texas, and that as President he would expand that story across the country. He attempted to reconstruct the internal story of the American Dream by explaining how he had given educational opportunity to children in Texas, which was one way to gain the American Dream. However, this appeal did not solve the problem of the narrative having no external consistency. Even though Latinos could believe that Bush wanted to restore the American Dream itself, they felt that the social reality created by Republicans would be hostile to such a change. This is where the campaign had to find a new character to persuade Latinos that Republicans could be friendly to them. George P. Bush, son of Jeb Bush, had been given many of the privileges of money and power, but was still proud of his Latino

heritage. When he took over as the ‘face’ of the campaign, Latinos began to see that the world was changing and that the Republican Party was changing also. This change not only needed a new hero, it also needed a new setting. “Un Nuevo Día [A New Day]” was coming, according to the campaign, and in that new setting the social reality would change. This new day would create an opportunity for the American Dream myth to have fidelity again, because the Republican Party was changing. Latinos began to believe that a Republican could find a way to protect their interests and give them access to the Dream.

George W. Bush’s rhetorical strategies during the 2000 election were quite different from Bill Clinton’s strategies in 1992 and 1996. Clinton’s rhetoric was layered with many different meanings, and he expertly used rhetoric to persuade his audience. Bush, however, had a simple message for Latinos—I am one of you, I understand you, I share in your vision for the American Dream. However, his message was always clouded by the legacy of the GOP. While Bush attempted to show Latinos that he understood them and was willing to work with them, he was unable to create a message that had narrative validity because Latinos had not known Republicans they could trust. Bush’s message did not make sense with what Latinos know about Republicans, the narrative had no fidelity. However, once the campaign introduced a different voice, a different hero they were able to overcome that concern. When the campaign introduced George P. Bush, the candidate’s half-Mexican nephew, as the face of the campaign toward Hispanics the message regained fidelity. Here was someone who *did* understand Latinos and who *could* vouch for the fact that George W. did too. Ironically, the message did

not change; both George W. and George P. were saying the same thing—that the candidate would protect Latino values and fight for the promise of the American Dream. The narrative simply did not have validity when a known Republican said it. But, a Latino, who happened to be related to the candidate, did have narrative fidelity.

In the 2000 election, Bush used the medium of television advertising to connect with Latinos. Few speeches were given specifically to Latinos, instead the campaign made commercials. This created a different perspective for the analysis, as the ads have both visual and rhetorical elements. For the purposes of this chapter, I will evaluate both the visual and the spoken rhetoric.

The Rhetorical Situation in 2000

“Para mí, la educación es number uno,” [For me, education is number one] a straight-faced and serious George W. Bush told his Hispanic audience, “Porque nuestros hijos merecían lo mejor [Because our children deserve the best].”²⁵ During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush reached out to the Hispanic community, not only in their own language, but also by recognizing their values. On Election Day, Bush received 35 percent of the Hispanic vote nationwide.²⁶ While Bush was not the only candidate reaching out to the Hispanic community, his campaign was seen as revolutionary because of the intensity of his desire to gain the Hispanic vote.²⁷

When Bush decided to run for the presidency, he decided that he was going to make a determined effort to pursue the votes of the Hispanic population. Bush’s original message was to persuade Latinos using their values, specifically their support of education. This strategy was moderately effective. However, it was the inclusion of his

nephew in a separate set of ads, and the changing setting of the story, that rallied Latinos to his side. Initially, Bush tried to mobilize Latinos by persuading them on one of their favorite issues, education.

The Education President & The Fight for California

From the beginning of the campaign George W. Bush made an effort to speak to as many Hispanic organizations as possible, including some organizations that traditionally were not kind to Republicans. The message was always predominately about education, an issue that he felt Latinos could identify with. In the fall of 1999 Bush began to speak to Latino groups in delegate-rich California, and his message was all about education. His first policy speech on education was given to a group of Hispanic leaders in Los Angeles, “Bush . . . who called himself ‘the education president,’ delivered his maiden speech about improving schools ‘We do not have a national school board and do not need one. A president is not a federal principal, and I will not be one . . . When we spend federal money, we want results.’”²⁸ This message continued at the Republican National Hispanic Assembly Dinner at the end of September 1999. He received their yearly award for service to the Latino community, “‘The assembly selected Mr. Bush because of his involvement in the Latino communities in Texas, fostering education and revitalizing Latino neighborhoods,’” said Jose Rivera, the assembly's national chairman [sic].²⁹ Governor Bush unveiled his most well known educational theme, “creating a system where *no child is left behind*,” during a rally in San Antonio in December of 1999.³⁰

This outreach made a huge difference in Bush's poll numbers with Latinos. In a poll taken in September of 1999, 34% of Latinos said that they would be willing to vote for the Republican candidate, while a staggering 66% said they would vote for the Democrat.³¹ However, once Bush became the frontrunner, those numbers shifted in his favor. In a *Wall Street Journal*/NBC poll taken in December, 52% of Latinos said they would support George Bush, even ardently liberal Latino groups were forced to concede Bush's success with Hispanics. The national executive director of the League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC) explained the change; "Bush has taken a completely different approach to Hispanics. He is not using the wedge issues Republicans have used in the past. He is not sending out vibes to Hispanics that I'm picking on you."³² The spokesperson for the National Council of La Raza explained the support in a similar way "Now you have a candidate who shows that he wants to be more inclusive, and Latinos have responded well to that."³³ Bush's genuine attention to Latinos and their issues led to good polling numbers in the beginning of the election, mainly because of his focus on education.

However, there was one group of Latinos that did not support Bush -- Californians. While national polls showed Bush winning among Hispanics by nine points, polling in California showed that Gore would beat Bush by eleven points in the state.³⁴ The reason for the anomaly was simple, Californians had not forgotten the hate filled politics of Pete Wilson, "The huge question mark, of course, is California, where the state GOP alienated Latino voters in 1994 by sponsoring an ugly, racially tinged campaign to ban benefits to illegal immigrants . . . [Some have] predicted that the GOP

has forfeited any chance of cultivating Latino support for at least a generation.”³⁵ Bush’s trips to California were under girded with a message of apology, making sure that Latinos knew he did not agree with the politics of Pete Wilson and others, “the fine line Bush is walking—appealing to Latinos and others who have recently spurned the GOP while holding on to his conservative base—was evident.”³⁶ California is important to study in this election, because it was a microcosm for the problems that Bush faced. All of Bush’s rhetorical problems were evident in California because those Latinos were still feeling the pain of the 1994 and 1996 elections. California is also where Bush eventually found a solution to his rhetorical problem, in the hero of his story. Bush needed to find a message that resonated with Latinos, especially in California, and the first attempt at that message was about education.

Education became such a key part of the campaign to Latinos that Bush visited California three times during the spring and summer of 2000, and every time he met with Latino groups, specifically to discuss education. As one journalist noted, “He never goes into a school where you don’t see him with Hispanic children.”³⁷ By March of 2000 Bush was leading Gore in national polls of Latinos, one poll showed that, in a two-way race between Gore and Bush, Bush would win with 51 percent.³⁸ Yet, Bush still could not persuade Californians to follow suit. In the March Primary he received only 18% of the Hispanic vote, in comparison to Gore’s 56%.³⁹ “Hispanics are still angry at former Republican Governor Pete Wilson and his drive to pass Proposition 187, a measure aimed at illegal immigration.”⁴⁰ Bush’s campaign believed that, if he could win in California, he could win anywhere; so they made California their top priority.⁴¹

During his first trip back to California in April 2000, Bush visited the National Hispanic Women's Conference. He spoke to them about education, focusing on immigrant children and their right to the American Dream. He argued against Republicans, like Wilson, who wanted to keep illegal children from the public school system. "We will not use our children, the children of immigrants, as a political issue in this country."⁴² This stance was risky, many conservative Republicans had supported the actions of Wilson and others, yet Bush's message was clear, "I understand not everybody will agree with my politics. But you've got to agree with my vision that says this country belongs to you, and my leadership style that welcomes new faces and new voices in our country."⁴³ This statement rejected the politics of separation, a message that Californian Latinos needed to hear from Bush. He acknowledged that he needed to change the image of the Republican Party "Our party, our candidate – me – has got to do a better job of convincing people that we want every child educated."⁴⁴

When Bush returned to California in May for a second trip, he went to several poor Hispanic schools to talk about education, and celebrated Cinco de Mayo in Santa Ana chatting with the locals.⁴⁵ Most of the trip was spent denying his opponent's latest attacks on Bush's connection to the National Rifle Association, but every stop was spent at Hispanic schools, "Some people aren't going to like the idea of me saying, 'you know, we ought to welcome immigrants to America . . . ' (but) I am campaigning in Hispanic venues, all trying to send that signal that the past is the past."⁴⁶ This message rejected the criticisms of his opponents and made his identification with the struggles of immigrants clear.

In the time between his second and third visits, George Bush received bad news. A bipartisan poll released in early May showed that Bush lost his lead among Hispanics across the nation, “Gore, who trailed Bush among Hispanics by 6 points in March, now leads by 12 points, an 18-point swing that could reflect serious volatility in a key slice of the electorate.”⁴⁷ This unusual tumble in the polls was difficult to explain. After the poll was released, several Latino journalists attempted to explain the drop as voters’ realizing that the Republican Party’s interest in them was shallow. “The Year of the Latino Voter? Only in Campaign Rhetoric,” and “Latino Voters Get a lot of Lip Service,” were the headlines the next day.

No one could completely explain the drop. Republicans argued that Hispanics were simply more comfortable with Democrats as Ed Goeas, a Republican pollster, argued, “some core Hispanic constituencies are going back [to the Democratic Party].”⁴⁸ But the problem can be explained rhetorically, Bush’s message had regained probability, but it still lacked narrative fidelity. Much like the Hispanics in California, Latinos across the nation could not understand how Bush could make his promises a reality; they felt that the climate of the Republican Party would not allow Bush to bring the changes he promised. Bush acknowledged this himself, “I think here in California there are people who are skeptical that my vision of the country includes them and their families and that the policies I espouse would be good for them and their families.”⁴⁹ Bush had to prove that his vision of the Dream was not consistent with the perception about his Party’s vision of the myth. The way he did that was to change the face of the campaign, which he did during his third trip to California.

It is during his third trip, in June, that Bush became more focused; he spoke with two of the most influential and ardently liberal Hispanic groups, the National Council of La Raza and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC).⁵⁰ However, the biggest change began during a stop in East Los Angeles, where he introduced his nephew to the crowd. This was the beginning of a real transition in his campaign.

George W. Bush began the 2000 election with a specific message to Hispanics – “you matter.”⁵¹ Throughout the primary election season, December through April, Bush spoke to numerous Latino groups at Hispanic conferences and visited the barrios and colonias of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California.⁵² Bush spoke about the issue that mattered most to Latinos: education, calling himself the “Education President.”⁵³ However, his attention did not work.⁵⁴ In May a bipartisan poll by The Voter.com/Battleground found that Bush’s numbers with Latinos had dropped by eighteen points in two months and that Gore’s favorable rating among Latinos was twelve points higher than Bush.⁵⁵ This pro-education message worked for a time, but by May, Hispanics were no longer persuaded by the message. The narrative lacked narrative validity because Latinos did not believe that a Republican could had a real commitment to their issues, the story lacked narrative fidelity. Latinos still could not believe that a Republican would really work on their behalf; they had not seen it happen in more than 20 years. Even though Bush was willing to work with them, there was a concern that he was just one person in the larger GOP machine, which was not willing to compromise.⁵⁶ In order to understand why Bush’s message did not translate into long-term Latino support, I will evaluate two education-based advertisements.

“Education in Texas” Advertisement

In the ad “Education in Texas,” Bush promoted his record in Texas. The ad began by focusing on the paradox between the strong economy and the weak position of Latinos in the marketplace; this message resonated with Latinos who felt that they had not profited from the growing economy.⁵⁷ Then the ad focused on Bush’s education accomplishments in Texas—two important parts of the ad are the visuals and the focus on “education.”

The advertisement said:

(Female announcer) They say that the economy’s better than ever, but in our neighborhoods, we feel forgotten. We need a better education. And that means a new commitment. In Texas, Governor Bush raised academic standards and teacher salaries. Test scores have improved. Now minority children in Texas lead the country in academic improvement. (George Bush) For me, education is number one. Because our children deserve the best.⁵⁸

The visual images in the advertisement added to the narrative being told by the announcer. The beginning of the ad showed depressing scenes of a run-down neighborhood with the pictures shot in black and white and somber music playing in the background. There are images of a Hispanic young man, his hand on his chin, looking completely hopeless; embodying what life can be like for Latinos who are not successful in America.⁵⁹ The producers put into visual images the narrative that Latinos told about their situation. The announcer’s language included us/them language, which invites an association between the audience and the narrator. The narrative reiterated how Latinos felt that their government has forgotten them.⁶⁰ Then the announcer said, “We need a better education. And that means a new commitment.” Then the tone of the music changed, the images go from black and white to color. These visuals complemented the

narrative that a change was coming, something that will take the audience from grey to color. Children are shown running and happy, enjoying time in a classroom, raising their hands and smiling as a Latina teacher walks between the desks, then children running home laughing at the end of the day. The ad concluded with a synopsis of Bush's accomplishments in Texas and a personal message from the candidate, "Para mí, la educación es número uno, [For me, education is number one]. Porque nuestros hijos merecían lo mejor" [Because our children deserve the best].⁶¹

The change from black and white to color is a visual depiction of this 'nuevo día' that Bush's later ads promised. The children looked happy; they are laughing and enjoying learning. They ran home from school, smiling. This is a dramatization of the fulfillment of Bush's promises, if elected. This last part of the ad looks like the Hispanic ads that come later in the election. Bush is casually dressed, in a living room setting, relaxed. He spoke straight to the audience, sternly telling them what is important to him. His voice was strong; he seemed willing to fight for their children. It was important to convey that strength, especially on this issue that was important to Hispanics.⁶²

"Education" (Spanish) Advertisement

While the advertisement "Education (Spanish)" debuted on the same day as the "Education in Texas" ad, there were some important differences. Whereas the "Education in Texas" ad focused on Bush's accomplishments in Texas, the "Education" ad set up his basic educational beliefs, ideas that would later be incorporated into his educational plan for the future, if elected.

(Male Announcer) One out of every five children born in this country is Latino. Their education will not only define their future, but the future of our nation.

George W. Bush knows that an education will bring opportunity. He wants every child to read well, that parents can choose the best school for their children and that schools are held responsible for their performance. (George W. Bush) For me, education is number one. Because our children deserve the best.

The images in the “Education” ad are of children, from the opening shot of a Hispanic girl and a White boy until the last shots of college-age students. In the ad the children are having fun, laughing in class, watching a parade, reading and generally enjoying life. When the announcer says, “George W. Bush knows that education will bring opportunity,” the image changed to George and Laura Bush sitting amongst students in a classroom setting, talking to them and reading to them. Bush’s Spanish ads differed from the type usually targeted at Anglo audiences.

Under the advice of Sosa, Bush’s Spanish ads did not show him speaking to crowds, but interacting with the public and talking candidly with the viewers.⁶³ Images of a pontificating politician can be positive or negative: they can recreate a powerful event to allow the audience to feel the excitement of the campaign trail, or they can show the politician as unconnected to the audience. Anglo media consultants use these pontificating images to prove the candidate’s ability to lead. However, this strategy does not work with Hispanics; communication consultants say that, like many others, Hispanics prefer more communicative speakers. They are less concerned with candidates who appear presidential, and more concerned with candidates who can understand them. They want to feel like they know a candidate. They want to watch the candidate on TV and feel that the candidate is talking to them, not at an undefined audience. They want to feel that the candidate is down to earth and real. Putting a

candidate in 'presidential' settings only causes the Hispanic audience to feel disconnected from the candidate.⁶⁴

There were also no contrasting images of hopeless children; it is clear that these happy faces are part of Bush's ideal new day. This ad covered other educational issues such as Bush's stance on school choice and teacher's salaries.⁶⁵ Most Hispanics agreed strongly with Bush on school choice. They felt that educators should be held accountable for the education they are providing.⁶⁶ This ad laid the groundwork for Bush's educational plan 'No Child Left Behind,' which came later, but this ad clarified Bush's opinion of the important issues about education.

A second difference in the "Education" ad was the announcer. This announcer was used in order to reach a specific audience -- Mexicans along the U.S. border. The announcer on this ad was a male with an unusually thick accent, almost unintelligible. His dialect was consistent with the thick Mexican-accented Spanish that was spoken along the border.⁶⁷ Usually producers choose to hire announcers that have clear diction and pronunciation as in the "Education in Texas" ad, where a woman with polished enunciation is the announcer. Nevertheless, in this case, I believe the decision was a strategic one.

These advertisements were not as successful as the campaign would have hoped. These ads served to show Latinos that Bush understood what was important to them. Nevertheless, the message did not resonate in such a way to translate to votes because the narrative was answering previous criticisms.⁶⁸ After the 1996 election, many Hispanics no longer trusted Republicans to protect and support public education. Latinos

believed that Republicans in general were anti-Hispanic; therefore Bush's message had no narrative fidelity for them. They did not believe that a candidate with an R after his name could uphold their values or beliefs. In the Plan of Delano Chávez wrote about finding candidates who would understand, lead and be faithful to Hispanics.⁶⁹ Latinos did not trust Republicans to do that. Bush and the GOP needed to reestablish that they were not just saying they believed in education, but would support their belief with action.⁷⁰

Bush spent a great deal of time at the beginning of the election talking about the education issue.⁷¹ As Bush himself explained in a stop in Los Angeles, "'I've got a lot of challenges in the state of California, I've got to change the perception that our party is anti-education Some think our party is anti-immigrant. But, we're making progress.'"⁷² As one journalist explained, "Typically, when speaking to Latino audiences, the Texas governor stresses Latinos' ability to overcome persistent obstacles. He deftly appeals to Latinos' pride in ethnicity while simultaneously declaring that they are integral and capable members of mainstream America."⁷³ The main theme of Bush's early speeches to the Latino community was education. Hispanics care about education because they see it as the key to opportunity and the American Dream. Bush was able to successfully convince Latinos that he cared about this issue. His narrative was clear, "For me, education is number one."⁷⁴ No matter what the Democrats tried to do, they could not seem to persuade the American public that Bush did not care about education, in DNC polls run during the election, 42 percent of Americans thought that Bush would do a good job on education, while 46 percent thought Gore would.⁷⁵ Clearly, the

American public believed *both* candidates would protect public education in America, which was a winning strategy for Bush since he started off the election attempting to dispel the myth that Republicans were anti-education. However that did not correspond to actual votes because Latinos still wanted proof that Bush truly *understood* them.⁷⁶ Therefore, George W. Bush had to find a way to connect with Latinos and to persuade them to cross party lines and vote for him. He did that by making his nephew, George P. Bush, the hero of his campaign narrative.

The Hero

George Prescott Bush

After his introduction to the public in California, George Prescott Bush, the oldest son of Jeb and Columba Bush, quickly became the face of his uncle's campaign targeting Latinos. P., as he is referred to, is Hispanic (Columba is originally from Mexico), and he is fluent in Spanish. At one of the very first campaign stops after the convention, the staff decided that George P. Bush would be key in the Hispanic community. Lionel Sosa explained the reason why the campaign decided to use P.,

I first saw him when he and I were in San Bernardino, California We were told, 'This is a group of important Democrats, and we need to get our message out.' What I didn't realize was that these voters were not just ordinary Democrats. They were César Chávez United Farm Worker Union Democrats! As I arrived, a fellow making a speech at the podium declared, 'The enemy is among us.' . . . Then George P. Bush arrived They came to him One man about forty years old came up to him and said, 'I want to shake the hand of the man who will be the first Hispanic president of this country.'⁷⁷

Subsequently, Sosa realized what an important instrument P. could be.

P. was a willing participant. He believed in his family and was more than willing to help his uncle.⁷⁸ This willingness also helped George W. Bush in the eyes of

Hispanics because “[t]o Hispanics in the United States, ‘family helping family’ is the best thing anyone can possibly do.”⁷⁹ Therefore, P.’s willingness to help was a way for the campaign to bring in more Hispanic voters by reaffirming the importance of ‘la familia.’ Several times George W. Bush referred to his nephew as “my family blood” during rallies at Latino dominated locations.⁸⁰ This familial connection reiterated to Latinos that not only was he a supporter of Hispanics—he was also family.

Earlier in the campaign George H.W. Bush (the candidate’s father) was actually criticized by the media and silenced by the campaign for *possibly* referring to the Bush family’s ‘right’ to the presidency. “[T]he former president is being kept out of the limelight by Mr. Bush’s campaign for fear that he would muddle the message. His praise of George W. as ‘this boy, this son of ours’ during the New Hampshire primary backfired, reinforcing the sense that the family was somehow entitled to the presidency.”⁸¹ Nevertheless, P.’s willingness to help his uncle did not backfire; it was a clear and important message throughout the campaign.⁸² It was a quick political introduction, at the beginning of the campaign the P. was just another shivering volunteer in New Hampshire; by the convention he was an integral part of the campaign strategy, and the reason he got the promotion was his cross-cultural appeal.⁸³ Bush’s explicit embrace of P. was a key component of the myth the campaign told—P. was an example of what the American Dream can accomplish.

The campaign made an interesting strategic choice: by placing attention on P. it was diverted attention away from the candidate. George W. Bush was not the main character in the narrative to Latinos, he was not the narrator—he was simply someone

that the main character discussed and vouched for. In previous ads, George and Laura Bush were frequently pictured, however once the campaign began to use P., the candidate almost disappeared from advertisements. The use of P. gave the campaign narrative fidelity and probability. Narrative fidelity because Latinos knew that only another Latino could truly understand their history. In the Plan of Delano, César Chávez makes several references to the importance of unity with other social movements, but ultimately the fight of the farm worker was a Latinos' revolution. "It is clearly evident that our path travels through a valley well known to all Mexican farm workers. We know all of these towns of Delano, Madera, Fresno, Modesto, Stockton, and Sacramento, because along this very same road, in this very same valley, the Mexican race has sacrificed itself for the last hundred years. Our sweat and our blood have fallen on this land to make other men rich."⁸⁴ In Chávez's mind, and in the mind of others the only way to truly understand the struggle of Latinos, one must be Latino. George P. understood the power of the revolution.

George P. Bush was the main character of the narrative: he was the ideal, embodying what Latinos hoped for in the future, the hero. He was the possible "first Latino president," someone all Hispanics would vote for, and they embraced his message as he proclaimed "I am a young Latino in the U.S. and very proud of my bloodline."⁸⁵ Both a Bush and a Latino, George P. gave his uncle the credibility in the Latino community that the education ads did not deliver. Prior to George P.'s début, the candidate would tell Latinos that he understood and that they mattered. However, George P. gave that message ethos.⁸⁶ He also gave his uncle's message narrative fidelity;

P. was able to tell Latinos the Republican Party is changing—look at me. If they can accept me, they can accept you. He made his uncle credible and, so instead of narrating the message, George P. became the main character—the hero of the story. The setting of the advertisements was another important component in the campaign’s telling of the American Dream narrative. In order for Latinos to see that a change was possible, they needed to see the world in a new light. Bush’s campaign was able to provide that by promising a new day in America.

The Scene

Nuevo Día

The new day message was incredibly simple. Bush’s campaign ran a small series of ads, recorded in English and Spanish, which were shown in heavily Hispanic states. The series was entitled “un Nuevo día [A new day],” and the ads featured the new hero of the story—George P. Bush.

“Nuevo Día” is one of the two ads that featured George P.. In this particular advertisement George P. discussed the values he felt were most important, “In many ways I am like any other American, I believe in opportunity, a level playing field for everyone, and the achievement of the American dream.”⁸⁷ P. closed by saying that he had an uncle that agreed with him on these values, an uncle with the same name. However, this message was important because it deviated from the message that Hispanics felt they had been hearing from Bush’s GOP predecessors.⁸⁸ Visually, the messages were clearly shot to interest Latinos, the visual aspects were unusual for

presidential campaign rhetoric: the camera angles were different and the advertisement never identified the candidate's party affiliation.

Both of the ads featuring P. were shot with close-ups of P.'s face. By shooting the commercial at such an intimate distance, it felt like P. was talking directly to the audience. Hispanic voters appreciate face-to-face contact; they prefer a communicative style that Kathleen Hall Jamieson has defined as effeminate.⁸⁹ If they feel a connection, they are quick to listen.⁹⁰ The close-up, intimate connection to the audience also reminded Latinos that P. was one of them. His first ad began, "I am a young Latino in the U.S. and very proud of my bloodline," this statement reiterated his connection with Hispanics. Both of these ads were shot in ideal settings, open fields full of sunshine and beautiful trees and wildflowers. George P. slowly walked through these settings as he spoke with Latinos. This beautiful backdrop just reiterated that it was going to be different in the Bush administration. The setting of a new day was illustrated by this simple setting—a place for rebirth and renewal. The ad concluded with a small picture of George and Laura Bush, and the George Bush for President logo. There is no discussion of party or affiliation, only the connection between the young man and his uncle who also believed in freedom, opportunity and the American Dream for every Latino.

One of the cardinal rules Lionel Sosa set up early in the election was that the campaign was *not* to identify Bush by party; Hispanics are not persuaded by party affiliation.⁹¹ Even in the Plan of Delano, Chávez disregards party affiliation; "We seek the support of all political groups and protection of the government, which is also our government, in our struggle."⁹² Latinos do not care what party the candidate is a

member of—they only care that they will be represented fairly by the government. On the campaign trail during the 2000 election, Hispanics reiterated their feeling that party affiliation was unimportant; restaurant owner Julio Martinez said, “When it comes down to the presidency, you don’t go toward Democrat or Republican. You go toward the one who is going to do the best job.”⁹³ None of Bush’s 2000 Spanish ads ended with the traditional campaign graphic identifying Bush as a Republican, running mate Dick Cheney was absent from all Latino ads.

Instead, at the end of the ads featuring George P. Bush, there was a simple message. In the last seconds of the commercial a single slide was shown on the screen (for only a second and a half); it was dark blue with white lettering, and it said, “Es Un Nuevo Día” [It is a new day].⁹⁴ This was the message of the Bush 2000 Campaign: things were going to change, and Bush would lead that change. While it was a departure from the previous GOP campaign, its importance was grounded in a subtle message referenced by this phrase. It told Hispanic voters to expect something new from this candidate, and that he would treat Latinos differently, he would help the Latino community. This message gave the campaign more narrative fidelity—in order for Latinos to believe that Republicans could accept them they needed to see that the scene had changed. And it did, it was a new day, according to Bush’s campaign. The rhetoric was almost biblical in its nature: a rainbow of hope that this candidate offered the Hispanic community. Bush promised that a change was coming, and that the pain and suffering of yesterday would be over permanently.

Reminiscent of Reagan's "its morning in America" commercials, the assumption that Bush could usher in an idyllic time, a time that would be better for Latinos, was clearly the message.⁹⁵ At the heart of that change is the promise of the American Dream. The Dream is an important narrative to many Latinos, in his 2000 election; Bush was overt in his use of the term to draw in Hispanics. He not only discussed it frequently, he also explained it in such a way that the values corresponded to the values that Latinos hold dear.

El sueño Americanos es para todos

Ronald Reagan's 1979 musing that Latinos "were Republicans, they just don't know it yet" was based on his perception of the religious values of Hispanics. In 2000 when George W. Bush's campaign used narratives to connect to Latinos' values they used very different values. Bush spoke about the importance of the American Dream openly and at every stop in Latino communities, he used the Spanish, "el sueño Americano," arguing that the dream should be available to everyone. This value of opportunity is one of the values outlined in the Plan of Delano, "UNITED WE SHALL STAND."⁹⁶ Also, by using his nephew, George P. as the hero of the American Dream Myth, Bush's campaign message had more narrative validity because Latinos could understand that another Hispanic would understand their values. As the Plan argues, "We are sons of the Mexican Revolution, a revolution of the poor seeking, bread and justicefrom this movement shall spring leaders who shall understand us, lead us, be faithful to us, and we shall elect them to represent us (emphasis mine)."⁹⁷ P. was a

descendent of this movement, he was the leader that was to come. This meant that his support of George W. Bush had a great deal of weight to Latinos across the nation.

The moral of the story for the Bush campaign was simply stated when George W. Bush began telling audiences very early in the campaign, “I want the American Dream, el sueño americano, to belong to all Americans.”⁹⁸ Bush did everything he could to prove to Latinos that he believed that the American Dream was a promise that *all* Americans share. This inclusive message continued to his views of immigration, “If you have to make a choice between 50 cents an hour and five dollars an hour and you believe in the family, there’s a pretty good chance you’re going to take the risk necessary to come and work to put food on the table. That’s a reality, a human reality, and it’s as true today as it’s ever been.”⁹⁹ By showing he understood the tough decisions faced by many illegal immigrants across the nation, Bush was able to show them that he truly believed that all Latinos had a right to have their voices heard.

From the very beginning of the campaign Bush gathered a group of first-generation immigrants who had business success to be his advisory board, called the “American Dreamers.”¹⁰⁰ As one member explained, “We’re going to raise money, basically, American Dreamers, the concept, the governor is very, very upbeat about it. He feels that’s the reason why a lot of us are here, to fulfill the American Dream.”¹⁰¹ Unlike any of his predecessors, Bush actually used the term the “American Dream” frequently during the 2000 campaign. In order for Latinos to believe that this candidate would be willing to fight for their right to the American Dream, Bush’s campaign also

called him a compassionate conservative, a label that gave Latinos a reason to believe he would work for them.

Bush's use of the moniker "compassionate conservative" was, in part, a strategy to connect with minorities.¹⁰² Bush and his advisors knew that the minority community had not been happy with the 1996 election that had centered on the advantages and disadvantages of immigration, and this slogan was created to remedy that concern; it communicated the difference between other conservatives and the Governor. Taken from the writings of Marvin Olansky, the idea is based in the argument that government control of social programs has created a dependent welfare state. Olansky argued that only through personal responsibility would someone be able to take care of himself or herself. This idea also laid the responsibility for social programs in the hands of private citizens, rather than the government's hands, an idea consistent with many political conservatives.¹⁰³ Bush made an effort to make himself comfortable with the Spanish language and the Spanish media. These efforts helped him sell the story of himself as a compassionate conservative.

During this election he made himself more open to the Latino media than his opponent did, and, in doing so, he spoke to the Latino population about his concerns and his views of Hispanic issues.¹⁰⁴ As Adam J. Segal, director of John Hopkins University's Hispanic Voter Project, concluded in his 2000 Report, the decision to target the Spanish language stations, especially in Florida, may have won him the 2000 election.¹⁰⁵

Early on, there was some backlash to the “compassionate conservative” message from Latinos, “Our community doesn’t need compassion. Even talking to us in that way treats us as a stepchild,” Rep. Robert Menendez of New Jersey complained in September 1999, “We don’t need compassion; we need educational opportunity... healthcare security and access to capital.”¹⁰⁶ However, that early criticism quickly silenced as the message reached the Latino population. More Latinos began to support Bush, and any questions about his loyalty ended.¹⁰⁷

George W. Bush continued to use the phrase “el sueño Americano es para todos,” throughout the campaign.¹⁰⁸ It was the core of the campaign as Ted Cruz, Bush’s domestic policy advisor, explained, “What it comes down to is communicating the message that George W. Bush believes everyone is part of the American dream and the model is really the Texas experience.”¹⁰⁹ George P. Bush reinforced it in his ads and speeches. In both speeches he mentioned the candidate’s belief in the American Dream. Combined with P.’s place as the hero of the American Dream myth, it was a powerful way to boost the candidate’s ethos, which translated into more Latino votes for Bush in the 2000 election.

Bush’s 2000 American Dream: Commitment Forgotten

Although Lionel Sosa argued that his philosophy was to keep Latinos at the forefront of the candidate’s mind, the Bush campaign seemed to forget about the Hispanic community early in the fall of 2000. During that time, the number of Spanish-speaking ads, and ads directed at Hispanics, dropped dramatically. Two changes in the campaign caused this; first, the Republicans began to take the Hispanic community for

granted, assuming that they had made the connection they needed to win and, second, the party's commitment to the Hispanic community was not as strong as the campaign originally indicated.

At the outset, it appears that the campaign's ads did bring in more Hispanic voters to Bush. He did win 38 percent of the Hispanic vote nationwide. In exit polls run by Republicans, Hispanics were asked several questions, "Do you feel more important in this campaign? Do you feel that one candidate or another was talking to you? Did you feel that your vote made a difference?" A majority of the Hispanic community answered "yes" to each of these questions.¹¹⁰ It appeared that Bush succeeded in persuading Hispanic voters by overcoming their negative feelings toward the Republican Party and then by persuading them to abandon the Democrats and vote for him. He did this by talking about their issues, then using his nephew to give his campaign credibility and finally creating an environment, "Un Nuevo Día," that illustrated what they could receive if they voted for him.

During the campaign many Latinos questioned Bush's commitment to his campaign promises. This distrust came from generations of broken promises from politicians. Hispanics were aware that they are one of several audiences that become important only when candidates needed them. When Bush began to abandon his Spanish-speaking ads, it reinforced their distrust of the candidate. Bush's narrative was good; however, it was too idealistic, *el nuevo día* seemed too good to be true. Articles such as, "Latinos Waiting for Bush to Make Good on Pledge of a Diverse Administration,"¹¹¹ "Latino Voters Get A Lot of Lip Service"¹¹² and "The Year of the

Latino Voter? Only in Campaign Rhetoric”¹¹³ (all written by Hispanic journalists) permeated the media. Groups that thought Bush was going to fulfill his campaign promises, like easing restrictions on illegal immigrants, appoint more Latinos to the cabinet, and reform the INS were deeply disappointed.¹¹⁴ In fact, after the campaign many in the Hispanic community said that they felt the campaign push for their vote was disingenuous. The commitment that Bush made to Hispanics in the campaign was not followed by action in the White House. This might have affected Bush’s chances in 2004. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 drastically changed the 2004 election, Latinos and Hispanic issues were rarely discussed.

Research has shown that Hispanics will pay attention if you are talking to them, but not if you fail to keep your promises. Minority groups in general tend to have long memories about who has been helpful to them and who has simply used them.¹¹⁵ Bush did not keep his promises.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The American Dream narrative is a powerful and integral element of the American story. It is the reason millions flock to our borders every year, with the hope that someday they can achieve success.¹ The promise of the Dream is a story that resonates not only with immigrants, but with all Americans.² As one discovers how many different opportunities one can get from being American, one redefines and expands the Dream narrative. Presidential candidates use different definitions or visions of the American Dream myth as they seek to gain supporters. The different ways that candidates explain the Dream show the limitations and boundaries of the myth—and those margins affect the future of this country. As James Cullen argued “...the American Dream continues to be stretched, not always comfortably, by those from elsewhere—which in the final analysis is where very American . . . is from.”³ Presidential campaigns stretch the definition of the American Dream every time.

In this chapter, I will evaluate the conclusions of the other four chapters by reiterating the different characters, settings and values each narrative advocated and, finally, discuss the limitations of my research and make recommendations for areas of future research.

The American Dream Myth: 1992-2000

Each retelling of the American Dream myth creates characters, settings and values that make up the American story.⁴ The American Dream story is a powerful motivation for minorities, Hispanics in particular. Many of them sacrifice everything for

a chance at the promise the American Dream offers.⁵ Candidates who have been able to communicate to Latinos about the American Dream—to use their values and their stories—have often been successful.

1992 Election

In 1992 Bill Clinton used his personal story of an upbringing in extreme poverty as a way to connect with Latinos. Clinton told the true story of a boy from Hope, Arkansas who, through education, was able to become President. As Clinton himself described in his autobiography, “I thought I could make it [in politics] without family wealth or connections . . . Of course it was improbable, but isn’t that what America is all about?”⁶ His story resonated with Latinos who want to believe that the American Dream narrative is still alive and well. He emphasized the materialistic version of the American Dream myth—the idea that financial success is possible in America.⁷ Clinton initially told the story with himself as the hero of the story, as an example of what the American Dream can accomplish.

Bill Clinton, as the main character of the story, made something of himself because of the opportunity that America offered. “I was born in a little town called Hope, Arkansas, three months after my father died. I remember that old two-story house where I lived with my grandparents. They had very limited incomes,”⁸ Clinton explained in his first national advertisement, “I worked my way through law school with part time jobs — anything I could find. After I graduated I really didn’t care about making a lot of money. I just wanted to go home and see if I could make a difference.”⁹ Clinton’s life, much like the lives of his audience had been affected by financial choices.

This narrative connected with Hispanics understanding of the struggles of poverty and the idea that the only way to escape poverty is through education. Clinton also took on another role, as a well-loved historical President.

Clinton compared himself to John F. Kennedy, who is seen by many as the first Hispanic president.¹⁰ Clinton's campaign publicized his quick meeting with Kennedy in 1963, emphasizing the effect it had on Clinton's future, "And I remember just, uh, thinking what an incredible country this was, that somebody like me, who had no money or anything, would be given the opportunity to meet the president. That's when I decided I could really do public service because I cared so much about people."¹¹ Clinton understood the issues facing the Latino population and, by connecting to the image of John Kennedy, he was able to make strides in the community because of the deep affinity between Kennedy and Hispanics.

The setting for Clinton's story was also important; Clinton set his story in his hometown, a place that held both poverty and hope. This setting held narrative fidelity with Latinos, because they grew up in similar communities, the barrios. The barrios of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California seemed much like Hope, Arkansas—they were places of both great poverty and great pride. Latinos know that out of desolation can spring hope.¹² Clinton also used the economic setting as a way to set the stage for his narrative. The economy in 1991 and 1992 was turbulent and especially difficult for minorities. There was a great deal of frustration with the previous two administrations.¹³ Hispanics, and others, felt that the trickle-down economics of the Reagan and Bush (41) administrations had made them poorer. Clinton used that frustration to his advantage,

arguing that he understood that pain and that he would work to change it, “All across America, people [talk to me] who have lost their jobs, lost their businesses, had to give up their jobs.”¹⁴ His narrative was successful with Latinos because he was able to show Latinos that a poor kid from Hope, Arkansas, could empathize with their plight, and wanted to fix it.

Clinton presented himself as the embodiment of what César Chávez predicted in the “Plan of Delano”, “. . . from this movement shall spring leaders who shall understand us, lead us, be faithful to us, and we shall elect them to represent us. WE SHALL BE HEARD.”¹⁵ Clinton also represented the importance of persistence, he was proof that hard work can pay off, as Chávez argued, “We draw our strength from the very despair in which we have been forced to live. WE SHALL ENDURE. . . . To those who oppose us, be they ranchers, police, politicians, or speculators, we say that we are going to continue fighting until we die, or we win. WE SHALL OVERCOME.”¹⁶ Latinos believed in Clinton’s story because the American Dream myth has narrative fidelity and probability to them. They believe that America is a place where a boy from Hope, through hard work and persistence, can become President, and that that President would someday listen to them and represent their voice. That story holds true to their understanding of what America has to offer. This story also holds true with basic Latino values, such as the value of opportunity.

1996 Election

In 1996, Clinton chose to change his story of the American Dream. He was not connected to Latinos the same way he had been in 1992. He had won them over

throughout the intervening years by implementing policies that they agreed with. But, he was the President—he no longer had a familiar connection with them. Instead, Clinton used the myth of brotherhood narrative of the American Dream—the idea that everyone should have access to the American Dream—regardless of race, ethnicity or background.

The rhetorical situation assisted Clinton in his ability to connect to Latinos. This election happened right after one of the most anti-minority periods in modern history. California had passed Proposition 187, which limited certain public services to only those who could prove their citizenship.¹⁷ Two presidential candidates (Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan) had run on the platform of closing American borders, and much of the Republican Party had supported immigrant bashing to the point that it became a part of mainstream political conversations.¹⁸ Initially, Clinton engaged the difficult immigration debate, siding with those who wanted to see our borders strengthened. However, after an angry response from Latinos, Clinton quickly stopped emphasizing his agreement with Republicans and, instead, focused on the importance of opportunity, specifically, opportunity in education.¹⁹

Clinton used his more presidential ethos to attempt to prove to Latinos that he was a protector of the American Dream. From his position as President, it was especially poignant in the rhetorical climate that he defended the American Dream and argued that all immigrants should have access to its promises.²⁰ He became a protector of the Dream, which was important in the face of his opponent's attacks on it.²¹ In

becoming the protector of the Dream, Clinton also became the narrator and, as the narrator, focused his attention on an issue that many Hispanics care about—education.²²

Clinton used educational institutions as the setting to define the American Dream. The majority of his campaign stops during the election were at educational facilities—his message was about the importance of education as a way to access the American Dream. As Latino journalist and researcher, Jorge Ramos explains:

Whoever wants to win the Latino vote will have to address these two critical problems. Hiring a mariachi band to play at a political rally is worthless if the rally itself doesn't feature a comprehensive plan for improving the quality of life and the quality of education for Latino children. It's education *and* the economy, stupid.²³

Clinton used his campaign stops to discuss the ways that his second Administration would increase the quality of life and educational opportunity for all. In a Spanish-language ad entitled “Education,” the campaign made the connection clear, “President Clinton wants to prepare our youngsters for the future, and to have more opportunities to improve our quality of life. That is why on the 5th of November I’m going to vote for President Clinton.”²⁴ This message held narrative fidelity with the Hispanic audience, Clinton had proven to them that he cared about their issues and wanted to work to protect their right to education.

Both of these parts of the myth: the ethos and the setting had narrative validity for Latinos because they were glad to hear a politician, whom they had already trusted, again defending them. He presented himself as the embodiment of what César Chávez promised forty years earlier—that a politician would come along who understood them,

would defend them and they would elect him. Clinton made the promise “WE WILL BE HEARD” true.

2000 Election

Against unimaginable odds, George W. Bush was able to reverse the Republican’s mistakes from the last six years and bring an increased proportion of Latinos into a party that had been labeled as anti-immigrant. Bush certainly had more credibility than any other Republican candidate at this time. He had been supportive of Latinos and Latino issues when very few in his party were. As Governor of Texas, he had worked closely with Hispanics and made them a key part of his Administration.²⁵ This made him the ideal candidate for the Republican Party in 2000. However, Bush had to overcome an overwhelming crisis of narrative validity.

Republicans had created a narrative of the American Dream that did not include immigrants, especially immigrants who came to this country the “wrong way.”²⁶ Immigrants, even legal ones, were a drain on other hard-working Americans whose tax dollars were being used to educate, feed, clothe and give medical care to immigrant children. This Republican version of the immigrant narrative gave Bush’s campaign problems. Bush himself recognized the difficulty he faced, he commented once during the election, “I believe this party is anxious for a different style of campaign. I think the Republican Party has somehow gotten the image that we are not mindful of the concerns of new Americans.”²⁷ Latinos believed Bush that the Republican Party was not “mindful of new Americans.” This idea had narrative fidelity for Latinos because all of the policies of the last six years showed that Republicans felt that way. Bush had to

prove to Hispanics that they were wrong--that there was room for them in the GOP and that was a difficult challenge.

Initially, Bush tried to change Latinos' minds by emphasizing his work in Texas on education, an important issue to many Hispanics.²⁸ However, he was never able to prove to Latinos' that he was going to be a different kind of Republican in general; he still had a problem of narrative fidelity. Latinos trusted that Bush was different, but couldn't trust that other Republicans would be different too. They still questioned if Republicans could truly work with them.²⁹ That is when Bush's campaign found a unique way to try to calm their concerns. The campaign's narrative evolved, they decided to use a totally different main character and narrator. Bush brought in his half-Mexican nephew, George P. Bush. P. became the face of the campaign toward Hispanics.³⁰ He was able to regain their confidence because he was able to show them that Republicans had changed, they had accepted him and allowed him to become the main character of the narrative. P. was the embodiment of everything that Latinos hoped for, the culmination of forty years of hard work. A Latino who was the product of an integrated prominent family, and who was able to become a key part of the campaign—and, as many referred to him, the future first Hispanic President.³¹ Whether that prediction comes true is unclear, but he calmed many Latinos' fears and was able to regain narrative fidelity for the Bush campaign, because he was proof that not only was Bush a different kind of Republican, but that the Party overall had changed.

The campaign also used a new setting to set their version of the American Dream. They wanted to make reference to the changing times, that there would be a

new day in relations between Hispanics and Republicans. The “Nuevo Día” ads represented the change that Bush would bring.³² In the “Plan of Delano”, César Chávez encourages a change like the one Bush represented, “. . .we want the existing social order to dissolve, we want a new social order.” P. as the star of the “Nuevo Día” ads focused on his Latino heritage and how proud he was of his upbringing. The setting represented a rebirth and renewal of the relationship between Latinos and Republicans. Shot in an open field of wildflowers and trees, P.’s message was simple. The world is changing and we (the GOP and its candidate George W. Bush) are going to change with it—for the better.

This setting allowed Latinos to see that George W. Bush, with the help of P. and other Hispanics, was going to change the way the American Dream was defined. George W. Bush made many uses of the Spanish translation “el sueño Americano,” even going as far as to make “el sueño Americano, belongs to all Americans” one of his campaign slogans.³³ This was truly a culmination of the promises of the “Plan of Delano”, “WE SHALL BE HEARD, GOD WILL NOT ABANDON US, WE SHALL ENDURE, UNITED WE SHALL STAND and WE SHALL OVERCOME.”³⁴

The American Dream as Narrative

The American Dream is a powerful narrative that many share, however, immigrants in particular feel an affinity for the opportunity that it offers. During the presidential elections from 1992-2000 each candidate defined the Dream in specific ways that were especially poignant for Latinos.

These new tellings of the American Dream myth valued specific characters—characters who had been blessed by the American Dream. In his 1992 telling of his own story, Clinton referred to the American Dream as a force that he could not control. The lucky surprises in his life (his meeting with Kennedy, the educational opportunities that he was offered) were outside of his control, almost predestined for him, as his mother described in his biography. Latinos want to know that the Dream is possible, they know that it requires work, and they are willing to work, but also feel there is some hope, some luck involved. Clinton's 1992 character had to work to gain success, but he was also blessed. This is the kind of hope that brings many to America, and it is a belief that Latinos share. George P. Bush is another character blessed by the American Dream.

P. is a most unique character in the telling of the American Dream Myth, he is blessed by being born into a politically powerful family and yet he is different. His ethnicity set him apart from his uncle and others in his family. But, as a first-generation American he represents the hope that brings many to America, the idea that their children will have opportunities the parents could not. P. had opportunities that his mother could not have in Mexico. However, because his mother came to America her children had access to education and other parts of the American Dream. There were blessings, marriage into the well-established Bush family was a blessing, but P. was a hero because he never forgot who he really was—a person who was blessed by the American Dream.

The settings of the American Dream story are also important. These settings varied greatly—from the decrepit and desolate to the fanciful and idyllic—but they

represented all the different places where the American Dream is possible. Hope Arkansas is not a place where much hope seems to exist. But, even a community as impoverished as Hope can be the birthplace of a President, because of the amazing ability of the Dream to permeate even the darkest corners of America. The barrios of the Southwest appear to be hopeless, but as Clinton's telling of the myth reminded Latinos, even people growing up in the barrios should have hope—because the American Dream can exist anywhere.

Education is central to the myth. Every election studied in this election referred to the importance of education in the efficacy of the American Dream. Educational institutions that may seem hopeless can be the birthplace of the success the American Dream offers. Little community colleges, small decrepit schools in Texas, elementary schools with no running water and no computers can also provide the Dream—to someone who is willing to work for it, like our heroes. But with the help of other heroes, like a President who believes in education (like Clinton and Bush claimed to) the American Dream can be even more accessible, because they will work to make it more available to everyone.

These values, these characters, these settings have added to the rich rhetorical history of the American Dream myth. As Cullen explained in *The American Dream* this is not a story that has an ending, as long as there is hope. These presidential candidates expanded the places where that hope could reach, and the people who could be blessed by the Dream. All of this culminated into a story that Latinos could relate to, that they shared and that rhetorically persuaded them to believe in these candidates.

Limitations on Research/Future Research Needed

The media has created this image that Latinos are an important voting population, and that they must be watched. Every election covered in this research was referred to as the “Year of the Latino” and many articles were written about how Hispanics would elect the next President. Or candidates would often talk about how important Latinos are in this particular election. And, while it is true that the numbers do not lie and Latinos could be so very powerful, in 2008 it was predicted that 9.2 million Latinos could turn out to the polls.³⁵ Other Hispanic authors (mostly journalists) have written about the potential power of Latino voters, but no one seems to be able to explain how to get them to stretch that power. Jorge Ramos in his book, *The Latino Wave*, argues that finding a candidate who will listen to Latino issues is an important part of that connection and, when Hispanics feel that a candidate truly understands them, and then they will vote for him or her.³⁶ Ramos’s research seems a bit one-sided, when Ramos wrote his book he was a very public supporter of George W. Bush. He was defending Bush’s strong 2000 showing, arguing that Bush had won because of his strong connection with Latinos. However, no one could have predicted how the world would change by September 11, 2001 and how it would lead to a drastic change in the focus of the coming 2004 election.

Other journalists, such as CNN’s Leslie Sanchez—the author of *Los Republicanos*, argue that Republicans need Latinos and that Latinos need Republicans. “I have written this book on the belief that Republicans and Hispanics need one another in order to make a better America. The Hispanic spirit of optimism, and enterprise, of faith and family, is

a spirit that fits naturally with the beliefs I hold as a Reagan Republican.”³⁷ The thesis of her book is similar to Regan’s 1979 statement where he argues that Hispanics are Republicans “they just don’t know it.”³⁸ This book makes the assumption that once Hispanics truly understand what Republicans stand for, they will want to join the GOP. However, there is no research to give credence to the claim. Especially in these times when economic issues dominate the news and the average American is struggling with consumer confidence, it seems that Latinos will support the party who works to overcome their economic problems.³⁹

The struggle for the party that wins the allegiance of Latinos is to get those voters to the polls. There is no magic formula that makes someone go to the polls and vote. Of course, Latinos are at a disadvantage, while the number of Hispanics in the United States is high—the number who are, actually eligible to vote is only about one-third of the total number.⁴⁰ This significantly decreases their ability to influence an election, and certainly influences their ability to take an election, as Ramos and Sanchez have argued.

The values in the “Plan of Delano” provide a start for understanding what Latinos are looking for in a political candidate. But, they are not a direct course of action for how to revitalize the Hispanic population and persuade them to get to the polls. In his book, *The Latino Wave*, Jorge Ramos gives a list of ten things that will promote a Latino agenda:

1. Improve Political Representation,
2. Standardize Latino Immigrants’ Legal Situation and Comprehensive Immigration Reform,
3. Learn Spanish and English: One Language Just Isn’t Enough,
4. Lift Hispanics out of poverty: Create Access to Better Jobs and Health Care,
5. Address School Dropout Rates,

6. Fight Crime and Make our Communities Safer,
7. Forge an Alliance with other Minorities,
8. Make Latin America a Prominent part of U.S. Foreign Policy,
9. Streamline the Process of Gaining Citizenship, and
10. Understand the Hispanic Experience.⁴¹

Many of these suggestions are grounded in the same belief system that created the “Plan of Delano;” the idea of working with other minority groups, providing equal access to important rights like education and changing the culture to understand the Hispanic experience. All of these ideas are also embedded in the “Plan of Delano.”

2004 and 2008 elections

Narratives during the 2004 election were quite different from the previous three elections. After the attack on September 11th 2001, the nation focused on Homeland Security and Defense, and the 2004 election reflected that change. Both candidates, John Kerry and George W. Bush, spent the election focused on defense and foreign policy: which are two issues that do not typically resonate with Latinos.⁴² However, the 2008 election brought the American Dream back to the forefront of a national conversation in its discussion of whether the U.S. was ready for its first African-American President.

The 2008 election deserves its own rhetorical analysis. The historic run of the first African-American President was almost entirely focused on the American Dream. Barack Obama’s life story is a perfect example of the American Dream. The story of a biracial son of an African and an American woman connected with many minorities. However, Obama still struggled to connect with Latino voters. From the beginning, there was the feeling that, with an African-American presidential candidate, Latinos’

issues would be ignored. There is also a historical divide between the two groups that has always caused some tension.⁴³ Obama attempted to discredit this belief by telling one crowd in Los Angeles on February 1, 2008, “In the past few weeks, we’ve heard some cynical talk about how black and white and Latino folks cannot come together. I am reminded of the Latino brothers and sisters I worked alongside on the streets of Chicago decades ago.”⁴⁴ Obama’s attempts at commonality did not work, in part, because of his Democratic opponent.

Too many Hispanics still had fond feelings for the Clintons, and felt more comfortable with Hillary. As one observer explained after the February 1st speech, “It’s the marquee value. They still remember [Bill] Clinton and those whole eight years. Obama comes out of nowhere, and Latinos are like, ‘What? An African American?’ [Hispanics] recognize the Clintons and are comfortable with them.”⁴⁵ It wasn’t until June, when Obama clinched the nomination, that Hispanics began to support the former Senator from Illinois.⁴⁶ Obama’s eventual success was seen by many as a win for African-Americans, as well as Latinos. Obama went on to nominate three Latinos to Cabinet-level positions—Bill Richardson to Department of Commerce (Richardson withdrew his nomination early in the process), Hilda Solis to Department of Labor and Ken Salazar to Department of Interior. And as of the writing of this dissertation, Obama has nominated the first Latina, Sonia Sotomayer, to the Supreme Court.⁴⁷ These nominations reflected a commitment to Latinos and their issues that has led to a great deal of goodwill between President Obama and Latinos.

I believe the key to understanding how to harness the Latino wave, as Ramos calls it, to influence politics is to understand how to get Latinos to the polls. I believe this research has proven that the use of the American Dream Myth is one way to connect with Latinos, and in each case it seemed to lead to electoral success. However, I feel there is still a great deal of room to discuss other rhetorical ways to influence Hispanics to go to the polls.

Other researchers have evaluated the efficacy of “non-issue” ads, which are advertisements that encourage a positive feeling among voters without focusing on a particular issue. Early research seems to show that these ads are successful in persuading Latinos to change their view of the different political parties. They were used with some success in 2004, when they were first introduced in Spanish. I believe more research into this type of advertisement would give rhetorical critics a better understanding of what Latinos find persuasive.

Another area of future research that is needed is in a general understanding of what constitutes rhetoric in Hispanic cultures. When I initially began researching this topic, the only rhetorical criticisms of Latino-American rhetoric I could find were the Hammerback and Jensen books on César Chávez. This is an area that is severely underrepresented. Understanding how Latinos talk about themselves, about their values, about their culture, about what it means to be a part of American culture, about how to assimilate—all of those would be excellent questions to research.

NOTES

Chapter I: Introduction

1. This conclusion about the nature of political campaigns is found in: Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 125-134.
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential Campaign Advertising*, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) xx-xxvi.
Jeffrey M. Berry, *The Interest Group Society, Second Edition* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman Publishing, 1989), 4-9.
2. James Madison, "Federalist Paper No. 9, 10, 51" in *Federalist Papers Reader and Historical Documents of Our American Heritage*, ed. Frederick Quinn (Santa Ana, Calif.: Seven Locks Press, 1997).
3. These terms were prevalent during elections in the 1990's. "Soccer moms" refers to middle- to upper-class mothers whose children are in soccer clubs, as voters they tended to be conservative, wealthy, white, stay at home mothers. "NASCAR Dads" refers to lower to middle-class fathers who regularly watch auto racing, these voters also tended to be conservative.
4. Despite different meanings, in the vernacular Hispanic and Latino (essentially defined as people of Spanish or Latin American descent, respectively) are interchangeable. I will use them as such.
5. Arlene Dávila, *Latinos, Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2001), 1.
6. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin," *Census 2000 Brief*, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf>.
7. I will use Hispanic and Latino interchangeably throughout this dissertation. This is common in academic journals. There are several reasons for this trend; first, people from different regions prefer different labels (i.e. California and Northern Latinos prefer "Latino," whereas Southwest and Florida Hispanics prefer "Hispanic"). Secondly, because so many Latinos identify themselves with their country of origin, it is easier to use a unifying term. I will readily admit that I am unhappy with the sexist nature of the term Latino, but I am equally unhappy with the awkwardness of some of the alternatives, which include Latino/a, Latina/o and Latin@. Therefore, I will use the term Latino, under protest. See Jorge Ramos, *The Latino Wave: How Hispanics will elect the next American President* (New York, NY: Rayo-HarperCollins Publishing, 2004), 97-99, for

more information. José de la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power* (Santa Maria, Calif.: Archer Books, 2003), 18-20 also has an excellent discussion of the use of these terms. As does Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez, "Introduction: The Research Agenda," *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 4. And Juan Gonzalez, *Harvest of an Empire: A History of Latinos in America* (New York: Viking Press, 2000), xix-xx.

1. New York Times, "2004 Campaign Map," *New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/2004_ELECTIONGUIDE_GRAPHIC/index.html.

2. Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, "*Washington Post*/Univision/TRPI Election Survey of Latino Registered Voters July 2004," 7.

3. Gregory Tejeda, "Latinos vote like rest of U.S.," *UPI (United Press International)*, November 16, 2004.

4. These numbers are not even consistent among "non-partisan" groups. The William C. Velazquez Institute (a non-partisan think-tank which specifically studies Latino voter turnout) puts the numbers at Kerry 67.7% and Bush 31.4%; whereas The Latino Coalition (a non-partisan group that studies the effects of policy initiatives on the Hispanic community) put the numbers at 53% for Kerry and 44% for Bush. Synthesizing these numbers is difficult, although privately Bush's people tend to admit they don't think they quite hit the 44% mark. (according to Richard S. Dunham, "Did Hispanics Really Surge to Bush?" *BusinessWeek*, November 29, 2004, 51.) The press release from the William C. Velasquez group can be accessed at: http://www.wcvi.org/press_room/press_releases/2004/us/nat_poll_110204.html. And the study conducted by The Latino Coalition can be accessed at: <http://www.thelatinocoalition.com/news/pdf/VotersSupportBush.pdf>

5. Richard S. Dunham, "Did Hispanics Really Surge to Bush?" *BusinessWeek*, November 29, 2004, 51.

6. Robert S. Boynton, "Demographics and Destiny," *The New York Times*, January 18, 2009, 11.

7. Elections coined as important years for Latinos include 1960, 2000 and 2004. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 23.

8. Jorge Ramos, *The Latino Wave: How Hispanics will elect the next American President* (New York, NY: Rayo-HarperCollins Publishing, 2004).

9. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 97-98.

10. *Merriam-Wester Online Dictionary*, s.v. "Latino,"
<http://www.merriamwebster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=Latino>
 (accessed May 18, 2005).

11. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 98.

12. *Merriam-Wester Online Dictionary*, s.v. "Hispanic,"
<http://www.merriamwebster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=Hispanic>
 (accessed May 18, 2005).

13. *Merriam-Wester Online Dictionary*, s.v. "Hispanic,"
<http://www.merriamwebster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=Hispanic>
 (accessed May 18, 2005).

The explanation of the connotative meaning comes from Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 98.

14. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 17.
 Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 96-100.

15. I realize how personal and informal this example is, however I feel that it gives a clear explanation of a very complex problem that many Latinos face.

16. George J. Sanchez, "Y tú, ¿qué? (Y2K): Latino History in the New Millennium," in *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 45.

17. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez, "Introduction: The Research Agenda," in *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 21.
 Sanchez, "Y tú, ¿qué? (Y2K)," 46-48.

Another good source on this phenomenon is Clara E. Rodríguez *Changing Race: Latinos, the Census and the History of Ethnicity in the United States* New York: New York University Press, 2000).

18. Sanchez, "Y tú, ¿qué? (Y2K)," 48.

19. The 18.6% that makes up the 'other' is a large number of people; however, politicians have ignored this group in their political campaigns. This group has been ignored mostly because of the sheer number of individual groups. While I feel this is a

mistake on the part of politicians, I will not be dealing with this group in particular because there is no rhetoric directed at them in particular.

U.S. Census Current Population Survey March 1999 & May 2001, chart recreated in Suárez-Orozco and Páez, "Introduction," 27.

20. I have never liked the term "immigrant." My mother is a legal immigrant (now, a US citizen) from Uruguay, and growing up in Dallas, Texas in the 1980's and 1990's, I always hated calling her an immigrant. This term has always been offensive to me. However, the literature uses this term, and therefore I will too, under protest.

21. Sanchez, "Y tú, ¿qué? (Y2K)," 49.

Alex Stepick and Carol Dutton Stepick, "Power and Identity: Miami Cubans," in *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 76.

Luis C. Moll and Richard Ruiz, "The Schooling of Latino Children," in *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 363-364.

22. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 96-100.

23. *The Tejano Yearbook: 1519-1978: A Selective Chronical of the Hispanic Presence in Texas*. Compiled and edited by Philip Ortego y Gasca and Arnoldo De León (San Antonio: Caravel Press, 1978), 41.

24. Suzanne Oboler, "'It Must Be a Fake!' Racial Ideologies, Identities and the Question of Rights," in *Hispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race, and Rights*, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Pablo De Greiff (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2000), 125-144.

25. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin," *Census 2000 Brief*, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf>.

26. Ramón Grosfoguel, *Colonial Subjects: Puerto Ricans in a Global Perspective* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2003), 107-108.

27. President Harry S. Truman, "Inaugural Address," on January 20, 1949 reprinted in *Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States from George Washington to John F. Kennedy* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), 254-255.

28. *The American Presidency: Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia*, s.v. "Point Four Program," <http://ap.grolier.com/article?assetid=0231250-0&templatename=/article/article.html> (accessed May 27, 2005).

29. Ramón Grosfoguel, "Puerto Rico's Exceptionalism: Industrialization, migration and Housing development" (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1992).
30. Grosfoguel, *Colonial Subjects*, 108.
31. Grosfoguel, *Colonial Subjects*, 110. And Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 89 gives a similar account of federally funded labor recruiters traveling through the poorest neighborhoods in San Juan with bull horns on their trucks offering jobs and the travel money to the United States.
32. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 90.
33. U.S. Census Bureau
34. Encarta Encyclopedia Online, s.v. "Fidel Castro,"
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761564308_1____2/Fidel_Castro.html??partner=orp#s2 (accessed May 25, 2005).
35. United States Department of State, *U.S. Policy Toward Cuba*, Department of State Publication 7690 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1964).
36. Grosfoguel, *Colonial Subjects*, 111-112.
37. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 110.
38. President John F. Kennedy, Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House proposing reorganization and reenactment of Refugee Aid Legislation (July 21, 1961). In *John F. Kennedy, public chapters of the presidents of the United States*, pp. 526-28. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
39. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 110-111.
40. Alex Stepnick and Carol Dutton Stepnick, "Power and Identity: Miami Cubans," in *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 76-77.
Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 111.
41. U.S. Census Bureau, "Summary File 1"
42. Suárez-Orozco and Páez, "Introduction," 26.

43. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 206-227.
44. U.S. Bureau of Census, "Spanish speaking Population: Percent of Population 5 Years and over who speak Spanish at home, by state," *Census 2000*, Washington, D.C., <http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf>.
45. Fox, *Hispanic Nation*, 58-62.
Even those who do not speak the language want to do so, several interesting studies prove that despite some negativity from outside sources, many Hispanics still prize the language, Ana Celia Zentella, "Latin@ Languages and Identities," in *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 321-338.
46. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 94.
47. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez, "Introduction: The Research Agenda," in *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 10-16.
48. Remittance is the sending of money back to the immigrant's native home, often immigrants come to the United States to get jobs and then return money to their families in other countries.
49. Suárez-Orozco and Páez, "Introduction," 11.
50. Peggy Levitt, "The transnationalization of civil and political change : the effect of migration on institutional ties between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic," (PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997).
51. Peggy Levitt, "Two Nations Under God? Latino Religious Life in the United States," in *Latinos: Remaking America* eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 152-153.
- Anthony Stevens-Arroyo, "The Latino Religious Resurgence," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 558 (July 1998), 163-176.
52. Mario Vargas Llosa, "Vargas Llosa Señala el Aporte Hispano," *El Nuevo Herald*, August 13, 2001, p. 3A.
53. Pew Hispanic Center & Kaiser Family Foundation, *2002 National Survey of Latinos*, final report released December 17, 2002. View online at www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/LatinoSurveyReportFinal.pdf.

54. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 84-85.
55. Rodolfo O. De la Garza, Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John Garcia and Angelo Falcon, *Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).
56. Barry A. Kosmin and Seymour P. Lachman, *One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society* (New York: Harmony Books, 1993).
57. Levitt, "Two Nations Under God?" 153-154.
58. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 109.
59. Pew Hispanic Center & Kaiser Family Foundation, "Latino voters most likely to identify as Democrats, but party loyalty is shallow, and political views defy easy categorization: Immigrants transforming and expanding the Hispanic electorate," news release, October 3, 2002. Accessible at <http://pewhispanic.org/newsroom/releases/release.php?ReleaseID=2>
60. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 19.
61. Pew Hispanic Center & Kaiser Family Foundation, *2002 National Survey of Latinos*, final report released December 17, 2002. View online at www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/LatinoSurveyReportFinal.pdf.
62. I am not comfortable with the term "minority group" or "ethnic group" or "special interest group" because they all cause the reader to think in oppositional terms like minority or majority, however, this is the term used in the academic literature, so I will be using it.
63. I use voters with quotations here in indicate that those Presidents did not give African-Americans the respect that they deserved as full citizens of this country.

Russell L. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality: Nation-keeping from 1831-1965* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 121-124.
64. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 124.
African-Americans were also ignored because Anglos considered them less than human. At this time, even with the right to vote, African-Americans were not seen as true humans, but as animals.

65. Kenneth O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics from Washington to Clinton* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 53.
66. Ernest M. Collins, "Cincinnati Negroes and Presidential Politics," *Journal of Negro History* 41 (April 1956): 131-132.
67. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 125-127.
68. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 126.
69. Washington founded the Tuskegee Institute, which Republican presidents saw a moderate alternative to civil rights leaders and groups (like W.E.B. DuBois and the NAACP).
70. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 128.
71. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 125.
72. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 129.
73. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 135.
74. Several Historians conclude that FDR was not as genuinely interested in the civil rights movement as he claimed to be. Here are several that I consulted:

O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano*, 109-145.

Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 139-155.

Garth E. Pauley, *The Modern Presidency & Civil Rights: Rhetoric on Race from Roosevelt to Nixon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 18-31.
75. O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano*, 115-118.
76. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 143.
77. O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano*, 110, 120, 143.
78. Richard P. Longaker, *The Presidency and Individual Liberties* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), 105-106.
79. Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality*, 155-156.

80. Manuel G. Gonzales, *Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999), 185.
81. The only organization founded at that time that still exists is the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) which was established in Corpus Christi, Texas on February 17, 1929.
Gonzalez, *Mexicanos*, 180.
82. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 170.
83. Suzanne Oboler, “‘It Must Be a Fake!’ Racial Ideologies, Identities and the Question of Rights,” in *Hispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race, and Rights*, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Pablo De Greiff (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2000), 125-144.
84. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 170.
85. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political*, 16.
86. The information on percentages of Catholicism in the Hispanic community come from,
Gonzales, *Mexicanos*, 242.
- De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 23.
87. Gonzales, *Harvest of Empire*, 171.
88. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 22-23.
89. Robert Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times 1961-1973*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 5-6.
90. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 23.
91. Like so many of the other theories surrounding the election of Kennedy, many minority groups claim that they helped get JFK elected. I agree all of these had some power in his election; but this hypothesis of Latinos has relevance because it lends credence to the argument that Latinos began having political power in the 1960 election. This hypothesis is also important because it is the narrative that is told in Latino communities, and one of the reasons there is still a close connection between Hispanics and Kennedy. This hypothesis is argued in:

Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 169-174.

De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 22-24.

Gonzales, *Mexicanos*, 183-190.

92. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 23.

93. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 17.

94. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 17.

95. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 174.

96. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 174-175.

97. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 174.

98. The César E. Chávez Foundation, "An American Hero,"

[http://Chavezfoundation.org/](http://Chavezfoundation.org/Default.aspx?pi=33)

Default.aspx?pi=33.

99. United Farm Workers, "Farm workers remember Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.,"

<http://www.ufw.org/mlk00.html>.

100. United Farm Workers, "César E. Chávez Chronology,"

<http://www.ufw.org/cecchron.htm>.

101. Interestingly, Chávez never intended to be a national figure. Much like the early Hispanic organizations that were formed, Chávez did not believe in working on a national level. He felt that the only way to truly change the working conditions for migrant farm workers was to work on a local level, literally, field by field.

102. United Farm Workers, "The Story of César E. Chávez," under "The Fast,"

<http://www.ufw.org/cecstory.htm>.

103. Richard J. Jensen and John C. Hammerback, "Chávez's Ceremonial Speaking," in *The Words of César Chávez*, eds. Richard J. Jensen and John C. Hammerback (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 159-160.

104. Gonzalez, *Harvest of Empire*, 176.

105. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 156.

106. One group of Hispanics clearly and strongly leans Republican, Cubans. Cubans felt so betrayed by John F. Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs Invasion that they have continued to support the Republican Party. The discussion of this phenomenon can be found in several places, including Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 110.

107. *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

108. Lionel Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," *Electing the President 2000: The Insider's View*, ed. Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Paul Waldman (Philadelphia, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 156.

109. Pew Hispanic Center & Kaiser Family Foundation, "Latino Voters most likely to identify as Democrats, but party loyalty is shallow, and political views defy easy categorization: Immigrants transforming and expanding the Hispanic Electorate," news release, October 3, 2002. View Online at http://www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/news_release_09.27.02.pdf

110. Pew Hispanic Center & Kaiser Family Foundation, *2002 National Survey of Latinos*, final report released December 17, 2002. View online at www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/LatinoSurveyReportFinal.pdf.

111. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 156.

Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 101.

112. Deborah Orin, "Chasing the Latino Vote: Both parties are doing their best to court the swing vote," *New York Post*, October 13, 2004, 66.

Alexandra Starr, "Why Bush isn't moving the needle with Latinos," *Business Week*, October 18, 2004, 53.

U.S. Newswire, "Hispanic survey shows Bush with unexpected lead in Florida: May reflect trend in other swing states," National Desk Section, October 15, 2004.

113. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 22-23.

114. Jacqueline Kennedy, "1960 Television Advertisement," *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. Philadelphia, Penn.: Kanda Software, 2000. CD-ROM.

115. Kennedy, "1960 Television Advertisement," CD-ROM.

116. Ignacio M. García, *Viva Kennedy: Mexican Americans in Search of Camelot* (College Station, Texas: Texas A& M University Press, 2000).

117. Garcia, *Viva Kennedy*,

118. Celeste Michelle Condit, *Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communication Social Change* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 12.

119. By referring to “official campaign speeches and ads” I am referring to ads paid for by the campaign itself or the national party, I am excluding any third party ads that might be directed at Hispanics. I am also excluding any speeches made on behalf of the candidate by a supporter or campaign employee. However, I will include ads (and speeches) that feature (or are given by) member’s of the candidate’s family, as that has been a common thread in the past few elections.

120. There will be one notable exception to this rule: presidential debates. Because debates are the one media where BOTH candidates have national coverage I will include those texts.

121. Walter R. Fisher, *Human Communication As Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value and Action* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1987) 57-78.

122. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 71-77

123. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 143.

124. William F. Lewis, “Telling America’s Story: Narrative Form and the Reagan Presidency,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (1987): 280-302.

125. Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1980): 26.

126. Lewis, “Telling America’s Story,” 288.

127. Lewis, “Telling America’s Story,” 288.

128. Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 21.

129. Thomas B. Farrell, “Narrative in Natural Discourse: On Conversation and Rhetoric,” *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1985): 119, 121-124.

Lewis, "Telling America's Story," 281-2, 289, 294.

Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," *Communication Monographs* 51 (1984): 10.

130. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 71-77.

131. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 47.

132. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 47.

133. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 107.

134. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 107.

135. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945; New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1955), x. Citations are to the George Braziller, Inc. edition.

136. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 144.

137. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 144. Based on Burke's definition, which comes from Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 29.

138. Jennifer L. Hochschild, *Facing up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 16.

139. James Truslow Adams, *The Epic of America* (New York: Little Brown Publishers, 1931), 404. According to James Cullen, Adams originally wanted to name the book *The American Dream*, but his publishers rejected the title because "no one would pay three dollars for a book about a dream." This anecdote illustrates that the term was not in common use until years later. James Cullen, *The American Dream: A Short History of an Idea that Shaped a Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3-4.

140. Adams, *The Epic of America*, 130.

141. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 5.

142. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration*, 148-149.

Walter R. Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion of The American Dream," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 59 (1973): 160- 167.

Jennifer L. Hochschild, *Facing up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), xvii.

143. Hochschild, *Facing up to the American Dream*, 16-18.

Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion," 161-163.

144. Walt Fisher bases his 1973 article about the Nixon-McGovern 1972 election on the idea that each candidate represented one side of this dream. And that Nixon won because the American public preferred his version of the American Dream. While I agree with his rhetorical criticism, I disagree with the idea that these two dreams are mutually exclusive. That idea, that these two dreams are two sides of a human desire is shared in several other works: Hochschild, *Facing up to the American Dream*, 16-19.

Cullen, *The American Dream*, 185-190.

Dan Rather, *The American Dream: Stories from the Heart of Our Nation* (New York: William Morrow, 2001), xviii.

145. Hochschild, *Facing up to the American Dream*, 16.

146. Walter R. Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion of the American Dream," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 59 (1973): 161.

147. Lewis, "Telling America's Story," 283.

148. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 60.

149. Rather, *The American Dream*, xiii.

150. "Declaration of Independence," July 4, 1776. Reprinted in Frederick Quinn, ed., *The Federalist Papers Reader and Historical Documents of our American Heritage* (Santa Ana, Calif.: Seven Locks Press, 1997), 226.

151. Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion," 161.

152. Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion," 161.

153. G. Thomas Goodnight, "Ronald Reagan and The American Dream," in *The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership*, ed. Leroy G. Dorsey (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 209.
 154. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 188.
 155. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 188.
 156. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 187.
 157. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 6.
 158. John C. Hammerback and Richard J. Jensen, "Ethnic Heritage as Rhetorical Legacy: The Plan of Delano," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 80 (1994): 55.
 159. Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) 295.
 160. J. Patrick Henry, *A Short History of Mexico*, rev. ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Press, 1990) 71.
 161. Davis and Virulegio, 74-85.
 162. Hammerback and Jensen, "Ethnic Heritage as Rhetorical Legacy," 53.
 163. César Chávez, quoted in Jacques E. Levy *César Chávez: Autobiography of La Raza* (New York: W.W. Norton Publishers, 1975), 207-208.
 164. Luis Valdez, "The Tale of la Raza," in *The Chicanos: Mexican-American Voices*, ed. Ed. Ludwig and James Santibañez (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Press, 1971), 99.
 165. "Walkout in Albuquerque," April 8, 1966 (Editorial) in "Walkout in Albuquerque: The Chicano Movement becomes Nationwide," in *Aztlán: An Anthology of Mexican American Literature*, ed. Luis Valdez and Stan Steiner (New York: Vintage Books Publishing, 1972), 211.
 166. Juan Gómez Quinoñes, *Chicano Politics: Reality and Promise 1940-1990* (Albuquerque, New Mex.: University of New Mexico Press, 1990), 106.
- Hammerback and Jensen, "Ethnic Heritage as Rhetorical Legacy," 53.

167. All direct quotes from the “Plan of Delano” are from a copy of the plan which can be found at: “The Plan of Delano,” <http://www.aztlan.net/plandela.htm>.

168. First, Chávez argued that the “Plan of Delano” created a new social movement that would give justice to the oppressed, which is a God-given right. Chávez concluded, “To respect the rights of others is peace.” The second idea is a clear distrust for the government. Chávez and his followers felt their legislators had abandoned them, that they did not trust lawmakers to listen to their concerns or to help them seek justice. Therefore, a change in the government was important to the movement, “We shall be heard.” Third, Chávez reinforced the Latino movement’s close connection to the Roman Catholic Church, an association that Chávez (a devout Catholic) encouraged. “We seek, and have, the support of the Church in what we do.” Chávez also mentioned the Jewish faith: “we also carry the Star of David . . . because we ask the help and prayers of all religions.” He concluded, “God shall not abandon us.” Fourth, Chávez repeated the mantra that so many other civil rights groups have used, “We shall endure.” Chávez noted the suffering, the injustice and the fact that his supporters will continue to suffer, “with hope that our children will not be exploited as we have been.” Just like the Chicano poets who were his contemporaries, Chávez reiterated the importance of suffering for the cause. The fifth idea connected all civil rights groups from the same time, “United we shall stand.” Chávez connected his fight to the struggle of poor whites, Filipinos, Blacks, Japanese-Americans and Muslims, arguing that all minorities in the U.S. must band together to defeat the discriminatory system. Finally, Chávez gave his audience this pledge, “We are sons of the Mexican Revolution, a revolution of the poor seeking bread and justice. Our revolution will not be armed, but we want the existing social order to dissolve, we want a new social order.” Borrowing from his friend Martin Luther King Jr., Chávez ended, “We shall overcome.” All direct quotes from the “Plan of Delano” are from a copy of the plan, which can be found at: “The Plan of Delano,” <http://www.aztlan.net/plandela.htm>.

169. This was one of Clinton’s most infamous campaign slogans in 1992, “I feel your pain” he famously told audiences.

Chapter II: 1992 Election

1. Curtis Wilkie, “Arkansas Democrat moves to begin presidency bid,” *The Boston Globe*, August 16, 1991, 3.
2. Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Knopf Publishers, 2005), 372-373.
3. Kati Marton, *Hidden Power: Presidential Marriages That Shaped our Recent History* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2001) 5, 307-308.

4. Clinton, *My Life*, 370-373.
5. O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano*, 407-409. Hillary Rodham Clinton also had an interesting history as a supporter of civil rights, including work with the Black Panthers, which put her on the FBI's watch list in the 1960's. As noted in O'Reilly's chapter.
6. O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano*, 409.
7. O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano*, 409.
8. La Raza and LULAC (the League of United Latin-American Citizens) are the two most outspoken and prestigious political organizations for Latinos, as discussed in Chapter I.
9. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 225-226.
10. Sandra Marquez, "Latinos at the Democratic Convention focus on Unity," *Hispanic Link Weekly Report* (July 20, 1992).
11. Marquez, "Latinos at the Democratic Convention focus on Unity,"
12. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 225-228.
13. George C. Edwards III, William Mitchell and Reed Welch, "Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience," *American Political Journal of Political Science* (February 1995): 108-134.
- "1992 Election," *Historycentral.com*, <http://www.multied.com/elections/1992.html> accessed August 2, 2005.
14. "Father-in-Law" Advertisement, *The Living Room Candidate: Presidential Campaign Commercials 1952-2004*, Website, accessible at <http://livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us/index.php>, s.v. 1988. Accessed July 11, 2005.
- The use of Bush's Hispanic family was also discussed in:
"A Nation within a Nation," *Businessweek*, September 25, 1989, 144.
15. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 20-22.
16. Edwards, Mitchell and Welch, "Explaining Presidential Approval," 108.

17. Camelot is the mythological castle of King Arthur and Queen Guinevere. But it is an important term in American pop culture, it refers to the carefree nature of the time when John F. Kennedy was president.

In American contexts, the phrase "Camelot" refers to the presidency of John F. Kennedy, as his term was said to have potential and promise for the future, and the period was symbolic of hope for many in the world, who were inspired by Kennedy's speeches, vision and political policies. The period was ended by Kennedy's November 22, 1963, assassination, which is often compared to the fall of King Arthur. The line "Don't let it be forgot, that once there was a spot, for one brief shining moment, that was known as Camelot," from the musical *Camelot*, has been used in pop culture to refer to this period.

Wikipedia.com, s.v. "Camelot," <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camelot> (accessed January 23, 2007).

18. The term pre-rhetorical comes from Maurice Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the *Peuple Québécois*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (May 1987): 133. As Charland outlines in his case study, this acceptance (or interpellation) occurs pre-rhetorically, "Interpellation occurs at the very moment one enters into a rhetorical situation, that is, as soon as an individual recognizes and acknowledges being addressed." In other words, an audience can be inclined to a message before the message begins, if they believe the ideology behind the narrative, if they recognize that they are the audience.

19. Geoffrey Fox, *Hispanic Nation: Culture, Politics and the Constructing of Identity* (Tucson, Ariz.: The University of Arizona Press, 1996), 183.

20. The 1998 U.S. Census showed that 22.7% of the Hispanic population was living below the poverty line, in comparison to 6.1% of non-Hispanic Whites, also 34.4% of Latino children were living in poverty in comparison to 10.6% of Anglo children. U.S. Bureau of Census. *Current Population Survey, March 1999*. Prepared by the Bureau of Census, Washington, DC, 1999.

21. Hispanic bureaucracy refers to the different institutionalized groups, like LULAC and La Raza that often attempt to control individual Latino voters.

22. Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion," 161.

23. Clinton used the recession as a scene in Burke's definition of scene, "the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred." In this case the situation was the campaign, so the background of the campaign, the situation in which it occurred. The

economy was the main theme of Clinton's campaign; and the recession was the backdrop to that campaign. Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, xv.

24. Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Knopf Publishers, 2004), 63.

25. Governor William Clinton, advertisement "Hope" *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

26. Governor William Clinton, advertisement "Hope," *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

27. "It all began in a place called Hope," The White House Website, available at: <http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/Hope.html> (accessed on January 24, 2007).

28. "It all began in a place called Hope," The White House Website, available at: <http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/Hope.html> (accessed on January 24, 2007).

29. The information on percentages of Catholicism in the Hispanic community come from, Gonzales, *Mexicanos*, 242.

De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 23.

30. President John F. Kennedy, speaking to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association at a campaign stop in Houston, Texas on September 12, 1960, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000. Similar speech also given during a television address from Faneuil Hall in Boston, Massachusetts on November 7, 1960, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000. Also an advertisement covered this issue: 1960 Ad, Kennedy, s.t. Catholicism, Freedom of Religion, Religion—Discrimination and Separation of Church and State, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

31. Ignacio M. García, *Viva Kennedy: Mexican Americans in Search of Camelot* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 58.

32. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 23.

33. Garcia, *Viva Kennedy*, 58.

34. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 23.
35. García, *Viva Kennedy*, 4.
36. Governor William Clinton, advertisement “Hope” *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
37. Dahl, “Clinton Seeks Texas’ Hispanic Vote,” 3A.
38. Clinton, *My Life*, 62. Here Clinton points out that he did not understand the significance of the moment until his adult years, however his mother was fond of pointing to this event as monumental in his career choice. Regardless, the picture of young Bill Clinton meeting President Kennedy became a famous part of the Clinton mystique. As discussed in his autobiography and in David Maraniss, *The Clinton Enigma: A four and a half minute speech reveals this President’s entire life* (New York: Simon and Schuster Publishing, 1998).
39. Governor William Clinton, advertisement “Hope” *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
40. Clinton, *My Life*, 50. Bill Clinton’s relationship with his mother is definitely interesting. Because his biological father died before he was born, Clinton always felt like he was living for two people (7). Because she was widowed so young, Clinton felt that his mother loved him for both parents (7). His mother’s repeated marriages to abusive and alcoholic men led young Clinton to feel a constant need to protect her (50). Despite her unconventional style, love of race tracks and the “fast life,” Clinton felt that she always knew what was best for him. In addition, he “worshipped” her, along with his younger brother, for her love of life, her beauty and her religious devotion (567-569). All of this cumulated in a devoted son, who felt his mother could do no wrong, and was always right. If she thought he was “called” into politics by his meeting with Kennedy, then, according to Clinton, he was.
41. Clinton, *My Life*, 44.
42. Clinton, *My Life*, 62.
43. Lewis, “Telling America’s Story”, 282.
44. Lewis, “Telling America’s Story”, 282.

45. Richard Cohen, "...And the Matter of Race," *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1992, A27.

46. William Julius Wilson, "The Right Message," *The New York Times*, March 17, 1992, A25.

47. Cindy Rugeley, "Clinton stumping in S. Texas to woo Hispanic votes," *The Houston Chronicle*, November 26, 1991, A17.

48. David Dahl, "Clinton seeks Texas' Hispanic Vote," *St. Petersburg Times (Florida)*, March 10, 1992, 3A.

49. Dahl, "Clinton seeks," 3A.

50. Rugeley, "Clinton stumping," A17.

51. Walter V. Robinson, "Diversity puts Florida in spotlight," *The Boston Globe*, March 7, 1992, 1.

52. Cohen, "... And the Matter of Race," A27..

53. Clinton, *My Life*, 52.

54. Governor William Clinton, advertisement "Hope" *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

55. Clinton actually spent a short amount of time in Hope. He was born there, lived with his mother there until he was about one year old. Then his mother moved to New Orleans to work on her nurse anesthetist training, and 'Billy' stayed with his grandparents until he was two, when Virigina Blythe married Roger Clinton, and Billy Blythe became Bill Clinton. The family moved to Hot Springs when Clinton was in the first grade. Despite spending only his earliest years in Hope, the irony of the name is still narratively powerful.

56. Governor William Clinton, advertisement "Hope" *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

57. Transcript from Governor William Clinton, advertisement “Hope” *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

The full ad can also be viewed at <http://www.livingroomcandidate.movingimages.us>. This site has the name of ad as “Journey.”

58. Governor William Clinton, advertisement “Hope” *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

59. Richard Cohen, “. . . And the Matter of Race,” *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1992, A27.

60. Cindy Rugeley, “Clinton stumping in South Texas to woo Hispanic voters,” *Houston Chronicle*, November 26, 1991, A17.

61. David Dahl, “Clinton seeks Texas’ Hispanic vote,” *St. Petersburg Times*, March 10, 1992, 3A.

62. Barrio means neighborhood, in Spanish.

63. Rugeley, “Clinton stumping in S. Texas to woo Hispanic votes, A17.

64. Michael Victor Sedano, “Chicanismo: A Rhetorical Analysis of Themes and Images of Selected Poetry From the Chicano Movement,” *The Western Journal of Speech Communication* 44 (Summer 1980): 183.

65. Sedano, “Chicanismo,” 182.

66. Sedano, “Chicanismo”, 181-182.

67. Dahl, “Clinton seeks Texas’ Hispanic vote,” 3A.

68. Governor William Clinton, a campaign speech in Washington D.C., on October 3, 1992, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

69. Sedano, “Chicanismo,” 180, discusses revolution as one of the four themes that permeate most Chicano poetry. The importance of revolution was also emphasized in the work of César Chávez.

70. Governor William Clinton, advertisement “Hope” *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
71. Rugeley, “Clinton stumping South Texas,” A17.
72. Fox, *Hispanic Nation*, 183.
73. Governor William Clinton, during the second presidential debate in Richmond, Virginia on October 15, 1992, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
74. Walter V. Robinson, “Diversity puts Florida in spotlight,” *The Boston Globe*, March 7, 1992, 1.
75. Governor William J. Clinton, during the second presidential debate in Richmond, Virginia on October 15, 1992, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
76. President George H.W. Bush, during the second presidential debate in Richmond, Virginia on October 15, 1992, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
77. Governor William J. Clinton, during the first presidential debate in St. Louis, Missouri on October 11, 1992, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
78. Governor Bill Clinton, speaking at a campaign stop at the Maxine Waters Employment Preparation Center in Los Angeles, California on September 16, 1992, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
79. In Charland’s article, the Québécois had the “White Papers” a group of papers detailing their history and their claim to sovereignty. Nothing like that exists in the Latino community, but the power of the shared verbal narrative is as important as a written history, which Charland admits. Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 143. There are some examples of ethnic heritage documents, like the papers that have been discussed in this chapter. However, they are not as powerful as the “White Papers” are

for the Québécois. While the various plans have been influential, they are different and sometimes contradicting. And different groups have chosen to follow different Plans, whereas the Québécois follow one document. The influence of the plans is in Hammerback and Jensen, "Ethnic Heritage as Rhetorical Legacy," 36-53.

80. "Conduct of Life" advertisement.

81. Clinton, speech to campaign stop in Tampa Florida, October 27, 1992.

82. Voter Research and Surveys. "Voter Research and Surveys General Election Exit Polls, 1992" [computer file]. New York: Voter Research and Surveys [producer], 1992. 2nd release. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1993.

83. Lori Rodriguez, "Hispanics cast lot with Clinton; Jobs, education main issues," *The Houston Chronicle*, March 12, 1992, A15.

84. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 120.

Chapter III: 1996 Election

1. Angela Cortez, "Cisneros stumps for Clinton, Latino choice clear, HUD Secretary says," *The Denver Post*, July 17, 1996.

2. Full text of legislation available from the University of California-Hastings College of Law Ballot Proposition Database s.v "187" and years 1994-1994, accessible at: <http://traynor.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/26981/calprop.txt>

3. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 273.

4. De la Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 267.

5. Ralph Z. Hallow, "Newt urges action against illegals," *The Washington Times*, February 21, 2005. Newt Gingrich calls for a new form of immigration called "Patriotic Immigration" which includes all legal immigrants taking a civics exam in English. Details at www.newt.org, and in his book *Winning the Future* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2005).

6. De La Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 267.

7. There had been a 74% increase between 1984 and 1994. De La Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 270.

8. As quoted in De La Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 270.
9. Marc Sandalow, "Wilson Makes It Official -- He's Running Governor to seek Republican nomination for president," *The San Francisco Chronicle*, August 29, 1995, A1.
10. De La Isla, *The Rise of Hispanic Political Power*, 271.
11. President Bill Clinton, speaking to a joint session of Congress on the occasion of the State of the Union Address in Washington, D.C., on January 23, 1996, full text available online from *The Washington Post* at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou96.htm>.
12. Carlos Muñoz, Jr., "Clinton leads charge against Latino Americans," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, February 6, 1996, 10.
13. I have concern with the sexist language involved in calling it the Myth of Brotherhood. This concern has also been expressed by others, however, this is the common name of this part of the American Dream myth. See Cullen, *The American Dream*, 188.
14. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 186-188.
15. Emphasis in original. Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion," 162.
16. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 188.
17. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 108.
18. Adams, *The Epic of America*, 415.
19. Jennifer Hoschschild has the best explanation of the hypocrisy of the American Dream, especially in relation to racial equality.
Hoschschild, *Facing Up to the American Dream*, 25, 250.
20. Rather, *The American Dream*, 166.
21. Clinton's book

22. Pew Hispanic Center & Kaiser Family Foundation, *2002 National Survey of Latinos*, final report released December 17, 2002. View online at www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/LatinoSurveyReportFinal.pdf.
23. President Bill Clinton, speaking to a joint session of Congress on the occasion of the State of the Union Address in Washington, D.C., on January 23, 1996, full text available online from *The Washington Post* at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou96.htm>.
24. President Clinton, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1996.
25. Carlos Muñoz, Jr., "Clinton leads charge against Latino Americans," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, February 6, 1996, 10.
26. Hector Gutierrez, "Hispanics urged to get aggressive, La Raza head calls U.S. hostile, blasts Dole and Clinton for staying away from convention," *Rocky Mountain News*, July 16, 1996, 6A.
27. Gonzalez, *Harvest of an Empire*, 185-187.
28. "Classroom," (Advertisement) *The Living Room Candidate: Presidential Campaign Commercials 1952-2004*, Website, accessible at <http://livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us/index.php>, s.v. 1996 "Classroom". Accessed July 28, 2005.
29. "Signed," (Advertisement) *The Living Room Candidate: Presidential Campaign Commercials 1952-2004*, Website, accessible at <http://livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us/index.php>, s.v. 1996 "Signed". Accessed May 19, 2009.
30. Quoted in Gutierrez, "Hispanics urged to get aggressive," 6A.
31. An important fine line that has been used by other candidates since Clinton, like George W. Bush. The Dole advertisement, "Classroom," (Advertisement) *The Living Room Candidate: Presidential Campaign Commercials 1952-2004*, Website, accessible at <http://livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us/index.php>, s.v. 1996 "Classroom". Accessed July 28, 2005. The Clinton ad, "Signed," can also be accessed at *The Living Room Candidate: Presidential Campaign Commercials 1952-2004*, Website, accessible at <http://livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us/index.php>, s.v. 1996 "Signed." Accessed July 28, 2005.

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33. Sara Curran and Estela Rivero-Fuentes, "Current Mexican Immigrants provide key link for Future Migrants." Study produced for the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, May 2003.

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36. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 148.

37. Rudolph Arnheim, *Radio*, trans. Margaret Ludwig and Herbert Read (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1937), 415.

38. Harold O. Dyrenforth, "Narration—The Cinderella of Radio and Film," *Western Speech* 15 (1951): 46-47.

39. "Clinton lauds Hispanic workers as a model for working together," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, October 18, 1995, 9.

40. "Clinton lauds Hispanic workers," 9.

41. "Education" commercial, first aired September 23, 1996. Translation by source, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

42. Dyrenforth, "Narration," 46-47.

43. Kim Masters, "At Hispanic Gala, Clinton Hurdles Language Barrier," *The Washington Post*, September 28, 1995, C01.

44. Masters, "At Hispanic Gala, Clinton Hurdles Language Barrier," C01.
45. Dyrenforth, "Narration," 47.
46. Dyrenforth, "Narration," 47.
47. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 123.
48. Pew Hispanic Center & Kaiser Family Foundation, *2002 National Survey of Latinos*, final report released December 17, 2002. View online at www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/LatinoSurveyReportFinal.pdf.
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51. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 123.
52. President Bill Clinton, speaking at Chaffey Community College at a campaign stop in Rancho Cucamonga, California on September 12, 1996, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
53. *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
54. The other facilities were: Sun Dial Educational Center in Sun City, Arizona; Chaffey Community College in Rancho Cucamonga, California; Rio Grande High School in Albuquerque, New Mexico; Dade Community College in Miami, Florida; New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico; and Hillsborough High School in Tampa, Florida.
55. "Plan of Delano"
56. "Plan of Delano"
57. "Plan of Delano"

58. President Bill Clinton, speaking at the Grady Gammage Auditorium during a campaign stop in Phoenix, Arizona on October 31, 1996, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

59. The stops where this strategy were used were: Phoenix, Arizona on October 31, 1996; Panama City, Florida on September 6, 1996; Miami, Florida on October 22, 1996; Fort Worth, Texas on September 27, 1996; and Panama City, Florida on September 7, 1996. All available on *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

60. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 148.

61. Emphasis in original, Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, "Forever Seen as New: Latino Participation in American Elections," in *Latinos: Remaking America*, eds. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2002), 406.

62. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "The Expanding Hispanic Vote Shakes Republican Stronghold," *New York Times* (Late Edition), November 10, 1996, 1.

63. National Association of Latino Elected Officials, *1996 Latino Election Handbook*, 4.

Chapter IV: 2000 Election

1. Carla Marinucci, "Republicans go all-out to sway the Latino Vote; GOP, Bush planning separate advertising campaigns," *The San Francisco Chronicle*, January 14, 2000, A3.

2. As quoted in John Marelius, "Bush tries to mend rift with Latinos in California," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, April 8, 2000, A1.

3. "Poll shows Hispanics support Dems 2-to-1," *The Bulletin's Frontrunner*, September 22, 1999.

4. The Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation, "2004 National Survey of Latinos Politics and Civic Participation," July 2004, available at www.pewhispanic.org.

5. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, "The Presidential Transition: Latinos waiting for Bush to make good on pledge of diverse administration," *Los Angeles Times*, December 16, 2000, A22.

6. Frank del Olmo, "On Latino Voters, Bush Gets It," *Los Angeles Times*, August 6, 2000, M5.

7. Gregory Rodriguez, "La Diferencia; Presidential candidates Bush and Gore both think they've found a way to Hispanic voters' hearts. Guess which one seems to be going over better?" *The Washington Post*, December 12, 1999, B1.

8. In this chapter when I refer to the 43rd President, George W. Bush, I will refer to him as "Bush." When referring to the elder Bush, I will use a qualifier, such as George H.W. Bush.

9. Peter Schweizer and Rochelle Schweizer, *The Bushes: Portrait of a Dynasty* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 139. Bush biographies have little information about his upbringing in relation to minorities. According to the Bush family, they were surrounded by minorities in Texas, and therefore notice no difference. However, there are also many good reports of the anger and frustration that George and Barbara felt when their son Jeb decided to marry a Mexican national. Yet, there are also reports about Barbara having no patience for racist remarks in her home. Therefore, the evidence of the Bushes being completely comfortable with Latinos is mixed, but it does seem probable that they are more comfortable with Hispanics than other minority groups.

10. Bush's command of the Spanish language is up for debate. According to Jorge Ramos (a native Spanish speaking reporter) in *The Latino Wave*, Bush's Spanish is rough, but at least intelligible. Whereas, outgoing White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan said that Bush was unable to speak Spanish at all. Regardless, the Bush Campaign tried to make him seem confident with his Spanish, including running more than ten ads with Bush speaking Spanish.

Jorge Ramos, *The Latino Wave: How Hispanics will elect the next American President* (New York: Rayo Publishing, 2004), 5-13.

CNN.com, "Bush's Spanish 'no muy bueno,' White House Says," Available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/05/04/bush.spanish.ap/index.html>. (Last accessed May 17, 2006)

11. Ann Gerhart, *The Perfect Wife: The Life and Choices of Laura Bush* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 28-30. Gerhart does an amazing analysis of Laura Bush's

upbringing in relation to minorities. She is much more thorough than any George Bush biographer; Gerhart argues that Laura grew up in segregated Midland and never really knew any minorities in her adolescence. However, she was always aware of the economic separation between herself and Hispanics in Midland; therefore, she felt enough empathy to always choose to teach at minority schools during her short teaching career.

Jim Yardley, "The 2000 campaign: The Texas Governor; Hispanics give Attentive Bush Mixed Reviews," *The New York Times*, August 27, 2000, 1.

12. Richard Wolfe, Holly Bailey and Evan Thomas, "Bush's Spanish Lessons," *Newsweek*, May 29, 2005, 26-27.

13. Ann Scales, "Bush tells Hispanics INS needs overhaul; GOP hopeful would divide agency," *The Boston Globe*, June 27, 2000, A4.

Although Bush did work specifically to bring in more Hispanic voters during his first race for governor of Texas in 1994, he was unsuccessful. He only received 28 percent of the Hispanic vote. His team worked even harder in the 1998 election, hiring advertising mogul Lionel Sosa. To this day, critics raise questions about Bush's statistics, but he argues that he received 49 percent of the Hispanic vote despite other polls that indicate that number was closer to 33 percent. Either way, it was an increase over the previous election. Despite critics who dispute Bush's numbers, many strategists and journalists put that number closer to 49 percent, making it a relative landslide.

Jim Yardley, "The 2000 Campaign: The Texas Governor, Hispanics Give Attentive Bush Mixed Reviews," *New York Times*, August 27, 2000, 1.

14. Jennifer Walsh, "Bush Tells Hispanic Journalists he back Bilingual Education," *The Boston Globe*, June 22, 2000, A8.

15. Yardley, "The 2000 Campaign: The Texas Governor," 1.

16. Lionel Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," in *Electing the President 2000: The Insider's View*, eds. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldeman, (Philadelphia, Penn.: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press), 156.

Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, "The Presidential Transition: Latinos Waiting for Bush to Make Good on Pledge of a Diverse Administration," *Los Angeles Times*, December 16, 2000, A22.

17. Peggy Fikac, "Bush appointing many females, minorities; Record 'very good for a Republican,'" *San Antonio Express*, July 9, 2000, 14A.

18. Betty Liu, "Rivals Feel Power of Hispanic Voters: Why Bush and Gore are Wooing the Latino Vote with Great Fervour," *London Financial Times*, October 2, 2000, 12.

19. Van Natta, "The 2000 Campaign," A12.

Julian Borger, "America Decides: Bush boldly salsas to Latino tune, Republicans are spending millions to win the powerful Hispanic vote," *New York Observer*, January 23, 2000, 24.

20. Don Van Natta, Jr., "The 2000 Campaign: The Ad Campaign; Republicans Open a Big Drive to Appeal to Hispanic Voters," *The New York Times*, January 15, 2000, A12. This is compared to the \$909,000 Democrats spent in the 1996 election, according to Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 2.

21. The choice to use George P. Bush was a media phenomenon, with many reporters and columnists quickly catching on to the idea and writing about P.'s influence on the media. Even Lionel Sosa, the architect of Bush's 2000 election advertising argued that it was the most important decision of the year.

22. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 156.

23. Hereafter I will refer to George Prescott as P., his preferred name and how the media refers to him.

24. Carla Marinucci, "Reaching Out to the State's Latinos: Bush Distances Himself from Pete Wilson," *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 8, 2000, A3.

25. "Bush on Education (in Spanish)" commercial, first aired October 22, 2000. Translation by author, ad is accessible on-line at:
www.cspan.org/campaign2000/advertising.asp

26. Tom Mashberg, "Vote Reflects Culture Clash," *The Boston Herald*, November 26, 2000, 3.

27. Don Van Natta, Jr., "The 2000 Campaign: The Ad Campaign; Republicans open a big drove to appeal to Hispanic Voters," *The New York Times*, January 15, 2000, A12.

Julian Borger, "America Decides: Bush boldly salsas to Latino tune; Republicans are spending millions to win the powerful Hispanic Vote," *The Observer*, January 23, 2000, 24.

Cathleen Decker, "Bush courts Latinos, other Californians," *Los Angeles Times*, April 8, 2000, A10.

28. Ann McFeatters, "80% Say Education is the Key Issue in the Presidential Election," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, September 12, 1999, A16.

29. Ellen Sorokin, "Hispanic Republicans honor Bush; Governor Appears at Dinner Gala," *Washington Times*, September 25, 1999, A4.

30. Gary Martin, "Latino's rising numbers gain politician's notice," *San Antonio Express-News*, December 4, 1999, A15. Emphasis mine.

31. August Gribbin, "Hispanics growing in numbers, clout," *Washington Times*, October 3, 1999, C1.

32. Donald Lambro, "Hispanic voters say 'sí' to Bush," *Washington Times*, December 20, 1999, A1.

33. Lambro, "Hispanic voters say 'sí' to Bush," A1.

34. Scott Lindlaw, "Trailing now, Bush will target Hispanics to beef up numbers," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 4, 2000, A8.

Rodriguez, "La Diferencia," B1.

35. Rodriguez, "La Diferencia," B1.

36. Cathleen Decker, "Bush courts Latinos, other Californians on two-day visit," *Los Angeles Times*, April 8, 2000, A10.

37. Lambro, "Hispanic voters say 'sí' to Bush," A1.

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39. Hotakainen, "Bush, Gore court key Hispanic vote," 1A.

40. Hotakainen, "Bush, Gore court key Hispanic vote," 1A.

41. Carla Marinucci, "Bush boosted by swing through state – 'I'll be back,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 6, 2000, A3.

42. John Marelius, "Bush tries to mend rift with Latinos in California," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, April 8, 2000, A1.
 43. Decker, "Bush courts Latinos," A10.
 44. Marinucci, "Reaching out to state's Latinos," A3.
 45. John Marelius, "Bush woos Latino voters in Cinco de Mayo speech," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, May 6, 2000, A1.
 46. "A California Message; George W. Bush aims to woo Latino voters," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, May 6, 2000, B8.
 47. Ben White, "Bush gains among women, Declines among Hispanics," *Washington Post*, May 14, 2000, A14.
 48. Dana Milbank, "The Year of the Latino Voter? Only in Campaign Rhetoric," *Washington Post*, May 21, 2000, B1.
 49. John Marelius, "Bush Woos Latino Voters in Cinco de Mayo Speech," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, May 6, 2000.
 50. Dana Wilkie, "Bush Now Finds Time for Latinos He Once Avoided," *San Diego Union- Tribune*, June 26, 2000, A3.
 51. Jena Heath, "Campaign 2000: Bush's plan to win every Latino vote goes into high gear," *The Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, December 19, 1999, 11A.
 52. Colonias are the border-towns along the U.S./Mexico border. Bush focused mostly on California, he visited that state three times during the primary election season. His visits and focus on Latinos is recorded in Rob Hotakainen, "Bush, Gore court key Hispanic vote: "This is the soccer-mom group of the 2000 election," "said one Democratic pollster," *Star Tribune (Minneapolis, Minn.)*, March 14, 2000, 1A.
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- The Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation, "2004 National Survey of Latinos Politics and Civic Participation," July 2004 available at www.pewhispanic.org, shows that

of all Latinos surveyed, 54% said that education was the most important issue to them, making it the most important issue in the survey.

54. Don Van Natta, Jr., "The 2000 Campaign: The Ad Campaign; Republicans open a big drive to appeal to Hispanic Voters," *The New York Times*, January 15, 2000, A12. Julian Borger, "America Decides: Bush boldly salsas to Latino tune; Republicans are spending millions to win the powerful Hispanic Vote," *The Observer*, January 23, 2000, 24.

Cathleen Decker, "Bush courts Latinos, other Californians," *Los Angeles Times*, April 8, 2000, A10.

55. Ben White, "Bush gains among Women, Declines among Hispanics," *The Washington Post*, May 14, 2000, A14.

56. Jim Yardley, "Hispanics Give Attentive Bush Mixed Reviews," *New York Times*, August 27, 2000, 1.

57. Jim Yardley, "Hispanics Give Attentive Bush Mixed Reviews," *New York Times*, August 27, 2000, 1.

58. "Education in Texas (Spanish)" commercial, first aired October 21, 2000. Ad is accessible on-line at: www.cspan.org/campaign2000/advertising.asp. Translated by the author.

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60. Lori Rodriguez, "'Together We Can': Bush Says as He Woos Latinos," *Houston Chronicle*, August 3, 2000, A19.

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63. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 158.

64. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 158-159.

65. "Education (Spanish)" commercial, first aired October 21, 2000. Ad is accessible online at: www.cspan.org/campaign2000/advertising.asp

66. Ricardo Reyes, Jr. "How to Woo Hispanic Voters," *USA Today*, 25A.

67. In an effort to understand and translate this ad, I showed copies of it to my mother and father (both native speakers) and they both commented on the surprisingly strong accent. My father, who is Mexican, said that it was consistent with the accents at the border. I also showed this ad to two other Spanish-speakers and their comments concurred with the comments I heard from my first two advisers.

68. Jim Yardley, "The 2000 campaign: The Texas Governor; Hispanics give Attentive Bush Mixed Reviews," *The New York Times*, August 27, 2000, 1.

69. "Plan of Delano"

70. Neal, "Recipe for Larger Slice of Latino Pie," A6.

71. Bush gave speeches at every campaign stop that were about education. Gregory Rodriguez, "La Diferencia; Presidential candidates Bush and Gore both think they've found a way to Hispanic Voters' hearts," *The Washington Post*, December 12, 1999, B1.

72. Terry M. Neal, "A Larger Slice of Latino Pie: Two Bushes campaign in California," *Washington Post*, June 22, 2000, A6.

73. Rodriguez, "La Diferencia," B1.

74. "Education in Texas (Spanish)" commercial.

75. Stanley Greenberg, "Stanley Greenberg," in *Electing the President 2000: The Insider's View*, eds. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldeman, (Philadelphia, Penn.: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press), 95.

76. Bill Knapp, "Bill Knapp," in *Electing the President 2000: The Insider's View*, eds. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldeman, (Philadelphia, Penn.: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press), 167.

77. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 159-160.

78. Massie Ritsch, "The Bush with Muy Guapo Appeal: George P., Nephew of George W., is Using His Looks, Latino Roots to Broaden GOP's Reach," *Los Angeles Times*, July 27, 2000, E1.

79. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 160.

80. Neal, "A Recipe for Larger Slice of Latino Pie," A6.

81. David Wastell, "Bush's Secret Weapon: Another Bush," *Ottawa Citizen*, June 11, 2000, A8.

82. Wastell, "Bush's Secret Weapon," A8.

83. Ritsch, "The Bush with Muy Guapo Appeal," E1.

84. "Plan of Delano"

85. Quoted in David Wastell, "Bush's secret weapon: Another Bush: George P. Bush is in charge of galvanizing youth and Latino voters to support uncle," *The Ottawa Citizen*, June 11, 2000, A8.

"Same as Mine" commercial, first aired June 2000. Ad is accessible online at: Stanford University's Political Communication Lab, website accessible at <http://www.pcl.stanford.edu/campaigns/campaign2000/bush/index.html>

86. Ethos is defined as character, the moral character of the speaker or someone else. Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A theory of Civic Discourse*, 2nd edition, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 316.

87. "George P. Bush to Latino Voters- Es Un Nuevo Día" commercial, first aired June 17, 2000. Ad is accessible on-line at: *The Living Room Candidate: Presidential Campaign Commercials 1952-2004*, Website, accessible at <http://livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us/index.php>, s.v. 2000 "Es un Nuevo Día".

88. Wilkie, "Bush Now Finds Time for Latinos He Once Avoided," A3.

89. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Eloquence in an Electronic Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 84-89.

90. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 158. Sosa argues that the ads were shot in this way because Latinos prefer a candidate who speaks directly to them, in a conversational style.

Although Sosa does not call it “effeminate,” it seems to fit the mold that Jamieson creates.

91. Sosa, “Lionel Sosa,” 158.

92. “Plan of Delano”

93. John W. Fountain, “Candidates Woo Latinos with Ads, Not Policy,” *New York Times*, November 6, 2000, A26.

94. Ad

95. Interestingly, the “it’s a new day” message was never used with Anglo audiences, that message was only used in Spanish-language ads.

96. “Plan of Delano”

97. “Plan of Delano”

98. Marinucci, “Reaching out to state’s Latinos,” A3.

99. Marelius, “Bush woos Latino voters in Cinco de Mayo Speech,” A1.

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102. Marco Diaz, “Hispanics are vital voting bloc,” *Deseret Morning News* (Salt Lake City, Utah), November 10, 2004, A1.

Richard Wolfe, Holly Bailey and Evan Thomas, “Bush’s Spanish Lessons,” *Newsweek*, May 29, 2006, 27.

103. Allison Mitchell, “Bush draws campaign theme from more than ‘the Heart,’” *The New York Times*, June 11, 2000, 1A.

104. Ramos, *The Latino Wave*,

105. Adam J. Segal, “The Hispanic Priority: The Spanish-Language Television Battle for the Hispanic Vote in the 2000 Election.” Hispanic Voter Project at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., January 2003. Available at: <http://www.jhu.edu/advanced/government/hvp/>

106. Scott Shepard, "Campaign 2000: Backed by Latinos, Gore rips GOP plans," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, September 15, 1999, 8A.

107. Betsy Rothstein, "Bush makes inroads among traditional Hispanic Dems," *The Hill*, October 20, 1999, 1.

108. Translated: The American Dream, its for everyone. The phrase appears in every campaign speech given in Hispanic venues from September 1999 until June 2000. For a sampling of the speeches see:

Mary Otto, "New survey says Hispanic voters have same concerns as other Americans," *Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service*, September 16, 1999, 1A.

Edward Hegstrom, "Should Bush, Gore keep up the Spanish? Many say sí," *Houston Chronicle*, September 23, 1999, A1.

Miguel Bustillo, "Presidential aspirants court Hispanics in Iowa," *Austin American-statesman*, November 20, 1999, A28.

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Marelius, "Bush woos Latino voters in Cinco de Mayo speech," A1.

109. Bustillo, "Presidential aspirants court Hispanics in Iowa," A28.

110. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 159.

111. Alonso-Zaldivar, "Latinos Waiting for Bush to Make Good on Pledge of a Diverse Administration," A22.

112. Dana Milbank, "Latino Voters get A Lot of Lip Service," *The Plain Dealer*, May 30, 2000, 7B.

113. Milbank, "The Year of the Latino Voter?," B1.

114. Fountain, "Candidates Woo Latinos with Ads, Not Policy," A26.

115. Hector Tobar, "A Hill to Climb: The Frosty Reception that the GOP's Minorities Get Back Home Shows Battle Bush Faces for Black and Latino Votes," *Los Angeles Times*, August 2, 2000, A16.

Chapter V: Conclusions

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2. Hochschild, *Facing up to the American Dream*, 16.
3. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 188.
4. Dorsey
5. Cullen, *The American Dream*, 188.
6. Clinton, *My Life*, 63.
7. Hochschild, *Facing up to the American Dream*, 16-18.
8. Governor William Clinton, advertisement "Hope" *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
9. Governor William Clinton, advertisement "Hope," *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
10. García, *Viva Kennedy*, 4.
11. Governor William Clinton, advertisement "Hope" *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
12. Sedano, "Chicanismo", 181-182.
- Dahl, "Clinton seeks Texas' Hispanic vote," 3A.
13. Rugeley, "Clinton stumping South Texas," A17.

14. Governor William J. Clinton, during the second presidential debate in Richmond, Virginia on October 15, 1992, *The Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. CD-ROM. The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.
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16. "Plan of Delano"
17. Full text of legislation available from the University of California-Hastings College of Law Ballot Proposition Database s.v "187" and years 1994-1994, accessible at: <http://traynor.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/26981/calprop.txt>
18. Sandalow, "Wilson Makes It Official," A1.
19. Munoz, Jr., "Clinton leads charge against Latino Americans," 10.
- 20 "Clinton lauds Hispanic workers as a model for working together," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, October 18, 1995, 9.
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- 23 Ramos, *The Latino Wave*, 123.
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30. Sosa, "Lionel Sosa," 159-160.
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